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SUMMARV 
Over the last quarter of a century, the nature and balance ol'the policies pursued by 
local government, and the ways in which local government pursues them, have 
changed considerably. In the fiace of' technological advance, deindustrialisation, 
global restructuring and intensified competition, local authorities have had to 
become proactively engaged in promoting their assets and competing Ior much 
sought aller investment. As such, it is widely acknowledged that there has been a 
reorientation in local government away from an emphasis on social service 
provision and social welfare, towards an cniphasis on econornic growth, econornic 
development and policies designed to enhance econormc competitiveness. 
This reorientation has been accompanied by changes in how these policies are 
delivered and by whom, and is classically referred to as the shift froin 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism. For example, place promotional strategies 
have been delivered by an ever wider array OfpUhlic, quasi-public and private sector 
agencies. Characterised by tile prioritisation of local economic development, most 
notably via the adoption of' place promotional strategies, and an institutional shift 
from public sector government to public-private governance, the shift to 
entrepreneurial i sin has Fundamentally changed the way places arc governed. 
It is widely perceived therelbre that place promotion is integral to the process ot 
conternporary governance, and yet despite this, few commentators have SOLIght to 
specify the form of local governance arrangements that have developed in suppoit of 
place promotion, or examine the relationship between place promotion and 
governance. These themes are developed in this thesis through a postal questionnaire 
survey of British local authorities and two case studies in Newcastle upon Tyne and 
Leeds. In general, the prominent role of local authorities within these new 
governance arrangements is highlighted, together with the complex and distinctive 
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Over the last quarter ot'a century, the nature and balance ofthe policies pursued by 
local government have changed considerably. One ofthe ways in which they have 
changed is the 'massive worldwide growth in the practice of' place marketing and 
promotion' (Ward, 1998,1). In Western democracies especially, place promotion 
has undoubtedly become an increasingly significant component of' the local 
economic development strategies employed by local government, to the extent that, 
"Every town, city, region and nation, it seems, is now frenetically selling 
itself with assertions of its competitive advantage" (Ward, 1998,1). 
F, conomic uncertainty has characterised the global economy since the early to mid- 
1970s, a time widely recognised as prefacing a transitory period in the organisation 
of capitalist development and the beginnings of' the collapse of' postwar Fordism. 
Deindustrialisation decimated the manufactUring bases of' many traditional global 
centres as technological advance, the introduction of' foreign competition, and the 
globalisation ofcapital investment led to Fundamental changes in what is produced, 
how, and where. The emergence ofnew spatial divisions oflabour and new reginies 
of capital accUMUlation thus compelled cities, regions and nations alike to promote 
their assets and compete for much sought after investment in the dynamic global 
marketplace. In the fight to remain economically buoyant, local economies have 
been drawn into more intensified competition with one another, as they try to draw 
in, or develop new types of economic activity. 
Over this same time period, the ways in'which policies are pursued by local 
govcmment has also changed significantly; political restructuring has taken place 
alongside its economic counterpart. In consequence, place promotional strategies 
have been delivered by an ever wider array of public, quasi-public and private sector 
agencies. The need to compete effectively has given rise to 'partnership' models of 
local management where knowledge, expertise and, in the context of the fiscal 
austerity of local government, resources, are drawn from a wide range of local public 
and private sector individuals and organisations. These alliances have incorporated 
new institutional networks and structures, which have in turn created a new local 
4govemance'. 
The last twenty years especially, have thus witnessed the birth of a new cohort of 
local economic policy makers as influential local actors have joined forces %ýith local 
government to restructure local economies and respond to economic trends in more 
entrepreneurial and proactive ways. Public-private partnerships have therefore 
become a common vehicle for local economic development, and this is demonstrated 
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by the proliferation of national, regional and local development agencies that 
emanated during the 1980s and 1990s'. 
All these agencies are similarly charged with the task of regenerating, diversifying or 
replacing the staple base of their local economies. Place promotional strategies form 
an integral part of this task. United by this aim, local economic and political leaders 
have sought to lure inward investment and capitalist development to their locality by 
using extensive promotional campaigns; designed to combat negative perceptions of 
place on the one hand, and promote a favourable business climate on the other. 
Early promotional activity was modest to say the least. It was unsophisticated and 
piecemeal in nature, often involving merely the use of simple advertising slogans 
(Fretter, 1993; Burgess, 1982). Over recent years however, place marketing 
techniques have become more sophisticated and place promotional practices more 
profcssionaliscd (Griffiths, 1998). By the 1980s, the 'selling of places 
.. [had].. become big business' (Fretter, 1993,165). Place marketeers adopted a 
market-led approach and became more strategic and corporate in their thinking. In 
place of the traditional scatter-gun approach, marketing was targeted more directly at 
particular sectors, companies, and investors' needs; ý 
1 Examples include urban development corporations, training and enterprise councils, various local 
authority, County-wide and regional economic partnerships, Regional Development Organisations, 
and their newly established replacement, the Regional Development Agencies. 
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"Place marketing has thus become much more than merely selling the area to 
attract mobile companies ... It can now 
be viewed as a fundamental part of 
planning, a fundamental part of guiding the development of places in a 
desired fashion" (Fretter, 1993,165). 
The practice of place promotion has thus become widespread, and with its massive 
growth, there has emerged a 'specifically promotional policy repertoire' (Ward, 
1998,1). This includes; 
"place logos, slogans, advertising, public relations... 'flagship' development 
projects, flamboyant architectural and urban design statements, trade fairs, 
cultural and sporting spectacles, heritage, public art and much else besides" 
(Ward, 1998,1). 
Place marketing techniques have therefore developed and the practice has become 
more sophisticated, but it is important to stress that place promotion is not a recent 
phenomenon. Although over the last two decades, it has been pursued to an extent, 
and with a vigour that is unprecedented (Griffiths, 1998), examples of extolling the 
virtues of place in order to boost economic fortunes have been recorded as early as 
the nineteenth century during US and West European colonial expansion (Griffiths, 
1998; Ward, 1998,1994,1990). British seaside resorts then adopted the practice 
early in the twentieth century, in conjunction with local railway companies, in an 
attempt to lure tourists to their bracing shores (Ward and Gold, 1994). Railway 
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companies took this one step further during the interwar years of suburban growth 
and rising home ownership by promoting new residential schemes in association . 
with private developers and building societies (Ward, 1994; Gold and Gold, 1994). 
Despite this shift in practice, place promotion in Britain remained mainlY tourism- 
orientated until the 1930s when municipal authorities were granted powers to 
advertise non-resort towns and cities for the first time (Ward, 1994,1990). 
Subsequent regional policy directives laid down by central governrnent paved the 
way for the type of town and city promotion prominent today. Place promotion thus 
became a mainstream policy of local economic development, most notably from the 
1970s, attracting investment through a variety of land and buildings-based 
inducements, financial grants and tax relief schemes (Dicken and Tickell, 1992; 
Mills and Young, 1986; Camina, 1974). Promotional activity that was more locally- 
derived, burgeoned during the 1980s when established regional economic 
development policies were undermined by the Thatcher administration (Ward, 
1994). Furthermore, whilst the Thatcher Government did erode certain local 
government powers with respect to local economic development, local authorities 
were awarded other powers to promote their local economies and were statutorily 
required by the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act to develop local economic 
development strategies. 
Place promotion therefore has a long history, embraces a wide variety of activities 
and is conducted by a range of municipal authorities and private organisations. In the 
face of economic restructuring, the practice has become more widespread and there 
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has been a shift from the essentially boosterist activity typified by British seaside 
resorts, to a more aggressive growth-inducing promotion which seeks to regenerate 
local economies and prevent major structural decline (Ward, 1994). Rather than 
advertising per se therefore, contemporary place promotion seeks to reconstruct the 
image of place, allied to a strategy of attracting particular types of economic activity 
which reflect and bolster that image (Paddison, 1993). 
Several texts (Ward, 1998; Gold and Ward, 1994; Philo and Keams, 1993) examine 
the historical development of place promotion and trace its evolution in response to 
changing economic circumstances, often focusing especially upon how traditional 
manufacturing centres 'sell' themselves to attract investment. Although typically 
only one aspect of the development remit, the attraction of inward investmene is 
arguably one of the most significant objectives, particularly in areas which have lost 
their traditional industrial base and where opportunities for indigenous investment 
are limited (Paddison, 1993). The political benefits that accrue from major 
investment schemes ensure that, as a development activity, the attraction of inward 
investment is placed firmly on local political agendas. As a major tool of local 
economic development policy therefore, place promotion is defined throughout this 
thesis as the deliberate use of marketing in the attraction of inward investment, allied 
with the promotion of new place images and associated public-private partnerships, 
in order to achieve economic regeneration. 
2 The term 'inward investment' is used generically throughout this thesis to cover all aspects of 
possible capital investment whether this be commercial, industrial, or otherwise. 
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1.1 Contemporary 'politicised' place promotion 
Whilst the goal of economic development runs as a common denominator 
throughout almost all place promotion (Paddison, 1993), there are important cross- 
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national variations in its practice and meaning which deserve examination. 
Marketing places in the European context relates much more to holistic notions of 
social welfare,, aiming to meet the consumer needs of both investors and local 
inhabitants (Paddison, 1993; Kotler et al, 1993; Ashworth and Voogd, 1990). This 
contrasts with the United States, where local economic development centres very 
much upon the attraction of inward investment (Cox, 1997), and place marketing is 
strongly associated with physical redevelopment and the promotion of new place 
images. Similarly, place marketing in Britain has been constructed around the 
achievement of economic objectives, in part because place promotional strategies are 
more fully developed in localities which have suffered the most severe effects of 
economic restructuring and are seeking sustained economic revival (Paddison, 
1993). For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s especially, the re-imaging 
process taking place in the more economically deprived areas of Britain was 
accompanied by extensive physical redevelopment. This can be illustrated 
particularly in the activities of the British urban development corporations (Meegan, 
1993; Wilkinson, 1992; Madsen, 1992; Burgess and Wood, 1988). 
It is important to note however, that to view place promotion in economic terms 
alone is to oversimplify its meaning (Paddison, 1993). This contemporary approach 
to place promotion gives rise to important political and social implications which are 
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often overlooked in practice, and which to a certain extent the academic literature 
neglects (Ashworth and Voogd, 1994,1990; Fretter, 1993). The process of 
realigning a locality within international and more local spatial divisions of labour 
involves a number of actors; from business leaders eager to stimulate investment, to 
local communities seeking employment and a better quality of life. Inevitably 
therefore, tensions can develop between these local groups when local place 
identities are seemingly altered to adhere to new place images and new investment 
landscapes. Place promotion is therefore both a cause and function of local politics 
and local struggles. These 'debates' take place within the apparatus of local 
governance and give rise to the formation and maintenance of particular networks of 
relations. It is this aspect of place promotion which is so often overlooked and 
deserves attention. 
The marketing of place, and the particular images projected are a reflection of the 
form of local governance and the particular pattern of interest involvement. Place 
images are partial views of localities in that they reflect the views of those 
determining them; most commonly the views of locally dominant institutional 
stakeholders. Place promotion is therefore not simply a technical tool with which to 
achieve economic development, as is portrayed in much of the literature (Ashworth 
and Voogd, 1994,1990; Gold and Ward, 1994; Smyth, 1994; Fretter, 1993), but is a 
highly political activity with important social, cultural and institutional implications. 
Its institutional context is therefore an important arena within which the economic, 
social and political meanings of places are mediated, contested and negotiated. 
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Crucially however, this institutional dimension is often underplayed in accounts of 
place promotion. The fact that place promotional strategies are in part determined by 
the pattern and form of local governance is far from apparent in much of the 
literature, especially that which portrays place promotion as a techno-rational 
process (Ashworth and Voogd, 1994,1990; Fretter, 1993). This set of literature 
regards place promotion as a technocratic procedure, and as such, provides step-by- 
step guides on 'how to market places' (Frctter, 1993). Frcttcr (1993) for example, 
reduces the complex task of promoting places to a six-staged process: Define Your 
Product; Know Your Customers; Know Your Competitors; Know Your Unique 
Selling Points; Adopt a Place Slogan and Logo; and Have One Voice. Although this 
mantra comprises part of the task, it cannot be said to fully represent the act of 
marketing places. Ashworth and Voogd (1994,1990) also adhere to a technocratic 
approach, and advocate the use of SWOT analysis; the* identification of an areas' 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Whilst these commentators 
concede that marketing a city is somewhat different from marketing a product, they 
all adopt the principles of product placement and promotion. In so doing, Ashworth 
and Voogd describe marketing cities as a; 
d6process whereby urban activities are as closely as possible related to the 
demands of targeted customers so as to maximise the efficient social and 
economic functioning of the area concerned in accordance with whatever 
goals have been established" (1990,11). 
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Commentators like these, who reduce the practice of place promotion ý to a set of 
technocratic procedures (Ashworth and Voogd, 1994,1990; Fretter, 1993) seem 
apparently impervious to the economic, political and institutional circumstances 
which influence the nature and extent, of promotional strategies in different 
localities. In turn, they seriously undervalue the historically and spatially contingent 
contexts within which the development and implementation of place promotional 
strategies takes place. For example, the types of interests involved plays a critical 
role in determining the types of strategies pursued and the degree of consensus 
and/or conflict over those strategies. The strategies then, in turn, feed back into and 
influence the particular pattern of interest involvement. Despite the fact that place 
promotion is 'widely regarded as emblematic of late twentieth-century urban policy 
and urban governance' (Griffiths, 1998,41), this interrelation between the marketing 
of place and emerging forms of governance has tended to be overlooked. There is 
therefore a pressing need to move beyond the current literature in its assessment of 
technocratic procedures and the content of promotional messages, to a more rigorous 
understanding of its institutional context; the emerging forms of entrepreneurial 
govemance. 
1.2 Place promotion and governance 
The global marketplace has been characterised by increasing economic uncertainty 
since the early to mid-1970s, a time widely recognised as prefacing a transitory 
period in the organisation of capitalist development and the beginnings of the 
collapse of postwar Fordism. Against the background of the growing power of 
global capital and the deindustrialisation of former strongholds of manufacturing 
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industry, managerial forms of governance, characterised by bureaucratic 
organisational forms of service delivery, were replaced by entrepreneurial forms. 
Predicated on a competitive quest for new I sources of economic development and a 
flexible organisational. approach, entrepreneurial governance typically involves the 
formation of alliances and partnerships between the public and private sectors 
around economic development objectives (Griffiths, 1998). 
Under pressure to improve competitiveness therefore, local policy makers developed 
more active entrepreneurial strategies and created new institutional structures of 
governance; a process now classically referred to as 'urban entreprencurialism' 
(Harvey, 1989). Whilst there are some major differences in the interpretation of 
these new forms of governance (Jessop et al, 1998; Judge et al, 1995; Mayer, 1995; 
Lovering, 1995), there is broad agreement that entrepreneurialism is essentially 
characterised by 'the proactive promotion of local economic development by local 
govenunent in alliance with other private sector agencies' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998, 
4); 
"The new entrepreneurialism has as its centrepiece the notion of public- 
private partnership in which a traditional local boosterism is integrated with 
the use of local govenimental powers to try and attract extemal sources of 
funding, new direct investments or new employment sources" (Harvey, 1989, 
7). 
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In essence therefore, it is widely regarded that there are two broad strands to the 
definition -and characterisation of entrepreneurialism (Hubbard and, Hall, 1998; 
Jessop, 1998; Painter, 1998; Wood, 1998b; Harvey, 1989). Firstly, a 'political 
prioritisation of pro-growth local economic development' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998, 
4), most notably via the adoption and increasing sophistication of place promotional 
strategies in ý the attraction of inward investment, and secondly, an associated 
institutional shift from local government to governance. Emerging forms of 
governance therefore, are increasingly orientating around narratives of 
entrepreneurialism, and place promotion especially (Hall, 1998). ' and yet with 
particular regard to place promotion, few commentators (Ward, 1999a) have 
specifically examined their constitution and configuration. Using theories, of 
governance, and particular models of configuration, this research therefore sets out 
firstly, to specify the form of local governance arrangements that have developed in 
support of place promotion, and secondly, to contribute to a greater understanding of 
the relationship between shifts in governance and place promotional practice. Place 
promotion is just one of 'the mYriad ways in which new modes of governance are 
implicated in the economic, social and cultural transformation of Western cities' 
(Hubbard and Hall, 1998,3), and yet because; 
"Changing the image of a locality is ... a central component of entrepreneurial 
govemance" (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,7), 
it provides a means by which to investigate more closely the putative shift from 
government to govemance, and from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Such an 
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examination is necessary because whilst there is an acknowledgement of new forms 
of local governance with an emphasis on economic development and place 
promotion, there is much less agreement as to the extent and precise forms of change 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996). For - exwnple, the literature exhibits considerable 
confusion with regard to the nature and significance of place promotion (Lovering, 
1995; Mayer, 1995; Gold and Ward, 1994; Philo and Kearns, 1993; Harvey, 1989). 
Lovering claims that; 
"Place marketing is now virtually the core activity in local economic 
developmenf' (1995,117); 
whilst Mayer although recognising that 'cities increasingly "markef' themselves in 
the global economy' (1995,234), argues strongly that there has been a shift in policy 
away from conventional promotional strategies; 
"Instead of seeking to attract capital from elsewhere, strategies focus on new 
business formation and small business expansion; instead of competing with 
other jurisdictions for the same investment, efforts are made to strengthen 
existing and potential indigenous resources" (ibid., 234). 
This research addresses these competing claims by determining, inter alia, the nature 
of, and extent to which place promotion occurs and by whom. Such difficulties are 
compounded by the literature on entrepreneurial forms of governance which, it is 
argued, 'rests on theoretically and conceptually impoverished grounds' (Hubbard 
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and Hall, 1998,3; Hall and Hubbard, 1996,153-4), and is hindered further by the 
fact that 'the notion of entrepreneurialism is used in a number of different and 
potentially conflicting manners by different individuals and groups' (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998,3). Consequently, commentators are demonstrating increased scepticism 
over the use of the term (Jessop, 1998; Painter, 1998; Jessop et al, 1998; Wood, 
1998b; Hubbard and Hall, 1998). Lovering for example, contends that; 
"Entrepreneurship" implies a putting together of various productive activities 
to bring about a technological innovation, creating something new. Recent 
developments in many British cities would be more accurately described as 
"commodificatiore', attempting to package and sell what is already there" 
(1995,115). 
Furthermore, when defining new forms of governance, many commentators accept 
that local government prior to 1970 was exclusively characterised by managerial 
politics and that since then politics has been dominated by entrepreneurial forms. 
However; 
"What is clearly missing here is any consideration of the extent to 
which ... [local] governments can pursue both objectives in tandem or whether 
both modes can coexist" (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,14). 
Whilst local govenunents are undeniably adopting a more proactive stance and 
spending more on local economic policies than ever before, this expenditure is 
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overwhelmed by that which continues to be spent on social services, education and 
welfare. Hubbard and Hall (1998) have been the most vociferous in suggesting 
therefore that there has not been a 'wholesale abandonment of managerial policies' 
(ibid., 14) and that there are indeed important continuities in the evolution of 
governance as well as change. They highlight how local govenunents, to a lesser or 
greater extent, have always pursued entrepreneurial strategies and played a crucial 
role in local economic development. Consequently, they argue strongly. that the role 
of the local state in this manner should not be considered exclusively as a recent 
phenomenon, 'rather, it might be suggested that entrepreneurial forms of governance 
are merely the latest in a long line of political strategies which have attempted to 
create conditions conducive to ... economic success' (ibid., 14; Hall and Hubbard, 
1996); 
"Clearly, then, it is difficult to assess whether the shift to entrepreneurial 
modes of governance is supplanting or merely supplementing traditional 
'managerial' approaches" (Hall and Hubbard, 1996,155). 
It is important to recognise therefore that 'there are dangers in accepting the idea that 
entrepreneurial governance is distinct from other modes of governance in all 
respects' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,15, emphasis added), and therefore that the shift 
to new forms of governance is perhaps a little more complex than some of the 
literature suggests. In this respect, the explanatory weakness of dualistic accounts of 
putative shifts from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, and from Fordism to post- 
Fordism is highlighted (Jessop et al, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Tickell and 
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Peck, 1995). As Lovering observes, the 'enormous diversity of real-world 
restructuring cannot be reduced to this sort of binary switchover' (1995,113). 
Moreover, he suggests that 'there is in fact nothing new about the emergence of new 
growth sectors in new places, accompanied by local institutional development. These 
features have characterised uneven development since the beginnings of 
industrialisation' (ibid., 113). 
A framework of analysis is therefore required which recognises elements of both 
continuity and change. The literature demands more refined specifications of what 
distinguishes contemporary entrepreneurialism from earlier forms of governance 
(Jessop et al, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Wood, 1998b). In its exploration and 
specification of the form of governance that has developed in support of place. 
promotion, this research aims to contribute towards a more precise understanding of 
the shift to entrepreneurialism. 
In seeking to specify and explain the rise of entrepreneurial governance, some 
commentators argue that its emergence is a by-product of broader forces of 
international social and economic transition (Amin, 1994a, 1994b; Amin and Thrift, 
1995,1992). Yet all too often localities are portrayed as 'individual, contingent and 
particular, while the global is abstract, social and general' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998, 
16; Sayer, 1992). This dichotomous portrayal of local-global relations implies that 
local economies are passive and dependent upon the hypermobility of capital (Jessop 
et al, 1998). Others however, attribute greater significance to local capacity, local 
social relations and the local dependence of capital (Mayer, 1995; Lovering, '1995; 
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Cox and Mair, 1988). Quite clearly, a more sophisticated conceptualisation of local- 
global relations is necessary in order to specify contemporary forms of governance 
more precisely within the shift to some form of entrepreneurialism and its role 
within the dynamics of advanced capitalism (Jess6p et al, 1998; Wood, 1998a); 
"political processes are not so much reactive to global forces ... these policies 
are part and parcel of a more pervasive reorganisation of the regulatory 
framework that controls global capitalism" (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,17). 
A regulation approach thus provides a usefid analytical framework with which to 
characterise and conceptualise contemporary forms of governance. The approach 
emerged through attempts to introduce more sensitivity to traditional analyses of 
capitalist development and as such, provides a more holistic interpretation of the 
ways in which the economy, the state and society have been restructured in specific 
historical and geographical contexts. 
1.3 Conclusion 
Until very recently, the interrelation between the marketing of place and emerging 
fonns of governance had been largely overlooked, despite the fact that it provides a 
useful vehicle with which to explore governance and the politics of local Partnership 
formation. Some commentators have recognised this and have begun to address 
some of the issues identified here (Jessop, 1998; Ward, 1999a; Hubbard and Hall, 
1998; Millington, 1998; Shaw, 1994; Wilkinson, 1992). However, there are still 
many uncertainties which pervade the literature around place promotion and the 
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changing nature of entrepreneurial governance. These have been briefly 
demonstrated here, but are developed fully in Chapters Two and Three. This thesis 
Al- - 
dicrefore aims to address competing claims by determining, inter alia, the nature of, 
and extent to which place promotion occurs and by whom, and sets out to contribute 
towards a more precise specification of entrepreneurial forms of governance and the 
role of contemporary place promotion within it. In particular, I examine the 
respective roles and functions of local goverranent and other quasi-public and 
private interests in local place promotional strategy making, and their involvement in 
A- - dic formation and maintenance of local partnerships. This is achieved through a 
large scale postal survey of British local authorities and in-depth exarnination of 
place promotional strategies and associated institutional structures in two major 
British cities. 
Following these introductory comments, Chapter Two introduces regulation theory 
as a framework for analysing the development of capitalism and the putative shifts 
described above. It demonstrates how, as an approach, regulation theory has evolved 
in response to many of the explanatory lacunae described above. These 
developments go some way in overcoming the crude conceptions of local politics 
and their interrelationships with broader processes of restructuring and make it 
possible to contextualise the analysis of local politics within the spectnun of 
economic and political processes operating at various spatial scales. It then goes on 
to explore the links between restructuring, entrepreneurialism and governance. 
Chapter Tbree reviews the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary 
conceptualisations of local politics, exploring how each contributes towards 
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specifying emerging forms of governance. In respect of the research methodology, 
Chapter Four details the research process, highlighting any areas of concern or 
obstacles that have arisen throughout. It discusses the appropriateness of the research 
techniques used, the choice of case study areas, and the benefit arising from a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The results of the local 
authority postal survey are then presented in Chapter Five, focusing upon current 
trends within local authority policy and practice. The interrelation between place 
promotion and associated governance structures is then explored in depth in 
Chapters Six and Seven in relation to the two case studies in Newcastle upon Tyne 
and Leeds respectively. The governance arrangements in each city are specified and 
explained in relation to local economic, social and political histories, and broader 
restructuring processes. The conclusions arising from a comparison of the two cities, 
located within the wider context of the survey findings, are presented and discussed 
in Chaptcr Eight. 
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CIIAPTER TWO 
REGULATION, ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND CIOVERNANCE 
2.0 Introduction 
Clearly, the scope and institutional structure of' the local state in Britain have been 
radically restructured, the indicativc cliangcs of' which have bccn wcIl-relicarscd 
elsewhere (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Cochrane, 1993,1991; Paintcr, 1995, 
1991 -, Jessop, 1990, Stoker, 1989-, Stewart and Stoker, 1989-, Duncan and Goodwin, 
1989-, inter alia). In brief'. while the precise coil I iguration ol'change remains subject 
to considerable debate, many of' these commentators cite the significance of' a shill 
fironi local government to qualitatively new patterns of local governancc, involving 
the replaccincnt of' l'Ormally accountable, dcniocratically elected structures of' local 
govemment with a plcthora ol'unaccountabic and non-electcd agcncics (I lay, 1995). 
Characterised by the emergence of' more flexible organisational approaches to 
service delivery, and the florniation of' strategic alliances and partnerships between 
public and private sector bodies, tile transition is further associated with a shill 
towards economically competitive ideologies (Griffiths, 1998). 
These changes represent both the expression of' wider economic and political 
processes settling upon local government, and their active constitution through tile 
institutional, social and political forms of the local state (Ooodwin et al, 1993). 
Indeed, Chapter One has demonstrated how place promotion occuples a central 
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position within local state restructuring, within these new patterns of governance, 
and within broader responses to economic restructuring and the putative crisis of 
10 
Fordism. Therefore, in order to specify the form of governance arrangements that 
have developed around place promotion, one needs to understand the intcrmeshing 
of economic and political processes and actors, operating at varying spatial scales. 
Analysis of local state restructuring therefore demands a theoretical and conceptual 
framework that inter-relatcs patterns and periods of economic, social and political 
development. It also demands a framework that examines both local and extra-local 
processes, and the reciprocity of the two; a requirement that has been explored in the 
much rehearsed 'structure-agency' (Sayer, 1992; Cox and Mair, 1991,1989; Cooke, 
1989; Giddens, 1984) and 'global-local' debates (Wood, 1998a; Lovering, 1995; 
Tickell and Peck, 1995; Amin and Thrift, 1995,1992; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Cox, 
1993,1991 a, 199 1 b); debates which have yet to be resolved. 
Commentators continue to deliberate over the level of relative autonomy that the 
local state and local actors possess vis-a-vis broader economic and political 
transformations. These debates are particularly acute wid-dn both the 'regulation' and 
6governance' projects, and are driving the theoretical and methodological advances 
currently ongoing within and between the two. In an attempt to overcome the 
problems posed by 'structure-agency' and 'global-local' dialectics, commentators 
are searching for increasing complementarities between regulation and governance 
approaches. This search has resulted in a substantial and influential body of literature 
as regulation theory is applied to the evolution of patterns of local governance and 
structures of the local state and vice versa (Jessop et al, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 
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1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Lauria, 1997; Jessop, 1997,1995; MacLeod, 1997; 
Jones, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1997, Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Hay, 1995; 
Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992). By virtue of these 
developments, an increasing synthesis between a regulation approach and theories of 
governance offers a potential framework for understanding changing institutional 
structures and the apparent rise of entrepreneurialism, and how these relate to the 
broader dynamics of advanced capitalism of which they are part. Although discussed 
in more detail shortly, it is important to stress at this point that regulation theory 
does not explain changes in the local state and local governance, rather it locates 
these changes within broader restructuring processes. It helps us to understand how 
broader processes of restructuring are played out and therefore how the economy, the 
state and society have changed. In possession of this knowledge and using 
appropriate theories of local politics, it is then possible to go on to explain 
governance and the changes within it. 
2.1 A regulation approach 
As briefly outlined in Chapter One, a regulation approach provides a useful 
analytical framework with which to characterise and conceptualise contemporary 
forms of governance since it locates the restructuring of the local state within the 
broader context of economic and extra-economic systemic change. It is therefore 
possible to contextualise the analysis of local politics within the spectrum of 
processes operating at various spatial scales, which in turn facilitates an holistic 
interpretation of the ways in which the economy, the state, and society have been 
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restructured in historically and spatially contingent contexts. I will shortly outline the 
ways in which this is achieved. 
The basic tenets of regulation theory are covered extensively within existing 
literature (Jessop, 1997,1995,1993,1990; Goodwin and Painter, 1997,1996; 
Lauria, 1997; MacLeod, 1997; Jones, 1997; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Hay, 1995; 
inter alia). Briefly, regulation theory provides an historical analysis of the 
development of capitalism and helps us to understand the underlying paradox of 
Marxist theory; the continual reproduction of capitalism. In essence, it seeks to 
explain how the capitalist system persists despite generic conflictual, contradictory 
and crisis-prone destructive tendencies; tendencies which are, albeit temporarily, 
resolved or offset by regulatory processes. At any one time, the balance of stabilising 
regulatory processes and disrupting counter-regulatory processes determines the 
relative stability or instability of the capitalist system (Goodwin and Painter, 1997). 
'First generation' regulation theory (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1986; Boyer, 1990; 
Jessop, 1990) was founded upon the 'twin pillars' (Tickell and Peck, 1992) of the 
'regime of accumulation' and the 'mode of social regulation'. Whilst defined in a 
variety of ways, the regime of accumulation specifies the broad relationships 
between production, consuraption, circulation and exchange which enable capital 
accumulation. The process of capital accumulation is not guaranteed however and 
has to be secured through mechanisms of regulation. These vary over time and 
across space but commonly include a range of institutions, societal relations, cultural 
norms and practices. Collectively, these comprise the mode of regulation which acts 
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to temporarily stabilise the'tensions which are inherent in the prevailing regime of 
accumulation. Once stabilised together in an historically and spatially contingent 
tstructural coupling' (Jessop, 1990), the mode of regulation and regime of 
accumulation support the process of capital accumulation. 
Modes of regulation however, only represent a temporary 'institutional fix' (Peck 
and Tickell, 1994; Tickell and Peck, 1995) until counter-regulatory processes within 
the accumulation process outweigh the stabilising processes of regulation. At this 
time, new and innovative institutional forms and regulatory modes may be 
assembled in an attempt to impede further structural crisis (MacLeod, 1997). These 
arguments are rehearsed at length in the debates surrounding the putative transition 
from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of accumulation and the associated 
'institutional search' (MacLeod, 1997; Peck and Tickell, 1994) for an effective and 
sustainable mode of regulation (Jessop, 1995,1990; Hay, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 
1995,1992; Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992; Harvey, 1989). 
It is within the 'evolving search to analyse new socioeconomic, institutional and 
cultural forms' (MacLeod, 1997,53 1), that the regulationist project has been applied 
across an ever-widening range of disciplines. Its application to local politics 
especially has revealed a number of analytical shortcomings. First and foremost, 
early regulationist accounts have been widely criticised for their economic 
determinism, theorising that economic processes are the driving force behind 
transformations in the economy, state and society. These early accounts fail to 
consider the extra-economic construction and mediation of processes of social, 
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political and economic change (Hay and Jessop, 1995) and therefore mask important 
extra-economic mechanisms, practices and relations. In consequence, they were 
increasingly regarded as 'inadequate to the task of accounting for the dynamic 
evolution of state-economy-society relations' (Hay, 1995,388). Calls for much 
greater integration between analyses of civil society, political society and the 
economy have led to an increasing concern for the theoretical commensurability 
between theories of regulation and governance (Painter, 1997; Jessop, 1995). 
Further criticisms levelled at 'first generation' regulation theory concern the deficit 
in conceptualising the micro-level, and a downplaying of the interaction between 
global, national, regional and local levels of regulatory activity (MacLeod, 1997). In 
mutually reinforcing ways, the identification of these explanatory lacunae highlights 
the need for empirical research which is 'rationally abstracting from (but grounded 
in) concrete circumstances' (MacLeod, 1997,547; Painter and Goodwin, 1995). 
Recent regulationist literature has thus departed from 'first generation' principles 
and seeks to fill these 'missing links' (Jessop, 1990; Tickell and Peck, 1992) through 
namely: the process of regulation and its social, political and discursive constitution; 
geographies of regulation and concerns with spatial scale; and the role of the local 
state in and through the regulatory process (MacLeod, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 
1997; Jones, 1997; Jessop, 1995; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 
1995). 
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2.2 The regulatory process - political strategy, practice and discourse 
Recently a n=ber of British regulationists have advocated the concept of regulation 
as process with an emphasis upon the 'always provisional, incomplete, and unstable 
nature of regulation as practice' (Hay and Jessop, 1995,305, original emphasis; 
Jessop, 1995; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Painter, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 
1997). They argue that the concept of mode of regulation is not as central to the 
regulationist core as it once was since the term 'mode' implies that regulatory 
mechanisms form coherent, distinct and more importantly, complete systems of 
regulation, rather than systems which are more realistically in a continual process of 
formation and evolution. As a result, the concept of mode of regulation 
overemphasises 'the stability and coherence of regulatory relations at the expense of 
instability, change and conflict' (MacLeod, 1997,534) on the one hand, whilst 
overplaying the notion of breaks and discontinuities within the historical 
development of capitalism on the other. Importantly, and contrary to several 
'mistranslations' (MacLeod, 1997), the regulation approach does not discern a 
'linear, standardized inevitable pattern' of development (MacLeod, 1997,532; 
Lipietz, 1986). 'Me term 'mode' contributes to these misconceived 'binary histories' 
(Sayer, 1989; Amin, 1994b); 
"the idea of contrasting modes succeeding one another places too much stress 
on sharp breaks and radical discontinuities in the development of capitalist 
societies. A crude account of one stable and enduring mode quickly breaking 
down and then equally quickly being replaced by a markedly different but 
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equally stable new arrangement is clearly unsatisfactory and historically 
inaccurate" (Goodwin and Painter, 1997,19). 
Contrasting accumulation-regulation couplings in this manner too readily invites the 
use of 'dualist logic' (MacLeod, 1997,534) which has plagued much of the 
regulationist research couched in terms of a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism 
(Hay, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994). Regulationist analyses 
couched in these tenns often unproblematically present the current period of 
institutional searching as the initial steps in the consolidation of a new post-Fordist 
mode of regulation, neglecting the spatial contingency of regulation, and failing to 
consider the political and discursive mediation of processes of economic and social 
change. For these reasons, Goodwin and Painter (1997) suggest that it is more 
helpful, and more accurate to conceptualise historically variable processes of 
regulation rather than a succession of discrete and stable 'modes' (Painter, 1997). 
Moreover, by emphasising the 'ebb and flow' of regulatory processes (Painter and 
Goodwin, 1995), attention is directed more towards (local) strategic action and 
practice and away from the (supra-local) structural determinants that have hitherto 
comprised the focus of conventional regulationist research. 
In contrast however, MacLeod suggests that the 'regulatory mode need not of 
necessity denote a succession of rigidly stable systems one after another' (1997,534, 
original emphasis) given the ongoing and intensive 'institutional search' (Peck and 
Tickell, 1994) for compatible systems of accumulation and regulation. He argues 
that by presenting everything as a process of 'ebb and flow', Goodwin and Painter 
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(1997) may actually deny the 'constitutive role of these discursive and material 
practices to cohere into relatively stable strategic contexts' (MacLeod, 1997,534; 
Jessop et al, 1998; Jessop, 1995) within which actors and processes operate. For 
example; 
"subjects may come to make sense of the world by acting in and through 
recognizable patterns of coherence over time and across space. Ibus, relative 
continuities are perceived, objectified, reproduced and in turn are recreated 
by key power brokers and influential actors ... [and as such] particular 
hegemonic projects crystallize and mutually articulate with particular social 
structures of accumulation and regulatory conduct, albeit unevenly spread 
and inconstanf' (MacLeod, 1997,534). 
For example, it is widely postulated that emerging discourses mutually constitute 
with developing institutional configurations to form 'coherences'. These have been 
conceptualised. in a number of different ways, but most notably as: 'local hegemonic 
disciplines' and 'local hegemonic projects' (Jessop et al, 1998; Jessop, 1995,1990; 
MacLeod, 1997); 'hegemonic public naffatives' (MacLeod, 1997); 'institutional 
centres of gravity' (Jessop, 1996); 'spatialised modes of social regulation' (Peck and 
Tickell, 1994); 'systemic coherences' (Amin, 1994b); and 'urban structured 
coherences' (Harvey, 1989). Defending the concept of the 'mode' of regulation, 
MacLeod therefore suggests that it 'may still be useful to consider capitalist 
governance as the contingent interaction of competing hegemonic projects and their 
materialization in and through particular modes of regulation' (1997,535). One such 
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'coherence' may be the widely prevalent entrepreneurial discourse, which, spurred 
on by intensifying international competition, is essentially characterised by the 
emergence of coalition politics, the creation of public-private partnerships and the 
widespread adoption of place promotional strategies (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Painter, 1998; Griffiths, 1998). Indeed, 
'coherences' may emerge in particular places as a result of the interaction between 
the entrepreneurial discourse and its regulatory context. 
Whether one chooses to accept or reject the concept of the 'mode' of regulation, 
there is widespread agreement that regulation conceptualised as 'process' is a 
substantial theoretical advance., It encapsulates firstly, the historically and spatially 
contingent natureof accumulation-regulation couplings, and secondly, the fact that 
these couplings are, in part, discursively produced through extra-economic as well as 
economic mechanisms and practices; 
"the process of regulation is the product of material and discursive practices 
that generate and are in turn conditioned by social and political institutions" 
(Painter and Goodwin, 1995,342). 
Understood in this manner, it emphasises the fact that both objects of regulation, and 
the processes of regulation themselves are mutually constituting and emerge together 
(Goodwin and Painter, 1997,1996; Painter and Goodwin, 1995). It also highlights 
the interdependence of the economy, state and society. Given that regulation 
theorists traditionally took the object of regulation to be the economy, and in 
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particular the process of capital accumulation (Painter, 1997), these more traditional 
regulationist readings have been criticised (Lovering, 1995) for their profound 
economic determinism and for misconceiving 'a theoretical and empirical separation 
of economy, politics and civil society' (Valler et al, forthcoming, 4). In contrast, 
$new regulationism' (MacLeod, 1997) is fundamentally concerned with the inter- 
relationships between the economy, society, politics and culture, and the mutual 
constitution of both economic and extra-economic regulatory objects and processes. 
It is advocated therefore, that since economic, social and political realms are not 
independent of one another (Painter, 1998), there is no intrinsic reason why a 
regulation approach cannot be used to characterise and conceptualise the local state 
and local political systems (Painter, 1997). It must be remembered however, that 
regulation theory explains economic continuity and change by way of the social, 
political and cultural processes and practices that sustain the process of capital 
accumulation, including local political processes. Regulation theory therefore does 
not provide an explanation of these political processes themselves (Painter, 1997); 
"Because modes of regulation are understood to be the product of the 
interaction of contingent phenomena, the concept of mode of regulation 
cannot explain the emergence of those phenomena in the first place" (Painter, 
1997,127). 
A 'theory of governance, a theory of the state' (Goodwin and Painter, 1996,28) is 
needed to explain the restructuring of local government and its regulatory role in the 
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uneven development of capitalism. Equally, changes in local governance cannot be 
fully understood simply in terms of their roles in regulation (Valler ct al, 
forthcoming; Painter, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Painter and Goodwin, 
1995), and so; 
"Though the form and nature of urban politics cannot be unproblematically 
derived from the characteristics of the prevailing mode of regulation, urban 
politics is not straightforwardly independent of the mode of regulation either 
- in practice they are partly mutually constitutingý' (Painter, 1997,127). 
Theories of governance can unravel the causal processes that explain local political 
processes, whether these political processes 'are grounded in the mode of regulation, 
in practices that are counterregulatory, or in other spheres of social life that have no 
strong relationship to the regulation of capital accumulation at all' (Painter, 1997, 
127). Theories of governance are therefore needed in order to explain that which 
falls outside of the regulation of social systems. Regulation theory is needed 
however, to account for the nature and form of institutional, social and cultural 
practices that maybe, at least in part, grounded in such regulatory processes. It 
directs our investigations towards institutions of governance since it is these, that in 
part, regulate the state, economy and society, just as the institutions in turn are 
regulated (afforded and constrained) by each of these three pillars of capitalist 
development. As such, regulatory processes, in part, determine, and are determined 
by the distinctive ways in which institutions evolve, policies emerge, and social and 
cultural norms arise (Valler et al, forthcoming). 
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In summary therefore, regulationist approaches help explain why capitalism persists 
despite inherent crisis tendencies using processes of (economic, social and political) 
regulation as an explanatory tool. Institutional structures form part of these processes 
of regulation. In turn, theories of governance help explain the mobilisation of these 
institutional arrangements. A much greater theoretical, empirical and methodological 
synthesis between theories of regulation and governance is therefore being sought by 
several commentators (Lauria, 1997; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 
1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Goodwin et al, 1993). In their search for greater 
commensurability, these regulationists emphasise that the methodology of the 
regulation approach can, and should be extended to the local state as an object and 
agent of regulation. Since regulatory processes are constituted in particular places at 
particular times, they have particularly stressed the need to prioritise concrete 
research. In consequence, the analysis of local state restructuring across time, and as 
is increasingly the case, across space, have become central debates within the 'new' 
regulationist project (Jones, 1997). 
2.3 Spaces of regulation-Places of governance 
Hitherto concerns with the supra-local economic determinants of regulation have 
largely neglected accumulation-regulation couplings at the local scale, and the 
actions and practices of economic and political actors operating within their strategic 
contexts (Jessop et al, 1998). Despite wide acceptance that regulatory processes are 
indeed unevenly constituted across time and space, there has been something of a 
theoretical lacuna (MacLeod, 1997) in the past with regard to understanding issues 
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of uneven development and the spatiality of regulation. Traditional regulationist 
research has prioritised time over space, largely concerning itself with the 
periodisation of capitalist development (MacLeod, 1997); a tendency which has not 
only resulted in a preoccupation with national and international accumulation 
regimes, but has also very often resulted in Fordist-post-Fordist teleology. 
Regulationist accounts exhibiting these tendencies have been widely criticised for 
failing to provide 'more nuanced understanding of the complex processes and 
mechanisms resulting in the transformation of political and economic structures at 
the local level' (Hay, 1995,3 87) since they downplay the; 
"significance of local political dynamics, struggles and resistances, and of 
any mediatmg social, political, cultural and economic factors through which 
global economic dynamics are filtered before they become reflected in local 
economic and political developmentel (Ilay, 1995,394). 
However, the 'hollowing out' (Jessop, 1998,1993,1990) of the nation-state and the 
rise of non-state governance as 'old and new capacities are reorganized territorially 
and functionally, on subnational, national, supranational and translocal levels' 
(MacLeod, 1997,544), has resulted in a growing awareness of the interaction 
between these levels of governance and of the geographical unevenness of regulation 
(MacLeod, 1997; Jones, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1997; Painter, and Goodwin, 
1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992; Goodwin et al, 1993). 
Recent regulationist research therefore accords greater significance to space, place 
and scale as part of the endeavour to develop theoretically infortned concrete 
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accounts of the particular contingent and non-contingent forces present in a 
particular place, at a particular time. 
Regulation theory has in effect been 'spatialised' (Jones, 1997) as intermediate 
conceptual frameworks for analysing the uneven development of capitalism and the 
geography of regulation have been developed through methodological refinement 
(Jones, 1997; MacLeod, 1997; Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992; Jessop, 1995,1990). 
'Mis is most recently illustrated by Jones (1997) who has built upon existing mid- 
level concepts (Jessop, 1993,1990) and introduced the notion of 'spatial selectivity' 
in an attempt to increase sensitivity to the role of the local state within its strategic 
and political context. He argues that by linking accumulative and regulatory 
processes to spatial scale, one can understand the tendency of the state to privilege 
certain places through accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. For example, 
the South of England, and the South East in particular, was clearly favoured by the 
neoliberal accumulation strategy of the Thatcher Government during the 1980s and 
thus could be interpreted as a spatially selected 'strategically significant region' of 
that time (Jones, 1997; Peck and Tickell, - 1994; Goodwin et al, 1993). Spatial 
selectivity, like regulation, is both materially and discursively produced and is 
realised in institutional and policy forms, hence reinforcing the need for more 
detailed studies of evolving institutional configurations and reiterating calls for more 
theoretically grounded concrete research embedded within the specificities and 
contingencies of place (Jones, 1997); 
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"Quite simply, an adequate understanding of spatial ý specificity vis-a-vis 
localities, regional couplings or national state projects can only occur in 
concrete and complex analyses, being contingent , upon 
the mutual 
articulation of the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of actors 
operating at various spatial scales, and in a variety of ventures", (MacLeod, 
1997,545, original emphasis). 
Therefore, in order to analyse contemporary shifts in the geography of regulation 
from government to governance, 'new regulationism' has been applied at more local 
scales of accumulation, focusing upon local processes of growth in the creation of 
&new institutional spaces' (Jones, 1997; Jessop et al, 1998; Goodwin et al, 1993; 
Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992). In so doing however, it must be recognised that these 
local regulatory processes do not exist in isolation from encompassing economic and 
political forces, nor do they exist solely at the local level. Jessop et al describe this 
complex web of spatially variant processes of growth as a 'tangled hierarchy of 
regularising and regulatory practices' (1998,10). 
Within this 'tangled hierarchy', the role of the local state is a matter of considerable 
contention. Commentators are divided as to whether local states are 'the helpless 
pawns of international finance, industry and commerce' (Jessop et al, 1998,10), or 
whether they are capable of mediating and directing their own destinies. The search 
for a greater synthesis between theories of regulation and governance has however 
gone some way towards overcoming crude conceptions of the ways in which local 
politics are implicated in broader transitions. Excessively structuralist and 
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excessively localist accounts of restructuring are being replaced with intermediate 
notions that; 
"In reality, local politics exist within a complex hierarchy of state structures 
and can only exist by reaching an accommodation with other elements in the 
hierarchy. Put simply, local politics does matter, but these 'Politics are 
structurally constrained by both local and extra-local economic forces" 
(Jessop et al, 1998,16). 
In this regard, an alliance between a regulation approach and theories of governance 
is attractive since it firstly provides a means of linking local politics to broader 
tendencies (whether these be economic, political or social); for ex=ple, intimating 
local coalitions to spatially variant accumulation regimes (whether these be Fordist 
or post-Fordist, or at local, national or international scales); and secondly it provides 
a means by which to link agency and structure in the study of local governance via 
the concept of processes of regulation, with their implicit concern with the role of 
structural forms and institutional frameworks (Jessop et al, 1998). It is widely argued 
therefore that more rigorous interpretations of local politics can be attained by 
locating the internal dynamics of local coalitions within the wider imperatives of 
capital accumulation, state restructuring, uneven spatial development and inter-urban 
competition (Jessop et al, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996; Tickell and Peck, 1995,1992; Peck and Tickell, 1994,1992; 
Goodwin et al, 1993; Harvey, 1989). 
36 
2.4 From managerialism to entrepreneurialism? 
One of the earliest and most influential accounts of situating local politics -within 
wider imperatives is David Harvey's 'urban entrepreneurialism' thesis, within 
which, in a manner compatible with a regulation approach, he locates and explores 
the role of urban change and urban governance in the transfonnation of advanced 
capitalist economies (Harvey, 1989). This chapter argues that useful insights on the 
process of change can be generated by emphasising both the emergence of a more 
entrepreneurial urban agenda, and the influential role of local spatial coalitions 
(Shaw, 1994; Cooke, 1988). An emphasis on both the transformation of urban 
agendas, and institutional structures of urban governance has -been extensively 
utilised in recent literature. Within and beyond Harvey's thesis, it is widely 
conceived that as part of the transition from government to governance, local 
government has become less of a service provider and more of a 'strategic cnabler', 
facilitating and coordinating the involvement of a range of other public and private 
sector agents in service delivery; in essence what has been referred to as the shift 
'from welfare state to enterprise state' (Cochrane, 1991,290). 
As part of an after-Fordist (Peck and Tickell, 1994) 'enterprise state', Harvey (1989) 
advocates that, mnongst other broader shifts in society, technology and culture, there 
has been a shift in the economic development agendas of local govenunents away 
from the 'managerialism' of the 1960s towards more initiatory and 'entrepreneurial' 
forms of action. These forms of action classically comprise the involvement of a 
wider range of agencies in traditional public sector activities, the associated 
emergence of new institutional structures and coalitions, allied with an increased 
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emphasis on encouraging economic development through more proactive and 
innovative strategies, such as physical development, place promotion and the 
attraction of inward investment; 
t 
"Such an entrepreneurial stance contrasts with the managerial practices of 
earlier decades which primarily focused on the local provision of services" 
(Harvey, 1989,3). 
Essentially, urban entrepreneurialism is characterised by three distinguishing 
features. Firstly, it is characterised by coalition politics, centred upon the notion of 
public-private partnership. Harvey argues that the changing nature of urban politics 
from government to governance has an important facilitative role to play in the 
transition of capitalism from a Fordist regime of capital accumulation to a regime of 
flexible accumulation and organisational innovation; 
"Each coalition will seek out its distinctive version of what Jessop (1983) 
calls 'accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects'. From the standpoint 
of long-run capital accumulation, it is essential that different paths and 
different packages of political, social, and entrepreneurial endeavours get 
explored. Only in this way is it possible for a dynainic and revolutionary 
social system, such as capitalism, to discover new forms and modes of social 
and political regulation suited to new fornis and paths of capital 
accumulation" (Harvey, 1989,15). 
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Secondly, the activities of these partnerships are perceived, to be entrepreneurial 
because they are speculative in nature, with the risk associated with development 
often being borne by the local public sector. This facet distinguishes 
'entrepreneurialism' from earlier periods of civic boosterism 'in which private 
capital seemed generally much less risk averse' (Harvey, 1989,7). 'Ibirdly, the 
projects associated with these activities can have effects on areas that are smaller or 
wider than the specific territory within which the projects occur. To this end, place 
promotional activities, and physical development schemes allied to them, are 
classically associated with notions of entrepreneurialism since they can have 
physical and/or symbolic significance within and beyond specific localities; 
"The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private 
partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the 
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speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions 
within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) 
political and economic goal" (Harvey, 1989,8). 
In adopting entrepreneurialism, place-based governing coalitions compete for 
economic development across a number of dimensions, each resulting in alternative 
strategies for local governance. It is the combination of these dimensions that Harvey 
believes provides the clue to Ahe 'recent rapid shifts in the uneven development of 
urban systems in the advanced capitalist world' (1989,8), namely: competition, for 
position in the new international division of labour; for position as centres of 
consumption; for control and command functions; and for governmental 
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redistributions (Harvey, 1989). Inter-urban competition operating across these 
dimensions is a key component in the logic of capitalism; 
"The coercive laws of competition force individual or collective agents 
(capitalist finns, financial institutions, states, cities) into certain 
configurations of activities, which are themselves constitutive of the 
capitalist dynamic" (Harvey, 1989,15). 
Spurred on by the global dynamic of intensifying competition, local economic and 
political actors develop coalition politics; 
"Within a metropolitan region as a whole, we have to look to the formation 
of coalition politics, to class alliance formation as the basis for any kind of 
urban entrepreneurialism at all" (Harvey, 1989,6). 
Secondly, these governing coalitions formulate proactive place promotion strategies 
based upon the entrepreneurial discourse of improving the economic 
competitiveness of the locality; 
"There can be little doubt that one of the most obvious manifestations of 
entrepreneurialism =ong city governments has been the attention devoted to 
the transformation, or at least enhancement, of the image of the city" (Hall, 
1998,27). 
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These entrepreneurial practices and strategies may then contribute to processes of 
regulation which sustain the process of capital accumulation, and hcncc capitalism. 
However, as outlined earlier, this is not guaranteed. Characteristic of the uneven 
development of capitalism, the contingent realisation of these practices can serve to 
regulate or disrupt the process of capital accumulation. Hence, the success of 
regulation in a particular place, at a particular time is, in part, determined by the 
particular balance of stabilising regulatory processes and disrupting counter- 
regulatory processes. Nevertheless, whether or not these practices are, in part, 
grounded in processes of regulation which support capital accumulation, the 
exploration of 'different paths and ... packages of political, social, and entrepreneurial 
endeavours' (Harvey, 1989,15) leads to a greater understanding of how different 
economic, social, political and cultural processes manifest themselves in locally 
distinctive policies and institutional arrangements. 
Inter-urban competition limits the transformative power of these entrepreneurial 
endeavours (Wood, 1998a) by operating as 'an 'external coercive power' over 
individual cities... [bringing] them closer into line with the discipline and logic of 
capitalist development' (Harvey, 1989,10). In consequence, even the 'most resolute 
and avantgarde municipal socialists ... find themselves, in the end, playing the 
capitalist game and performing as agents of discipline for the very processes they are 
trying to resist' (Harvey, 1989,5) as local governing coalitions are driven to tailor 
local conditions of production and consumption to perceived entrepreneurial ist 
ideals in an attempt to lure capitalist development; 
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"place promotion is both an obvious manifestation and contributory cause of 
the heightened inter-urban competition associated with entrepreneurialism, 
the process of place promotion has become integral to the process of 
urbanisation in the late twentieth century" (11all, 1998,27-28). 
The task of urban governance therefore is, 'in short, to lure highly mobile and 
flexible production, financial, and consumption flows into its space' (Harvey, 1989, 
11; Wood, 1998a; Cox and Mair, 1988). Intcr-urban competition is thereby the 
means by which Harvey relates the 'fonns of development associated with urban 
cntrcprcncurialism to broader processes of economic change' (Wood, 1998a, 4). As 
Wood highlights, this is 'a welcome coffective to both accounts that conflate the 
economic and the global and the political and the local and ... those that.. see the latter 
as simply determined by the former' (1998a, 4). In the face of intensified 
international, inter-regional, and intra-regional competition, 'there have been major 
shifts in cities' roles as subjects, sites and stakes in economic restructuring and 
securing structural competitivenese' (Jessop et al, 1998,16, emphasis added). 
2.5 Interpreting urban entrepreneurialism 
Although traditionally locatcd within litcrature advocating -a shift from Fordism to 
post-Fordism, the discourse of entrepreneurialism has gained salience beyond this 
classic transition and has cognisance irrespective of whether one chooses to accept 
the particular post-Fordist rhetoric. Generically, 'entrepreneurialism' has come to 
indicate that localities are (supposedly) being managed, organised and governed in 
more effective and business-like ways (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As such, it has 
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proved a popular discourse with local policy makers who 'increasingly posit the 
adoption of an entrepreneurial stance as the key to creating conditions conducive to 
capital accumulation' and economic success (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,2). In turn, 
entrepreneurialism has become 'the dominant response to urban problems' (Jessop, 
1996, cited in Hubbard and Hall, 1998,2). The rhetoric surrounding 
'entrepreneurialism' has reached such axiomatic heights and permeated urban 
discourses to such an extent that 'being an 'entrepreneurial city' has ... become a 
central element in many cities' self-imaging and/or - place-marketing activities' 
(Jessop, 1998,77); 
"Politically urban governance is becoming constituted to a greater extent 
around the narratives of entrepreneurialism envisioned by, among other 
things, place promotion! ' (Hall, 1998,28-29). 
Yet despite this, as outlined in Chapter One, few commentators have specifically 
examined the constitution and configuration of urban governance around place 
promotion. Furthermore, despite the prevalence of the entrepreneurialist' narrative, 
there is 'little agreement as to the defining features of urban entrepreneurialism' 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996,154) or the extent to which entrepreneurialism differs 
from previous practice (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Painter, 1998); 
"Clearly, the notion of entrepreneurialism is of little use as a theoretical, 
conceptual or pedagogical tool if we are unable to define with any 
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meaningful precision exactly what we are talking about' ' (Hubbard and Hall, 
1998,3). 
Given the 'theoretically and empirically impoverished grounds' (Hall and Hubbard, 
1996,154) upon which the literature on entrepreneurialism rests, commentators have 
recently called for studies to identify more precisely the defining characteristics of 
urban entrepreneurialism. and the implications these have for the changing structures 
and strategies of urban governance (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Jessop et 
al, 1998; Painter, 1998). Both Jessop (1998) and Painter (1998) question the 
pervasiveness of the entrepreneurial discourse and examine the range of meanings 
that have come to be associated with the term. In particular, Jessop identifies the 
various ways in which cities 'can be (said to be) entrepreneurial' (1998,79). He 'ý 
concludes that; 
"despite the increasingly common rhetoric and narrative of 
6entrepreneurialism', there are few cities which genuinely qualify for this title 
in the strong sense. For there are few cities which are systematically oriented 
to securing sustainable dynamic competitive advantages through continuing 
economic, political and social innovations that are intended to enhance 
productivity and other conditions of structural and systemic competitiveness" 
(ibid., 1998,79). 
This provides a useful definition of 'strong' urban entrepreneurialism and highlights 
a fundamental paradox within the entrepreneurialism thesis. Entrepreneurialism is 
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intimately linked to the adoption of innovative practices and strategies as part of the 
search for after-Fordist regulatory solutions and more effective regimes of 
accumulation (Harvey, 1989). In the fight for economic survival, inter-urban 
competition coerces governing coalitions to devise innovative solutions to 
contemporary urban problems. However, whilst inter-urban competition induces 
innovation, it also has the potential to generate the 'repetitive and serial reproduction 
of certain patterns of development' (Harvey, 1989,10), as witnessed in the global 
replication of shopping malls, convention centres, waterfront developments and 
sports stadia (Harvey, 1989; Gold and Ward, 1994; Philo and Kearns, 1993). While 
these strategies have beerf successful in particular places at particular times (thus 
inducing their replication in the hope that they will produce the same degree of 
success elsewhere), there is a limit to the number of local economies that can reap 
success from them (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Jessop et al, 
1998; Jessop, 1998; Harvey, 1989). In contrast therefore to the innovation implied 
by entrepreneurialism, much of 'the marketing of cities tends to be generic and 
repetitive' (Holcomb, 1994,12 1). 
It is for these reasons that Jessop (1998) makes a clear distinction between those 
cities demonstrating entrepreneurialism in its strongest sense and those that exhibit 
weak entrepreneurialist tendencies. This provides the basis for identifying forms of 
both strong and weak competition and in turn, identifying the cities which are 
resPonding to these different forms. Drawing on Cox (1995, cited in Jessop, 1998), 
Jessop argues that strong competition 'refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to 
improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation' 
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(1998,79). Weak competition on the other hand, refers to 'essentially zero-sum 
attempts to secure the reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other 
localities' (ibid., 79), for example, simple image-raising measures or strategies 
aimed at capturing mobile investment which do not have the potential to, secure 
sustainable and dynamic competitive advantages through continuing innovations. 
Harvey himself highlights the potential zero-sum nature of inter-urban competition, 
and also, in accordance with notions of strong competition, pronounces that 'urban 
entrepreneurialism. and even inter-urban competition may open the way to a non 
zero-sum pattern of development' (1989,5). Cox (1995, cited in Jessop, 1998) 
further suggests that weak competition is 'sociafly disembedding', whereas strong 
competition 'involves the territorialisation of economic activity' (cited in Jessop, 
1998,79). In this way, weak competition serves to undermine local attempts to 
secure economic competitiveness through deterritorialisation, whilst attempts to 
respond to strong competition have the potential to reinforce local commitments, 
structures and strategies. 
Jessop (1998) thus argues that only those cities responding to strong competition, 
who are actively developing strategies that are capable of creating sustained growth 
and competitiveness, can be said to be 'entrepreneurial'. For example, some cities 
may be proficient in promoting a business-friendly climate and attracting inward 
investment, and this may maintain the process of capital accumulation for a time, but 
this does not mean that they are entrepreneurial. Proactive engagement with 
innovative practices that secure sustained economic growth more accurately define 
entrepreneurialism; 
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"there are clear dangers in trivialising urban entrepreneurial activities by 
reducing them to all manner of routine activities which are directly economic 
or at least economically relevant; and/or mistaking a city's self-image and 
place marketing as entrepreneurial for the presence of strong entrepreneurial 
activities" (Jessop, 1998,86). 
Furthermore, 'there are both theoretical and practical dangers in accepting 
uncritically the narratives and/or discourses of the 'entrepreneurial city'. 
Theoretically, we run the risk of treating the city unproblematically as a subject 
capable of action' (Jessop, 1998,86); 
"It is only if cities are meaningfid units of competition3 which can also 
pursue competitive strategies that we can speak of their actually becoming 
f entrepreneurial' actors as opposed to merely representing themselves as such 
through entrepreneurial narratives. Otherwise, they can at best be seen as 
spatialised configurations of institutions and practices that offer more or less 
favourable conditions for individual fmns (or alliances and/or networks of 
firms) to compete in a more or less entrepreneurial mannei" (Jessop, 1998, 
81). 
3 With regard to 'competition', Jessop (1998) refers to both the putative 'natural' comparative 
advantages of resources, and dynamic competitive advantages which are more obviously socially 
created and socially transformed, for example, enterprise. 
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The extent to which cities, and/or localities and local economies can be reified as 
entities and projected as 'subjects', 'actors' or 'agents' is a matter of considerable 
debate. Cox and Mair argue that; 
"If people interpret localised social structures in explicitly territorial tenns, 
come to view their interests and identities as 'local', and then act upon that 
view by mobilising locally defted organisations to further their interests in a 
manner that would not be possible were they to act separately, then it seems 
eminently reasonable to talk about 'locality as agent' (1991,198). 
Yet both Jessop (1998) and Harvey (1989) are aware of the dangers of 'equating 
cities merely with the city's political leaders and other notables' (Jessop, 1998,87) 
or a city's governing coalition, when cities comprise complex relations between 
individuals, groups, and agendas which interrelate to varying degrees and for varying 
purposes. Indeed, Harvey (1989) views urbanisation as 'a spatially grounded social 
process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and 
agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices' 
(flarvey, 1989,5). It is therefore important to refi-ain from representing the city as a 
unified set of interests, and endeavour to evoke the pattern and balance of both 
consensus and conflict within and between interest groups, whether these individuals 
and groups are included or excluded from local governance structures. 
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This line of argument has resonance with the practice of place promotion itself, and 
in particular the projection of place-images., We have seen how for many local policy 
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makers, the 'narratives' of entrcprcncurialism and representing oneself as 
entrepreneurial, have become as important as actually being so. In the same vein, the 
act of projecting an image of a dynamic, vibrant economy is as important as actually 
being one. It is for this reason that place promotion is much criticised (Lovering, 
1995; Mayer, 1995) for doing little to address the underlying problems that 
necessitate regeneration in the first place (Hall, 1998). As described in Chapter One, 
the particular place images projected are often partial views of localities in that they 
reflect the form of local governance and the particular interests of those involved in 
local policy making. The views and aspirations of locally dominant institutional 
stakeholders are quite often prioritised, and local place identities associated with 
local histories or industrial pasts are often hidden or distorted by clean, postindustrial 
images and the development of heritage quarters. In this manner, as outlined in 
Chapter One, the 'narratives' of place promotion and the creation of new investment 
landscapes and new place images can serve to marginalise sectors of the local 
community and actually reinforce existing social and economic polarisations. 
In summary therefore, it is quite evident that the term 'entrepreneurialism' has 
several connotations (Painter, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Wood, 1998a, 1998b; Hubbard 
and Hall, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996) and that as a form of govemance, it has 
wide-reaching implications both economically and politically, but also socially and 
culturally. Within these parameters, there are themes which are common to many 
definitions of entrepreneurialism: for example, increased risk-taking on the part of 
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the public sector; increasing numbers of indigenous entrepreneurs, realised in the 
increasing numbers and success of small and medium-sized enterprises; a general 
shift from public to private sector activity; encouraging the role of the private sector 
in urban economic and political activity; and the symbolic construction of place 
associated with urban living, culture and business (Painter, 1998,260). However, 
since 'there is little doubt that urban politics has increasingly been organised around 
the discourse of entrepreneunalism' (Painter, 1998,261), the most common theme in 
entrepreneurial discourse is the; 
"shift in urban politics and governance away from the management of public 
services and the provision of local welfare services towards the promotion of 
economic competitiveness, place marketing to -attract inward investment and ' 
support for the development of indigenous private sector firms" (Painter, 
1998,261). 
Furthermore, the social, political and institutional changes associated with this 
particular shift have often involved attempts to bring about the kinds of changes 
implied by the other definitions (Painter, 1998,261). 
2.6 Regulation, entrepreneurialism and governance 
It is worth reiterating that the restructuring of local government in particular places 
represents the expression of processes operating at supranational. scales down to 
those operating at the level of the individual actor. These processes (whether they are 
processes of uneven development, capital accumulation, spatial restructuring, or 
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coalition formation) extend into wider crises of regulation associated with the 
demise of Fordism. and the transition to a potential successor. These crises of 
regulation are rooted in combined market, state and governance failures, however 
these failures in themselves, do not dictate a particular institutional or policy 
response, nor do they characterise a putative shift to a new fonn of local politics. 
These failures need to be translated into specific policy problems that demand or 
6require' new ways of working, including for example, new forms of local politics 
(Jessop et al, 1998). Considerable diversity therefore exists as different forms of 
politics and governance emerge in different places. However, postwar economic and 
political failures, and their pervasiveness, have forced local actors to 'modify 
economic strategies, economic institutions, modes of governance and the form of the 
state' (Jessop et al, 1998,18) in what is often perceived to be an entrepreneurial 
manner. Thus, there are many commonalities in the precise ways entrepreneurialism 
and govemance are mobilised; 
"Running together, these processes (and the failure of the system in place to 
regulate) left localities with some hard decisions, the most important of 
which was 'how were they to position their city in the newly emerging global 
economyT. The script given to the localities in the late 1980s and early 
1990s was that in order to compete or remain competitive, they needed to 
form a spatial coalition, comprising a predetermined but contingently elastic 
set of actors" (Ward, 1997a, 1500, original emphasis). 
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As Jessop et al (1998) highlight, the development of local coalitions is only one 
potential response to the crises of regulation, and yet localities are on the receiving 
end of policy prescriptions from national government. These policy prescriptions 
strongly advocate a 'partnership' model of local management in the hope that such a 
'local institutional fix' (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Tickell and Peck, 1995; Ward, 
1997a) will remedy national crises. Localities therefore are very often 'faced with 
little option but to seek to position themselves alongside the other localities' (Ward, 
1997a, 1500) thus contributing to the governance process. 
Overarching global patterns are therefore plain to see, despite the fact that the crisis 
tendencies of Fordism have been mediated through an indeterminate number of 
(economically, politically and socio-culturally) contingent circumstances and 
transformed locally into a diverse set of policy responses and institutional outcomes. 
The meta-narratives of governance, partnership, entrepreneurialism, enterprise, 
innovation, and cooperation are clearly operating on a supranational scale (Jessop et 
al, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Painter, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Wood, 1998a, 
1998b). For example, the general shift towards encouraging economic growth 
agendas and private sector involvement in urban regeneration, accompanied by the 
increasing adoption of place promotional strategies and associated rhetorics of 
partnership and entrepreneurialism, are all indicative of common evolutionary 
development trajectories which Jessop et al, (1998) refer to as 'macro-necessity'. 
These emerging discourses (re)shape local coalitions and are in turn shaped by the 
'micro-diversity' of their local manifestation. Analysis of local state restructuring 
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therefore needs to address the processes influencing both the macro-riccessities and 
micro-diversities of structures and strategies of urban governance. 
Yet, in a manner similar to the misconceptions and omissions noted in regulationist 
analysis, it has been argued that much of the recent work on urban politics has lost 
sight of the vital connections between the actions of local policy makers and broader 
structural imperatives. In response to the alleged failure of '&and theory' to explain 
the macro-necessities dictating new forms of urban coalitions (Jessop et al, 1998), 
interest burgeoned in the 'internal machinations' of these coalitions (Jessop et al, 
1998), thus prioritising the micro-level diversity of structures and strategies of urban 
govemance (Judge et al, 1995; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b; Ilarloe et 
al, 1990; Cooke, 1989). Whilst these inquiries have 'produced deep and nuanced 
accounts of the structure and dynamics of urban coalitions, they reveal much less 
about the wider economic and political context within which urban strategies are 
embedded' (Jessop et al, 1998,3). Analogous with recent developments in 
regulation theory, Jessop et al. (1998) argue that analyses should not regard urban 
politics as existing in isolation from wider economic and political forces and 
processes, nor should analysis focus upon local actors and agency to the exclusion of 
economic and political structures; 
"Instead we [need to] explore the dialectic among different spatial scales, of 
economic and political organization and emphasise the mutual constitution of 
structure and agency across different levels" (Jessop et al, 1998,2). 
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Approaching urban politics from the 'bottom up" (Jessop et al, 1998), the local polity 
often proves to be the sole object of analysis within much urban governance 
research, thereby affording 'primary attention to the strategies, schemes, and needs 
of human, agents at the local level' (Logan and Molotch, 1987,11). Herein lies the 
danger that analysis becomes; 
"more preoccupied with the actions of urban agents than with the underlying 
social processes which these actions produce. As a result ... the pattern of local 
political relations not only provides the point of methodological entry but 
also delivers the exPlanatory power" (Jessop et al, 1998,5). 
Indeed, there are many instances (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b; Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1994; Logan and Molotch, 1987) where 'common structures and 
stratcgics of urban govcmance arc intcrprctcd not in tcrms of the impact of extra. - 
local processes such as inter-urban competition, but instead in terms of basic 
similarities in local institutional contexts and norms of elite behavior' (Jessop et al, 
1998,4). Local agency is often perceived as merely 'mediating' wider structural 
imperatives, when on the contrary, governance analysis can be broadened to 
encompass the contingent interaction of both local and supra-local forces (for 
example, capital accumulation, inter-urban competition or state restructuring) upon 
the process of coalition formation (Jessop et at, 1998; Cox, 199 1 a, 199 1 b). 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion therefore, it is evident that there is a need to overcome the 'micro- 
diversity' (Jessop et al, 1998; Stoker, 1995) of much urban governance research 
(DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994) and move 
beyond excessively localist (or even structurally determined) accounts of urban 
politics to consider the changing strategic contexts within which urban actors shape 
urban fortunes (Jessop et al, 1998). Consequently, there has been a recent backlash 
as commentators seek to recontextualise issues of spatial scale and structure and 
agency within the analysis of urban politics (Jessop et al, 1998; Wood, 1998a; 
Lauria, 1997; Painter, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1997,1996). In this regard, there 
can be a reiteration of the issues highlighted at the beginning of this chapter; the 
analysis of local state restructuring demands a theoretical and conceptual framework 
that examines both local and extra-local processes, and the reciprocity of the two, in 
turn addressing both processes of structure and agency and processes operating 
within and between the global and local scales. For these reasons, regulationists and 
governance theorists alike are seeking greater complementarities between the two 
approaches. 
Theories of local governance emphasise the fonns of political conflict and 
cooperation at the urban scale, thereby potentially addressing the 'missing links' 
identified earlier in the ongoing regulationist project (Painter,, 1997). It is important 
to note however, that complementarity would stem from their focus on politics and 
not from their concern with the urban scale. Painter dismisses the notion that 
regulation theory needs 'a mesolevel theory to deal with the urban scale' (1997,126, 
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original emphasis). Indeed, as discussed, regulation theory has been applied at more 
local levels of activity; 
"It is untrue to say that regulation theory necessarily deals with large scale 
(regional, national, or international) and that ... [governance] theory is needed 
to fill in the gap at the urban or local scale. It is also fallacious to equate on 
the one hand 'macrolevel theories with abstraction and large geographical 
scales or on the other hand meso- and microlevel theories with successively 
more concrete analyses and successively smaller geographical scales! ' 
(Painter, 1997,126). 
One can have abstract theories of micro processes and concrete accounts of large 
scale processes, and so whilst regulation theory does not need theories of urban 
politics to address issues at the local scale, governance theory does provide answers 
to questions that regulation theory cannot address (Painter, 1997). Unlike regulation 
theory, theories of governance provide an explanation of (local) political processes, 
hence they may help explain the emergence (or nonemergence) of practices (which 
may or may not have regulatory effects) and thereby provide an account of regulation 
at the urban scale. Jessol? argues that "unless one examines the mediation of 
regulation in and through specific social practices and forces, regulation will ... go 
unexplained" (1990,319). It is this mediation that is the focus of theories of urban 
politics. 
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CH A IITE R TH REE 
CIOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE 
3.0 Introduction 
ChapterTwo has outlined in detail how, over the last twenty years, loeal government 
in Britain has been radically restructured. Oiving rise to changes in scope and 
institutional structure, there has been a reorientation in local government 'away from 
the management of public services and the provision of local welfare services 
towards the promotion of' economic competitiveness-landl place marketing' 
(Painter, 1998,261). This reorientation is classically retlerred to as the shilt from 
managerialism to entrepreneurial ism (I larvey, 1989) and has Fundamentally changed 
the way places arc governed. It is widely perceived that place promotion, as both a 
'manifiestation and contributory cause of' the heightened intcr-Urban competition 
associated with entrepreneuri al i sin' (I lall, 1998,27-28), has becorne integral to the 
process ol'contemporary govemance (I [all, 1999-, 1 lubbard and I lall, 1998-, Grilliths, 
1998-, Harvey, 1999). 
As Chapters One and Two have discussed, despite its centrality within the slill't to 
entrepreneurial ism, flew commentators have sought to specify the f'orm of' local 
governance arrangements that have developed in support of' place promotion. or 
examine the relationship between place promotion and governance. '['his is necessary 
because whilst the broad principles of' file aforementioned transition are commonly 
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accepted, there is much less agreement regarding the nature, extent and precise 
forms of change. This thesis therefore addresses the, 'empirical silences that 
permeate work in this field' (Hall and Hubbard, 1996,155) by examining the 
constitution and configuration of promotional forms of governance using theories of 
urban politics, and particular models of configuration. This chapter reviews the 
strengths and weaknesses of contemporary conceptualisations, of local politics and 
explores how each contributes towards specifying these entrepreneurial forms of 
govemance. 
Theories of urban politics have diverse origins and reflect various theoretical and 
methodological currents, however, all propose to account for the changing form of 
local governance and seek directly to inform the nature of restructuring local public- 
private relations. The most notable conceptualisations are local corporatism, 'growth 
machine' or 'growth coalition' theory and urban regime theory, whose core 
characteristics are explored. The -salience of each of these different concepts, or 
aspects of these concepts needs to be considered, especially when certain 
commentators (Brindley et al, 1989, cited in Cochrane, 1991; Jessop et al, 1998) 
suspect and/or reject the possibility of characterising changing forms of urban 
politics with any one overarching label. Indeed, the processes in operation are 
complex and are perhaps evolving, but that said, it may well be possible to identify 
directions of change and specify certain features and arrangements (Cochrane, 1991). 
Fundamentally, what remains important is the fact that 'local politics in the 
1990S ... increasingly need to be analysed in terms which acknowledge a new set of 
power relations, reflected in an increased emphasis on public/private partnership; 
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which partner is dominant in particular cases may still be an open question, but 
that ... [is] the question which matters' (Cochrane, 1991,299). 
3.1 Theories of urban politics 
In response to the shift 'from welfare state to enterprise state' (Cochrane, 1991,290), 
Cochrane proclaims 'the arrival, or possibly the return, of business as an active 
participant in the political process' (1991,292) and acknowledges the increased 
significance of 'corporatist' modes of mediation at the local level, both in terms of 
business interest representation and the restructuring of welfare provision (Cochrane, 
1991; Valler, 1996). The debate surrounding corporatism is an attempt to understand 
and explain the reciprocal relationships that have developed between the state and 
major organised interest groups based on the division of labour in society (Grant, 
1985). Grant defines corporatism as; 
"a process of interest intermediation which involves the negotiation of policy 
between state agencies and interest organisations arising from the division of 
labour in society, where the policy agreements are implemented through the 
collaboration of the interest organisations and their willingness and ability to 
secure the compliance of their memberel (1985,34). 
Corporatism thereby implies more than an 'intensive consultative relationship' 
(Grant, 1985,3), it involves the sharing of state authority with these interests and 
highlights the variety of ways in which interest groups influence government, and in 
turn, how government exerts influence over these supposedly autonomous interests. 
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Although the state has powerful incentives to engage in corporatist modes of 
intermediation, for example, gaining support for, and in, the implementation of 
policy, it is argued that the process should not be characterised as one that is state- 
led. Rather, both state and interest groups should 'seek each other out' (Grant, 1985, 
3). 
Early corporatist notions focused on the macro-lcvcl and on the tripartite bargaining 
forms between government, labour and capital operating at the national level (Grant, 
1985). However, a need was soon identified to examine corporatist modes of 
intennediation at the local-(sectoral and policy) level. The practical applicability of 
the concept has however been hindered by the imprecise specification of what 
corporatism and indeed 'local corporatism' might actually involve (Cawson, 1985); 
"the first thing that strikes one as one reads through the recent literature on 
modem corporatism is the profound lack of agreement on what the concept 
actually refers to" (Panitch, 1980, cited in Grant, 1985,2). 
Its ambiguities derive from the problems associated with locating the concept within 
the different levels of state organisation, together with the relationships between 
policy modes, and the different processes of interest intermediation (Cawson, 1985). 
In all, the relevance of corporatist analysis for local political processes remains 
unclear (King, 1985). For example, Cawson and Saunders (1983, cited in Cawson, 
1985) advocate a 'dual-state' model in which corporatist forms of interest mediation 
and policy implementation are linked to national levels of decision making (King, 
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1985). They argue that central government's concern with production-related issues 
and securing the process of capital accumulation leads to tripartite arrangements in 
which the interests of both capital and labour are represented. In contrast, they 
suggest that interests other than those of capital tend to prevail in local state 
arrangements, which they regard as more concerned with the 'consumption-related 
issues of education, housing and welfare provision (Cawson, 1985). They do 
however allow, for local corporatist developments if, inter alia, the local state 
becomes more involved in production issues (King, 1985). For example, corporatist 
developments can take place in areas of sustained dcindustrialisation, where 
production issues have been placed high on the local political agenda and the local 
state is taking a more interventionist role in the local economy (Mayer, 1995). In 
these circumstances, local state agencies may intervene in a manner which involves 
negotiation with local Chambers of Commerce or trade union branches (Cawson, 
1985); 
"economic decline can generate corporatist alliances between local 
politicians, capital and labour in defence of local economies' (Urry, 1983, 
cited in King, 1985,204). 
The conceptualisation. is plagued further by several definitional ambiguities 
(Cawson, 1985; Valler, 1996). Some commentators (Hernes and Selvik, 1981) 
characterise forms of local politics as corporatist if there is merely evidence of 
increased public-private interaction. This clearly does not demonstrate whether there 
has been a real, as opposed to symbolic, shift in public policy practice. As Cawson 
61 
notes, 'much specificity in the concept of corporatism would be lost if we were to 
identify any kind of relationship between the local state and economic groups as 
tcorporatist" (1985,130, original emphasis). Simmie (1985) on the other hand, 
believes that interest groups have to be drawn from functionally differentiated 
organisations to pertain to corporatism, whilst Cawson remains sceptical, arguing 
that 'genuine' corporatist structures are 'unlikely to become as significant at the 
local level as elsewhere' (1985,128) because of three constraints: a lack of local 
government autonomy; the degree of centralisation of the economy; and the historic 
weakness of local producer organisations. This is in spite of the fact that; 
"shifts in the mode of state intervention, partly in response to the economic 
crisis of recent years, have led to more locally based attempts to influence the 
behaviour of local economies which involve a search for interest 
organisations, that might become corporatist partners in policy making" 
(Cawson, 1985,128); 
In contrast, Shaw (1994,1990) demonstrates how each of the three constraints above 
have been overcome in the North East of England, thus giving rise to a form of local 
corporatism. More recently, Pierre describes corporatist forms of local governance, 
but does emphasise that they occur 'primarily in the distributive sectors of local 
government' (1999,381) and only when local politics reflect the ideals of a 
participatory local democracy so that the interests of organised social groups can be 
represented. Cawson (1985) however, strongly argues that the foundations of local 
corporatism rcmain prcdominantly non-local. Hc advocatcs that 'local' corporatism 
62 
depends, inter alia, upon strong local state institutions and that 'in Britain the 
unitary structure of the state and the extent to which local government functions 
have to be centrally handed down by statute ... severely constrains the possibility of a 
viable local corporatism' (Cawson, 1985,146). Furthermore, he'argues that the 
relative weakness of local business organisations and local trade union councils in 
Britain impedes the development of an effective local corporatism. Ile therefore 
suggests that any 'local' dimension derives from the target of policy intervention as 
opposed to a territorial basis for the organisation, of participating bodies (Cawson, 
1985); 
"The most striking examples of the corporatist policy mode turn out on 
closer inspection to be where the local defines the object of policy rather than 
characterises the nature of the interest involved" (Cawson, 1985,145). 
Indeed, Cawson believes that the conditions for local corporatism are unlikely to be 
attained; 
"Economic decline -and mounting political pressure to alleviate its 
consequences, coupled with a policy of privatisation and perhaps the growth 
of a contract model of local service provision, may in time lead to a marked 
change in the role of the local state. But such a change is unlikely to be 
towards greater autonomy, and the kinds of corporatist interventions that may 
reshape the local political economy will be determined outside the reach of 
local political organisatioW' (Cawson, 1985,147). 
63 
This conclusion stands in marked contrast to the US based literature on local 
'growth coalitions' or 'growth machines'. The growth coalition concept has been 
predominantly advocated by Molotch (1988,1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987), 
but has influenced a substantial body of literature on the politics of local economic 
devclopment (Harding, 1995,1994,, 1991; Lloyd and Newlands, ý 1988; Cox and 
Mair, 1988; Bassett and Harloe, 1990; Cooke, 1989,1988). Growth coalition theory 
is an elite and instnunentalist approach to local public-private relations in which the 
development and use of land provides the focus for 'interest formation, competition, 
conflict and coalescence' (Valler, 1993,60; Molotch, 1976). As such, 'growth 
machines' typically comprise local coordinated land and property-oriented business 
interests. These are defined by Logan and Molotch (1987) as 'rentiers' or 'place 
entrepreneurs', and it is these interests, through their pursuit of exchange values (in 
the form of rent), that form growth coalitions or growth machines. Once formed, 
these coalitions attempt to harness the power of local government in support of 
policies and initiatives that increase the demand for land and therefore maximise the 
profit received through land rents (Cox and Mair, 1989b). 'Ibis original growth 
machine concept has been broadened however to encompass a wider range of local 
interest groups; 
'Initially the growth machine is viewed as an expression of the interests of 
rentiers and is quite emphatically concemed with maximising land, 
rents ... however, the growth machine has been broadened to include anybody 
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who becomes an entrepreneur in a particular place" (Cox and Mair, 1989b, 
138). 
The central core of land-bascd rcnticr elites thereby secure support from other local 
organised, interests whose success is likewise dependent upon the economic 
prosperity of the locality; ' for example, financial institutions, utility companies, 
universities, large retail companies, and media 'growth statesmen' (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). Together, these interests constitute a private sector- 
led coalition which emerges primarily out of a desire to, instrumentally 'control' 
local government and gain-access to local decision making processes and vital public 
resources. By forming powerful local elites, these interests can make specific 
demands of local government in order to further their own economic interests; often 
that local government should actively promote the area and maintain a favourable 
business climate that is attractive to potential investors (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). 
This ensures that pro-growth strategies are placed firmly on local political agendas. 
Local newspaper companies contribute to this process by acting as 'growth 
statesmen', promoting local growth and growth-related policies, and spreading the 
ideology that growth is in everyone's interest. In this way, the coalition identifies 
itself with the local community, gains popular support, and generally diverts 
attention away from issues relating to welfare, social justice and wealth distribution. 
The US based literature therefore argues that the urban development process is, in a 
sense, 'hi-jacked' by strong business-led coalitions and that local government is in 
effect by-passed as restrictive state barriers to economic development are overcome 
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by these local pro-growth elites (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). This 
particular argument however has much less cognisance in the UK. As Jessop et al 
(1998) observe, growth coalition theory offers a powerful explanation for urban 
dynamics during the rise and initial crisis of US Fordism, but beyond this context, it 
has limited applicability owing to the problems of cross-national comparison and 
translation. As previously demonstrated, analyses of urban politics must be rooted in 
the historically and spatially specific conditions within which urban coalitions 
emerge and local accumulation strategies are developed. So whilst growth coalition 
theory offers important considerations for understanding British urban politics, the 
more centralised state system and the continuing importance of local authorities in 
urban economic policy making (Valler, 1996,1993; Bassett and Harloe, 1990; 
Cooke, 1989,1988) means that the typology has less validity here in the UK than it 
does in the US (Wood, 1996; Harding, 1995,1994,1991; Lloyd and Newlands, 
1988); 
"Whatever the comparative insights to be gained about the transformation of 
urban governance in the UK (through emphasising the shift to urban 
entrepreneurialism and the emergence of growth coalitions) it is important to 
acknowledge that such fi-ameworks have their roots in the particular 
experiences of American cities, and thus may not adequately capture the 
element of continuity in both the structures of urban governance and the 
nature of urban leadership in the UK! ' (Shaw, 1994,50, original emphases). 
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Firstly, local governrnent has much less autonomy in Britain's unitary political 
system than it does in the American federal system of government; in particular, its 
ability to levy taxes on business is much less (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). Hence, 
the local business sector in the US has much more to gain from influencing local 
policies. Accordingly, local business interests are regarded as far more dependent on 
local state powers and local markets than their UK counterparts and therefore have 
more incentive to form strong business-led coalitions. This 'local dependence' (Cox 
and Mair, 1988) acts as a powerful mobilising force for private interests to come 
together to try and overcome growth restrictive state policies. 
Cox and Mair (1988,1989b; Cox, 1997) use 'local dependence' to explain why 
different interests coalesce and why coalitions actually emerge. Organisations and 
individuals with a major stake in local economic development have in common 
various place-specific social relations that immobilise them, or at the very least, limit 
their spatial alternatives to particular local, sub-regional (metropolitan), or even 
regional economies. The local dependence of firms derives firstly, from the 
immobility of the built environment, infmstructure and investment, and secondly, 
from the development of established relations in local supply and demand networks. 
Local capital becomes tied to, and therefore dependent upon local markets for sales, 
and therefore profit. For example, local utility companies are dependent upon a 
specified service area and local property developers become locked into particular 
markets because of local knowledge and reputation (Cox, 1997). Consequently, 
firms seeking to protect local operations, coalesce and attempt to harness the powers 
and resources of local government through the formation of a business coalition in 
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support of local growth. It is, in part, for these reasons that growth coalitions are 
predominantly a US phenomena; owing to the decentralised. state system, local 
capital is far more dependent upon the self-generation of local profit. 
Secondly, the emphasis given to land-based interests within growth coalitions may 
reflect the specific institutional arrangements governing land use and development in 
the US. Owing to a general lack of public controls over land development, the land 
market in the US is relatively 'open' when compared to the more comprehensively 
controlled and regulated land market in'Britain (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). These 
factors combined explain why 'in Britain, there is no tradition of the business- 
dominated growth coalition' (Cooke, 1988,194, emphasis added). There is evidence 
to suggest however that there are local authority-led growth coalitions. Cooke argues 
that 'to the extent that "growth coalitions" have existed in Britain they are more 
likely to have been formed by Labour local authorities, often directly through links 
between the organised labour movement and local indusW' (1988,194). Ile 
highlights the continuing significance of local state control and illustrates how in the 
UK, local government often instigates coalition fonnation, for exmnple, in Swindon 
(Bassett and Harloe, 1990), in Glasgow (Boyle and Hughes, 1995) and in Leeds 
(Haughton and Williams, 1996; Haughton and Whitney, 1994). In Britain, the 
centralised nature of the political sphere often results in local authorities seeking the 
cooperation of local businesses in an attempt to overcome the shackles of central 
government. He therefore concludes that; 
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66many localities do not have a strong or politically-motivated business-class. 
Thus, to the extent that growth coalitions have a role to play in the 
contemporary period ... many will have to be 
dominated not by the business 
class but by political and professional representatives not wholly ensnared by 
the profit-motive" (Cooke, 1988,192). 
This in turn highlights another criticism of Molotch's (1976) original formulation. 
Lloyd and Newlands believe that the theory of, and overall approach to local 
goverriment is 'poorly developed' (1988,35). For example, local govemments may 
actually share the growth ideology of business and wish to actively promote their 
economic interests, whereas Molotch (1976) describes a situation where local 
government is coerced by business interests to assist in the promotion of growth 
(Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). The process by which local govcmment is 'hi-jacked' 
by, or drawn into a growth coalition is not explaincd. Indccd, cven within the US, 
growth coalition theory is not, without its critics. Cox (1997) questions the 
prioritisation of the private over the public sector and criticises the over-acceptance 
of a reduced local authority role in the US context. In particular, he argues that the 
'local dependence' of the public sector is understated, highlighting that local 
governments too are dependent upon local tax revenues. This very often makes they 
themselves ardent advocates of local economic development policies. 
Commentators have also criticised the lack of clarity that surrounds the specification 
of the growth 'machine' itself Firstly, the definition of the growth machine has been 
inconsistent (Cox and Mair, 1989b; Valler, 1996,1993; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). 
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As described, the original land-based characterisation of the growth machine has 
been broadened to encompass a variety of financial, cultural and educational 
interests, however, Cox and Mair (1989b) note further that not all these rentiers 
necessarily belong to the growth machine and that their membership depends, in 
part, upon the territorial base of their operations (Logan and Molotch, 1987,238- 
239); 
"So it is not just being a rentier that seems important: it is being a rentier at a 
particular scale. This observation is never theorized" (Cox and Mair, 1989b, 
138). 
Confusion therefore presides over the functional and territorial basis of coalition 
formation and membership. Secondly, the mechanisms for interaction between 
member groups are insufficiently specified. For example, Molotch (1976) argues that 
growth is the overriding goal around which economic and political groups rally, and 
yet this downplays any differentiation that may exist between member interests and 
their policy concerns (Valler, 1993). For exmnple, local government is exposed to a 
range of other interests, such as those of labour and the local community (Lloyd and 
Newlands, 1988; Cooke, 1988), and so the potential for conflict within the growth 
machine and between member groups is masked behind this supposedly common 
aim. Partially in response to this economic instnimentalism, more recent governance 
literature (Jessop et al, 1998; Painter, 1998; Lauria, 1997) has directed attention 
towards local political processes and the nuances of cooperation, competition, 
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conflict and conflict resolution that are inherent in the development and 
implementation of policy and associated processes of coalition building. 
This focus has favoured and developed urban regime theory (Fainstein and Fainstein, 
1983; Elkin, 1987; Stone and Sanders, 1987; Stone, 1987a, 1987b, 1989,1993). 
Founded upon the notion that 'politics matters' (Stone, 1987a, 6), regime theory 
offers a distinctive approach to the study of the internal politics of coalition building. 
It is attractive to urban theorists for a number of reasons. It questions whether there 
is a single, overriding economic imperative, -or 'whether there are multiple 
"imperatives" that public officials must balance' (Stone, 1987a, 12). It thereby 
focuses attention upon the processes of cooperation and coordination between 
governmental and non-governmental actors and, in turn, addresses the diversity of 
interests and political agendas that coexist within the city. Urban regime theory 
rejects; 
"the notion of some unitary interest ... in favour of coalition-building between 
4multiple imperatives', which in turn derive distinctive and variable policy 
trajectones" (Valler, 1996,386). 
It therefore has the potential to understand a variety of responses to urban change 
(Stoker, 1995). In so doing, it begins to address the social complexity of local 
political processes and the privileged position of certain interests. Complexity is 
central to the regime perspective, as it emphasises that contemporary urban politics 
are characterised by diverse and extensive patterns of interdependence between 
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institutions and actors. Indeed, congruent with regulation theory, urban regime 
theory assumes that the process of govemance is about much more than govemment; 
"Successful governance, whether of a city, a nation-state, international 
relations, or economic processes almost always depends on the availability 
and mobilization of resources and actors beyond those that are formally part 
of goven=ent" (Painter, 1997,128). 
Thus, 'to be effective, governments must blend their capacities with those of various 
non-governmental actors' (Stone, 1993,6, original emphasis). Hence, an urban 
regime is defined as 'the informal arrangements through which public bodies and 
private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out 
governing decisions' (Stone, 1989,6). Government is driven to cooperate with those 
sectors of society who possess the economic and knowledge resources essential to 
achieving policy goals (Stoker, 1995). This tends to be predominantly business 
interests who, because of their control over the economy, through investment 
decisions and ownership of productive assets, possess a privileged role in policy 
making. It is argued therefore that through the process of regime formation, the 
division of labour between the private sector and govermnent is bridged by a shared 
sense of purpose and direction (Stoker, 1995). Tbe resulting regime has 'access to 
institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making goveming 
decisions' (Stone, 1989,4, original emphasis). 
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Having access to financial and institutional resources and possessing a privileged 
position in policy making combine to ensure that one has the 'capacity to act' 
(Stone, 1989). Urban regime theory analyses local politics in a way that recognises 
new sets of power relations, and directs attention away from power as 'social 
control' towards an understanding of power expressed through social production. 
The social production perspective is concerned with the 'capacity to act'. This rests 
on the need for leadership in a complex society and the capacity of certain interests 
in the coalition to provide that leadership (Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1989). Governing 
capacity is produced through coalition building and -coalition membership is 
dependent upon possessing the 'power to' act. This model supersedes social control 
conceptions of urban political power where elite groups exercise 'power over' those 
not participating in the regime; 
"What is at issue is not so much domination and subordination as a capacity 
to act and accomplish goals. The power struggle concerns, not control and 
resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act - power to, not power 
ovee, (Stone, 1989,229). 
This form of power involves actors and institutions 'gaining and fusing the capacity 
to act by blending their resources, skills and purposes into a coalition: a regime 
(Stoker, 1995). Regime theorists therefore believe that effective action flows from 
the cooperative efforts of diverse interests and organisations. The crux of regime 
politics concerns how privileged sectors combine forces for a particular policy 
initiative or activity, and how in that process, certain ideas and interests prevail 
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(Stoker, 1995). Urban regime theory was initially praised for its ability to detail these 
nuances of the urban political process. More recently however, it has been criticised 
for concentrating upon, and emphasising these local processes at the expense of 
those operating at extra-local scales; 
"it has been asserted that it is the local conditions which lead to regimes 
forming and extra-local processes are only considered as mediating through 
to policy outcomes rather than explaining the existence of the regime. This 
means that regime theory is [too often seen as] incapable of explaining the I 
series of structural changes in urban governance" (Ward, 1997a, 1495). 
For ex=ple, Stone (1989) focuses upon the internal politics of coalitions to the 
detriment of other contextual forces, when indeed, the capacity and policy direction 
of regimes may be significantly constrained or enhanced by access to non-local 
powers and resources. To be effective therefore, regime theory needs to address 
exogenous conditions as well as developments in the internal dynamics of coalition 
building (Stoker, 1995). Moreover, urban regime theory has all too often been 
emPiricist in nature and centred around the US context (Ward, 1997a, 1996,1995, 
Jessop et al, 1998; Painter, 1998; Lauria, 1997; - Stoker, 1995; Stoker - and 
Mossberger, 1994; Harding, 1995,1994; Stone, 1993,1989; Stone and Sanders, 
1987). In fact, much of the US literature is underpinned with the assumption that a 
regime exists. Rather than prove its existence, commentators have chosen instead to 
focus ýupon the orientation of the policies undertaken' (Ward, 1997a, 1495). 
Successful regimes, according to Stone's original definition, are relatively rare 
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(Stone, 1989) and yet there is an implicit assumption within much of the literature 
'that all, or at least most, cities have regimes and that one task of the urban political 
scientist is to categorize regimes into different types' (Painter, 1997,129; Stoker and 
Mossberger, 1994; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b). As this approach has 
been applied in more and more cities, it has given rise to a proliferation of regime 
typologies. In an attempt to overcome much of its US ethnocentrism, the concept of 
the urban regime has been broadened even further to 'fit' (DiGactano and 
Klemanski, 1993a) the British urban experience. 
Stone (1987b) outlines three broad configurations which derive from particular 
coalition types. Firstly, the 'corporate' regime closely parallels the growth coalition 
concept in that the development interests of pro-growth interests are centralised. 
Secondly, the 'caretaker' regime comprises mainly smaller scale business interests 
who have few aspirations for growth or change and so seek to limit the tasks of 
governance to routine service provision (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a). 
Typically fiscally conservative, caretaker regimes act to oppose growth strategies 
which may lead to increased taxation. They seek to preserve the status quo, and in so 
doing, call for passive rather than active regime strategies (Stoker and Mossberger, 
1994). Finally, non-business interests seeking to moderate or restrict the rate of 
growth and development and thereby protect certain land use values in the locality, 
coalesce into 'progressive' coalitions. These typologies begin to address the 
complexity of state-non-governmental relations, however, such diversity is further 
complicated by the emergence of coalitions which cut across those typologies 
already outlined. 
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Hence, Stone (1993,1989) extends his original formulation to encompass 
development regimes, maintenance regimes, middle-class progressive regimes and 
regimes devoted to lower-class opportunity expansion. Building upon these 
typologies, DiGaetano, and Klemanski (1993a) introduce a fivefold typology of 
regime types: pro-growth market-led regimes, which seek to reduce or eliminate the 
planning and regulatory powers of local government in order to facilitate market-led 
urban growth and development; pro-growth government-led regimes, which use 
public sector resources, oflen in partnership with the private sector, to encourage, 
promote and subsidise private investment through grants, loans and other such 
inducements; growth management regimes, which in a manner akin to Stone's 
(1987b) progressive regime, seeks to moderate or restrict the kind of growth and rate 
of development within a locality; social reform regimes, which emphasise 
community rather than business development; and caretaker regimes, which broadly 
follow the principles outlined by Stone's (1987b) equivalent regime above. 
Duplicating and cross-cutting these typologies further, Stoker and Mossberger 
(1994) identify three overarching regime categories, namely: organic; instrumental; 
and symbolic. Organic regimes reiterate the principles ofthe caretaker and 
maintenance regime, whilst instrumental regimes are project-orientated. The main 
participants are motivated by attaining specific goals and achieving tangible results. 
In contrast to organic and carctakcr regimcs, symbolic rcgimcs arc conccmcd with 
transition. This category comprises Stone's (1987b) original progressive regime, his 
revised middle-class progressive and lower-class opportunity expansion regimes 
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(ibid., 1993), and the urban revitalisation regime. Symbolic urban revitalisation 
regimes attempt to fundamentally change a city's ideology or image in order to 
attract investment. 
3.2 Conclusion 
The proliferation of regime typologies in this manner has opened up a debate within 
urban regime theory and within urban politics more generally. As described above, 
urban regime theory was initially praised for its ability to detail the nuances of the 
urban political process, and in so doing, was praised for its ability to account for 
issues of both continuity and change within evolving institutional contexts. For 
example, urban regime theory recognises that whilst the lead role of local authorities 
has been challenged, they often remain important facilitators and coordinators within 
new institutional an-angements (Valler, 1996; Stone, 1993,1989,1987a, 1987b; 
Bassett and Harloe, 1990; Cooke, 1989,1988). More recently however, urban 
regime theory has been criticised for emphasising continuity in regime evolution 
rather than change (Jessop et al, 1998; Ward, 1997a; Stoker, 1995). In a manner akin 
to regulation theory, it has been criticised for emphasising stability at the expense of 
change by focusing upon the typological categorisation of policy outcomes as 
opposed to identifying evolving mechanisms and processes which drive the 
formation and maintenance of regimes; 
"It is the mechanisms underpinning the forming of regimes rather than 
superficially similar concrete outcomes which will provide urban regime 
analysis with theoretical power" (Ward, 1996,429). 
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Regime theory proposes that the causal relationships underlying policy development 
are very complex and so it should be used to demonstrate and explain these 
relationships. However, many accounts of urban politics lack any explicit analysis of 
interest formation, or indeed, regime coalescence, competition and conflict. As 
Stoker observes, a 'regime terminology is used but a regime analysis is not really 
provided' (1995,55). 
All these typologies focus heavily on the nature of policy outcomes resulting from 
each regime type, thereby underemphasising the extent to which coalitions can 
incorporate elements of more than one regime type, neglecting the mechanisms and 
processes by which coalitions form, and negating their evolving character. 
Furthermore, by broadening the definition and categorisation of urban regimes in 
this way, the concept loses much of its analytical rigour (Painter, 1997). In contrast, 
recent empirical work in the UK has shifted away from the categorisation of regime 
types, towards a concern with specifying and understanding the practices, 
mechanisms and processes contributing to regime formation, maintenance or 
decline. Just as regulation is viewed as a process, rather than an established state, 
regimes too can be understood as dynamic forms in a continual process of formation. 
Given that a regime is rarely static, it is important to investigate the processes of 
cooperation, conflict, and conflict resolution that may, or may not determine interest 
coalescence and potential regime formation; in essence, the processes and struggles 
involved in 'regime formation, reproduction, and crisis' (Painter, 1997,13 0). 
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The current debates within urban politics and theorising urban politics are therefore 
acknowledged, and it is recognised that there has been a shift away from categorising 
coalitions and regimes as particular 'types'. However, whilst it is also rccognised 
that the precise configuration of entrepreneurial fonns of governance has been 
discussed at length (Lauria, 1997; Judge et al, 1995; Healey et al, 1995; Judd and 
Parkinson, 1990; Harvey, 1989; inter alia), some of the recent literature has tended 
to assume that certain overarching patterns exist, without first identifying their 
presence adequately. Therefore, specifying the character andform of change is still a 
necessary requirement of empirical enquiry, since the debate; 
"around the new local governance has often focused on overall patterns and 
trajectones - to fragmentation, entrepreneurialism, a new corporatism and so .P 
forth - at the expense of detailed concern for who does precisely what, when 
and how. The commentary thus tends to distil particular styles, themes or 
frameworks which seek to 'capture' the essence of change" (Valler et al, 
forthcoming, 7). 
Consequently, the specification of who does what, when and how is often neglected 
and masked behind these larger claims. In essence, in order to. explain the 
restructuring of local governance, we must first and foremost adequately and 
accurately identify and describe the processes underpinning this restructuring. Valler 
ct al therefore argue for a; 
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"renewed commitment to detailed empirical investigation and reporting 
greater precision here is essential to illuminate the lineaments of change and 
the character of new forms. Part of this work must involve detailed attention 
to the constitution of roles within new arrangements. This involves 
questions of who does what and wheW' (forthcoming, 7-8). 
When specifying the character and form of urban politics it is therefore important to 
acknowledge the debates outlined above and set out: firstly, to identify the 
relationships that constitute local urban politics; secondly, to examine the nature and 
dynamic character of those'relationships; and finally conclude as to whether or not a 
coalition or regime exists, and whether it is appropriate to demonstrate this forrii of 
urban politics using a particular model or typology (John and Cole, 1998; Jessop et 
al, 1998; Ward, 1997a, 1997b). Moreover, it is important to locate these 
investigations within the wider processes of state restructuring, uneven development 
and capital accumulation (Jessop et al, 1998; Ward, 1997a, 1997b, 1996). In essence 
therefore, the political process is examined in its strategic. context. Analysis such as 
this, will lead to a greater understanding of how institutional forms, and social, 
political and economic practices react with wider economic and political forces to 





ChapterTwo has demonstrated how recent theoretical debates within both regulation 
and governance have led to emerging methodological concerns flor theoretically 
grounded concrete research (. Iessop et al, 1998; Painter, 1998; I., uma, 1997; 
Goodwin and Painter, 1997, Painter, 1997). It has been shown just how these 
literatures attempt to specify tile historically and Spatially Contingent 
interrelationships between the economy, political institutions and civil society in 
particular placcs (Jessop et al, 1999). This rcsonates strongly with the Changing 
Urban and Regional Systern (CURS) localities' pro. ject during the late 1980s 
(Cooke, 1989). The proJect and the cnstfing 'localities debate' centrcd fundzimentally 
upon a set of methodological concerns surrounding the value of' undertaking 
empirical research within a defined and defirnited geographical area (Warde, 1999). 
It sought to determine how localities l'unction intcrnally, the balance of' local and 
extra-local processes, and to what extent localities are actively involved in their own 
transf'on, nations and articulate to wider national and international processes of' 
change (Cookc, 1989). 
The regulationist call flor concrete research shares these concerns, however (here are 
sorne important distinctions. For example, the locality does not provide the starting 
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point for regulationists. Rather, regulationists start from the premise that all 
processes, of both higher and lower abstractions, are grounded in concrete social 
practice, since it is only in concrete social, practices that these processes arise. 
Therefore, the social context within which regulation is temporally and spatially 
embedded is paramount. Context is 'central to understanding social practice and 
practice [i]s central to understanding regulation or lack of it' (Goodwin and Paintcr, 
1997,28). In this way, analysis of the concrete highlights the complex pmctices and 
geographies of regulation (Goodwin and Painter, 1997), which has given rise, to a 
concern for the role of space in the geography of regulation and governance. 
As part of a wider debate within the Social Sciences concerning the philosophy and 
method of case study research (Sayer, 1992; Cox and Mair, 1991,1989a; Duncan, 
1989; Duncan and Savage, 1989; Warde, 1989; Platt, 1988; Smith, 1987; Grcgson, 
1987), both sets of literature aim to clarify the links between theory, epistemology 
and method within social research confined to particular places, and demonstrate 
that geographically-delimited research goes beyond merc empiricism. Indeed, the 
study of urban politics has very recently been criticised for failing 'to provide 
penetrating theoretical analyses ... succumbing instead to empiricism and 'excessive 
localism" (Jessop et al, 1998,6). Criticisms primarily surround the more agency- 
centred accounts of urban politics which focus upon the mobilisation of actors into 
local coalitions and fail to satisfactorily link these empirical outcomes with the 
diverse causal processes operating within and beyond the locality. Furthering 
methodological debate is a logical extension of the current theoretical debates within 
these disciplines. Hence, regulationist and governance work is very much concerned 
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with how to theorise and empirically investigate the interaction of diverse causal 
processes across space and across time (Jessop et al, 1998; Lauria, 1997) in the 
attempt to understand how local and extra-local processes mediate contingently. An 
epistemology is therefore required which facilitates the interpretative understanding 
of the motivations and reasoning of local actors, together with cultural norms, 
institutional practices and structural pressures (Sarre, 1987). Positivist and empiricist 
approaches, together with structurally-oriented and agency-orientcd approaches are 
therefore rejected in favour of an approach which demonstrates a concern for both 
structure and agency. 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) provides a useful ontological starting point for 
this type of research since it avoids the dogmatic orientation towards either structure 
or agency. It advocates that social structures are constituted by agency and yet are the 
very medium of this constitution (Cloke et al, 1991), in other words, structures both 
enable and constrain human action, as action influences and reconstitutes structure. 
Structuration theory therefore provides significant epistemological insights, however 
it remains a rather formal and abstract theory, providing little guidance as to just 
how structure interacts with agency in practice. In response to this, many 
commentators have argued that critical realism is a more appropriate research 
foundation for both the structural analysis of social systems and the explanation of 
individual action (Sarre, 1987). Emerging empirical work by realists themselves 
(Sarre, 1987; Pratt, 1995), the influential work of Andrew Sayer in particular (1992, 
1985,1984), and the contributions made by both the localities and regulation 
debates, have provided clearer indications of how an investigation into both structure 
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and agency can be achieved (Cox and Mair, 1991,1989a; Cooke, 1989; Duncan, 
1989; Duncan and Savage, 1989). Thus, it is argued that realism provides a more 
explicit epistemological and methodological foundation for empirical research that 
seeks to elucidate causality in this manner (Saffe, 1987; Sayer, 1992; Pratt, 1995). 
4.1 Theory, epistemology and method 
Realism assumes a stratified and differentiated world comprising events, 
mechanisms and structures, all operating in an open system where there are complex, 
reproducing and transforming interactions between structure and agency. Realist 
philosophy is based on the use of abstraction to identify 'necessary' causal powers of 
specific structures that are realised. under specific 'contingent' conditions (Sarre, 
1987). Certain causal powers exist 'necessarily' because of the characteristics and 
form of the objects possessing them, but it is contingent upon certain circumstances 
whether or not these causal powersare activated (Sayer, 1992). 
The central tenet of realism is the intimate link between abstract theory, which 
considers the structures and mechanisms underpinning causal relationships, and 
concrete research which explains particular events by showing how structures and 
mechanisms interact with contingent circumstances (Sarre, 1987, Sayer, 1992, Pratt, 
1995). This distinction between abstract and concrete, and the synthesis of the two 
represents the most crucial contribution of realism. Through its 'attempt to walk a 
knife-edge between ... the abyss of abstract theory and the equally daunting abyss of 
empiricism' (Smith, 1987,60), it contributes to an understanding of which 
relationships are necessary and which are contingent, and thus goes some way 
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towards redressing the traditional dichotomies associated with structure and agency, 
the theoretical and the empirical, the global and the local, and increasingly, the social 
and the spatial. 
Realist thought provides a means of overcoming these dichotomies by emphasising 
that structures, mechanisms, events and agency, as conceptual abstractions, can be 
conceived as operating at all spatial scalcs. This interconnectivity illustrates the 
hierarchical basis to how 'space makes a difference' (Duncan, 1989) to social 
processes, a hierarchy based on the notion of causal and contingent relations. Levels 
of abstraction (Cox and Mair, 1989a), or levels of conceptualisation, allow 
researchers to advance theoretical propositions about a locality (or what could 
otherwise be referred to as a particular spatial intersection of both necessary and 
contingent processes). For example, for regulationists, the abstract is dependent upon 
the concrete since, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the processes that 
define higher level abstractions only arise in concrete social practices. Moreover, 
investigating the spatial differentiation of regulation also requires concrete research 
since 'specifying elements of regulation in the abstract cannot establish how, and 
with what effects, regulation elements interact in particular geographical contexts. 
Nor, of course, does an abstraction establish how they vary over time' (Goodwin and 
Painter, 1997,14). 
Theoretically grounded concrete research can thereby contribute to the construction 
of theoretical frameworks outlining the general and specific interactions within a 
single place, or across several places. Duncan (1989) advocates using the 
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conceptualisations: 4contingent local variation'. where spatial contingency affects 
how social mechanisms operate in practice; and 'causal local processes', where 
social mechanisms themselves are locally derived. For example, restructuring local 
governance is undeniably a response to (inter)national processes of economic and 
political change, whilst equally, one cannot deny the significance of sub-national and 
local histories, cultures and social forms in specifying such processes and mediating 
them in particular ways. Chapter Two has outlined the meta-narratives of local state 
restructuring, inter-urban competition, entrepreneurialism and place promotion, 
whilst Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate how 'space matters' (Duncan, 1989; 
Warde, 1989) by illustrating spatial variation and local specificity within these meta- 
naffatives. 
Realism therefore helps the researcher to relate local characteristics to the concrete 
mediation and constitution of general processes, hence facilitating an abstract- 
concrete synthesis. Analysis and interpretation between empirical data and 
theoretical propositions connects, by way of a two-way causal, arrow, particular 
concrete outcomes, events, strategies, institutional mechanisms and practices, to the 
structural forces which mutually facilitate and constrain them (Saffe, 1987). 
Therefore, the underlying value of a research method that is predicated broadly upon 
a realist approach, is the acknowledgement of the multiple iterations between theory, 
experience and method. It is widely perceived that this enhances the validity of 
research. 
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An iterative process of conceptualisation and reconceptualisation with continual 
reference to theoretical propositions, ensures greater validity by identifying 
conceptual inconsistencies. Conceptual frameworks can then be adapted if their 
meanings change significantly in new contexts (Sarre, 1987). 'The quality of any 
realist research design is thus improved by virtue- of it being explicit about the 
derivation of its conceptual categories and research questions. Continual feedback 
between the theoretical propositions, the conceptual framework,, the research 
questions, the methodology and the resultant empirical information, all finally feed 
back into abstract social theory (Pratt, 1995) as part of the process of synthesis that 
links the abstract and the concrete across comparative cases. In this manner, the task 
of empirical research is to show how, in practice, general processes are concretely 
constituted and how these combine in various contingent ways to create the 
particular outcomes one wants to explain, in this instance, the form of local 
governance arrangements ý surrounding the promotion of places. Theoretical 
categories are essential to 'access' necessary relations (abstract theory) and empirical 
study is needed to gain an understanding of contingent conditions (concrete 
research). To uncover both necessary and contingent relations, different methods of 
empirical research may need to be used. - 
EmPirical research can be either extensive or intensive, but each is distinguished by 
different types of research questions and different techniques and methods. Intensive 
research looks for causal relationships and questions how a process works and what 
agents do in a particular case or limited number of cases. In contrast, extensive 
research is concerned with discovering general patterns and common regularities in a 
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population as a whole (Sayer, 1992). Typical methods of extensive research include 
large scale surveys and formal questionnaires. These produce findings that are 
representative and largely descriptive, but which lack explanatory power. Intensive 
research, on the other hand, employs mainly qualitative techniques such as 
interviews, ethnography and participant observation, predominantly within a case 
study approach (Sayer, 1992). Intensive research cannot claim to be widely 
representative, but does allow the realisation of certain phenomena to be explained. 
The methods within these different research designs are not mutually exclusive, what 
is different however is the assumptions upon which each method is based (Sayer, 
1992). It is worth highlighting that the distinction between these different research 
designs does not equate to the distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
research methods (Philip, 1998; Brannen, 1992a, 1992b; Bryman, 1992). Both 
research designs can employ both methods. In fact, the use of a large scale survey 
need not be devoid of attempts to understand the motivations or reasoning of 
respondents (Sayer, 1992). The end use of a survey depends on the types of 
questions asked and can be used to complement other types of extensive and 
intensive research techniques. Closed questions requiring a simple yes or no answer 
lend themselves to quantitative analysis and descriptive generalisation. Open 
questions however, requiring relatively detailed comments, can be qualitatively 
analysed and used as a basis on which to construct theoretical and conceptual 
fi-ameworks; from which interview questions could be based. 
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4.2 Research themes and processes 
Reflecting these concerns, this thesis adopts a two-stage research design, comprising 
a large scale questionnaire survey and two comparative case studies. This extensive- 
intensive mix facilitates the identification of broad trends in the pattern of local 
place promotional strategy development and allows the investigation of distinctive 
experiences of place promotion and associated institutional frameworks in particular 
places. The major reasons behind this chosen methodology are twofold. Firstly, as 
outlined in Chapter One, there have been many competing claims in the literature, 
pertaining to both - the increased and decreased significance of place promotion 
(Lovering, 1995; Mayer, 1995; Gold and Ward, 1994; Philo and Kearns, 1993; 
Harvey, 1989), and yet there is little detailed empirical evidence on which to base 
these claims. The survey therefore addresses this deficit by revealing, inter alia, the 
extent to which these strategies are currently being pursued. The survey facilitates 
the identification of regularities and anomalies in place promotional strategy 
development and therefore provides clues as to the existence of particular 
mechanisms operating across Britain (Saffe, 1987). 
Building upon the literature and the themes previously outlined, case study analysis 
seeks to question the theoretical propositions identified in Chapters Two and Three. 
In particular, the case studies specify and explain the fonn of local governance 
arrangements that have developed in support of place promotion in two British 
cities. Detailed analysis of these political and institutional forms, and their 
interaction with local economic and social relations and wider processes of 
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restructuring, can be used to form conclusions that are of significance to the 
changing nature of local governance more generally. 
Aggregate research 
The survey, in essence, has three principal aims: firstly, to determine the overall 
pattern of local place promotional strategy development, including for example, the 
extent to which these strategies are being conducted and by whom; secondly, at an 
aggregate level, to specify the institutional roles and functions of the different public 
and private sector organisations involved in place promotion; and thirdly, to examine 
temporal and spatial diversity in both of the above. Its main purpose therefore is to 
identify aggregate patterns and trends in local place promotional strategy 
development and associated institutional formation; information which can then be 
used to direct and inform subsequent case study analysis of the causal processes 
defining SP, atially differentiated patterns and locally distinctive strategies and 
institutional arrangements. 
In advance of the full exercise, a pilot survey was administered to six local 
authorities located within Yorkshire and neighbouring counties as a method of 
identifying any problems with the initial questionnaire design. The authorities 
chosen represented a mix of metropolitan, unitary, county and district councils in the 
hope that any difficulties completing the questionnaire encountered by each authority 
type would be highlighted at this stage. Problems of this nature were not identified, 
however the exercise did usefully reveal a few minor flaws in the initial 
questionnaire design. In particular, the pilot responses highlighted the complexity 
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associated with the historical and present day interconnectivity of departments and 
departmental responsibility; complexity which the amended questionnaire tried to 
address. Responsibility for place promotion spans Economic Development and 
Planning departments, the Chief Executive's department, Strategic Policy, Tourism, 
Leisure, Culture, and Environment departments. The related responses however, 
proved difficult to analyse, and so with hindsight, it is questionable as to whether 
this level of complexity could ever really be gleaned through a questionnaire survey 
alone. 
In addition, there were a number of alterations to design and layout, especially in 
relation to the clarity of instructions where it was particularly evident that 
instructions had been misunderstood or missed altogether. In order to maximise the 
response rate, every effort was made to ensure that the questionnaire was concise 
and easily comprehensible, whilst asking detailed questions and providing adequate 
space for responses, so that valid and interesting conclusions could be drawn. 
Greater clarity would result in the more accurate reporting of behaviour and so easy 
response methods were used. The questionnaire comprised two types of questions: 
those which required the respondent to simply tick boxes; and open questions which 
required a short written commentary to more detailed questions, for example asking 
respondents to support their answers to other questions. To maximise the 
respondents' interest in the questionnaire and provide greater richness of data, there 
is a mix of questions between those requiring mere description and those pressing 
for more detailed explanation of the policy and institutional processes operating in 
their locality. Overall, the final questionnaire design was an iterative process and 
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was informed by a variety of sources, including literature reviews, the pilot survey, 
and pilot interviews that were conducted with four of the local authority officers who 
had completed the pilot questionnaire. As a general point, the large number of 
partnerships in place promotional activity and the wide ranging involvement of non- 
governmental actors were both immediately obvious from the pilot questionnaires, 
thereby reinforcing the need to investigate the institutional roles and fraxneworks that 
are emerging in support of place promotion. 
The postal survey was distributed across England, Scotland and Wales. Being 
efficient in both time and resources, a postal questionnaire is the most appropriate 
method of gathering geographically-spread data and is most appropriate for the type 
of general data being sought at this stage of the research (Burgess, 1993; Bryman, 
1989; Hoinville and Jowell et al, 1987). The final questionnaire was administered 
during February 1997 to 300 local authorities across Britain. It was felt that this 
number of questionnaires would represent British local authorities to a sufficient 
degree, whilst keeping the project manageable. 
A complete list of British local authorities was obtained from the Municipal 
Yearbook 1997 and random number tables were used to select those authorities 
included in the survey. The sample was not stratified according to the type of local 
authority (metropolitan, county, district or unitary), as at this stage of the research it 
could not be asswned that local authority type affects the pattern of place 
promotional strategy development. A truly random sample ensures that the resultant 
data set is as unbiased as possible and is free of any presumed influencing factors. It 
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was for this reason again that the final data set was not weighted according to any 
pre-dctermined factors. 
The Municipal Yearbook usefully further divides authorities into their service 
functions, in this instance economic development, and for each, identifies a contact 
person and the relevant department, even in those authorities where officially there is 
no economic development or planning department. Questionnaires were therefore 
addressed to the named economic development contact in each authority, and the 
covering letter requestedthat the questionnaire be passed on to the most relevant 
person in their department. This method ensured that authorities had an equally 
random chance of being included in the survey, irrespective of whether they conduct 
economic development activities, thus obtaining a more accurate picture of the 
extent to which British local authorities conduct place promotional activity. For 
example, a sample of authorities obtained from just tho§e authorities with economic 
development departments would overemphasise the extent to which this activity, and 
aspects of it, are undertaken. 
A final response rate was obtained in May 1997 following a single round of postal 
and telephone reminders respectively. The pilot process, and the fact that the 
questionnaire was sent to a named contact no doubt contributed to the overall 
success of the final survey; achieving an overall valid response rate of 74% (see 
Appendix One for a copy of the questionnaire). This figure is well above the average 
expected response rates for a survey of this nature (Burgess, 1993; Bryman, 1989). 
The covering letter, colourful questionnaire and refined layout may have also 
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contributed to this high response rate. The covering letter plays an important role in 
setting the research context and equipping the respondent with sufficient infonnation 
so that they can successfully complete the questionnaire and provide the correct type 
of information. Assurances of confidentiality also enhances the accuracy of response. 
It should be noted however, that the high response rate may also, in part, be a 
reflection of the nature of place promotional activity. Respondents may have 
perceived the completion of the questionnaire and the inclusion of promotional 
material in their response, as a public relations and marketing exercise in itselE 
Higher response rates are also easier to achieve within the public, as opposed to the 
private sector, owing to the fact that local authorities and local authority officers are 
accountable to the public. In summary therefore, the questionnaire was administered 
to 306 (including the six valid pilot survey responses) of the 446 local authorities in 
Britain. This equates to 69% of all British authorities. 236 responses were received 
in total, of which 226 were valid. The remaining 10 provided various reasons why 
they could not assist with the research, most commonly owing to a shortage of staff 
resources and time. The overall valid response rate of 74% ensures that the resultant 
findings represent just over half (51%) of all the local authorities in Britain. 
In order to contain the project within manageable boundaries, this thesis concentrates 
upon the place promotional activities designed to attract inward investment 
undertaken by economic development departments, as opposed to the promotional 
activities conducted by tourism, leisure or external relations departments. This point 
was made firmly in the covering letter and in an attempt to avoid confusion, place 
promotion was defined in both the covering letter and the questionnaire as 'the 
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deliberate use of marketing in the attraction of inward investment and/or the 
development of new place images'. Despite all attempts to gear responses to this 
particular form of place promotion, difficulties arose where respondents had missed 
or misinterpreted the requirements. Some respondents included tourism-related 
activity in their overall responses, others divided the two activities and provided 
additional information on tourism. The majority of this additional information could 
simply be dismissed where appropriate, however, in some instances, it was 
impossible to distinguish between the two activities and the so the whole response 
had to be dismissed. 
A ftuther issue relates to the changing administrative and spatial context for policy 
making. Local Government Reorganisation was underway in England, Scotland and 
Wales at the time of survey administration. Hence, some respondents found it 
difficult to respond to certain questions. For example, those respondents in new 
unitary authorities, where old government structures no longer existed, found it 
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difficult to answer questions relating to historical change in place promotional 
activity and departmental responsibility. The reorganisation of departments and 
departmental responsibilities made it very difficult for these respondents to answer 
particular questions. Furthermore, the questionnaire was administered at the end of 
the financial year; a period of the year which is perhaps more busy than most. This 
may explain the delay (from February to May) in receiving questionnaires. 
There were also the general misunderstandings that one expects with a survey of this 
nature (Burgess, 1993; Bryman, 1989; Hakim, 1987). In the absence of the 
95 
researcher to guide the respondent through the questionnaire, problems arose where 
respondents had misinterpreted written instructions or even missed questions and 
instructions altogether. For example, some respondents misread or missed the 
filtering instructions between questions, leaving questions they should have 
answered blank and answering questions they were not required to. The instructions 
for one particular question were perhaps not as explicit as they might have been. The 
question referred to the amount of expenditure devoted to place promotional activity 
in the current budgetary arrangements. However, the question was not explicit 
enough and left too much room for the respondents to interpret it in their own way. 
This resulted in a variety of different responses. Owing to the aforementioned timing 
of the questionnaire, this resulted in both gross and net figures for the years 
1996/1997 and 1997/1998. Consequently, an overall figure for the 226 
questionnaires could not be obtained. The responses were difficult to analyse and so 
the results for this question were inconclusive. 
One of the most striking features arising from this aggregate research is the range of 
activities undertaken as part of place promotion, ranging from the production of 
simple place awareness-raising fact sheets, to multi-media business packs, 
presentations and exhibitions, and overseas trade missions. At a most general level, 
the range, 'depth' and originality of activities undertaken was a clear indication of 
the amount of expenditure and importance attributed to place promotion; as to 
whether it was a central or marginal economic development activity. The survey did 
provide clues as to the distinctive experience of place promotion in particular places. 
For example, Cambridge City Council does not conduct any inward investment 
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promotion. The city of Cambridge has a successful high wage, hi-tech, research and 
development economy and so it is largely perceived that there is no need to attract 
any ftirther investment. The returned questionnaire also mentioned that the lack of 
available investment sites was a contributory factor. Interestingly, within the survey 
responses as a whole, the presence of greenfield sites was seen as both an asset and a 
hindrance to the attraction of inward investment. This perhaps reflects the general 
availability of investment land in particular localities, and therefore the level of 
importance attached to greenfield sites. It may also be a reflection of the types of 
investment they wish to attract, and the location choices and production needs of 
those particular types of investment. 
Following Saffe, the data was not analysed in a 'positivistic hypothesis-testing spirit' 
(1987,7), but was conducted in a realist manner, seeking to identify underlying 
strategies and mechanisms. It was not intended that the information obtained would 
undergo rigorous statistical testing in the attempt to propose explanations for the 
identified pattern of place promotional strategy development. Instead, the aggregate 
information was used descriptively to identify broad regularities and trends in the 
overall pattern of strategy development, which have since proved instrinnental in 
directing and informing subsequent case study research. By providing important 
clues as to the existence of particular mechanisms, identified patterns and 
regularities can be used as an indication of practice and then verified to varying 
degrees by using alternative research techniques in case study research. Yin refers to 
this as a process of data triangulation (1994). This illustrates the advantages of 
adopting an extensive-intensive research design within a realist framework. The 
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survey and the comparative case studies in unison help identify what is, and what is 
not contingent to a particular locality, thereby identifying both necessary and 
contingent relations. 
Case studies 
Case studies Provide a rich account of the processes at work and can be used to 
substantiate or refine the causal processes thought to underlie the observed patterns 
identified by the survey (Hakim, 1987); 
"By looking at the actual relations entered into by identifiable agents, the 
interdependencies between activities and between characteristics can be 
revealed" (Sayer, 1984,220). 
Case study research is the most appropriate method for studying individual 
phenomena and agents in their causal contexts (for example, places or particular 
institutional arrangements), using interpretative understanding to invoke the 
meanings and motivations behind practices and events (Sayer, 1992, Sarre, 1987). 
Such complexity could not be gleaned through a survey. It is clear from earlier 
theoretical review in Chapters Two and Three and methodological review in this 
chapter, that case study research is vital to the understanding of local specificities 
and the local constitution and mediation of wider processes and narratives. An 
intensive case study approach is thereby the most appropriate means by which to 
gain understanding of the relative balance of local-extra-local processes operating 
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within -and beyond a locality in determining distinctive strategy making and 
institution forming processes. 
The second phase of the research therefore comprises two intensive case studies in 
Newcastle upon Tyne and Leeds, the primary aim being to address the distinctive 
nature of place promotional strategy and associated institutional frameworks. In- 
depth analysis of local agents, institutions, relations and histories will reveal the 
local and extra-local processes defining the particular fonns of local governance in 
each city. It will be possible to identify to what extent different causal contexts have 
influenced each particular form of governance, for example, local economic and 
social relations, local and national policy frameworks and the meta-narratives of 
governance, partnership and entrepreneurialism. In particular, this stage of the 
research addresses the policy and institutional frameworks surrounding place 
promotion and the respective involvement of local government and other non- 
govemmental actors. 
In the process of data triangulation, many different methods of data collection have 
been incorporated into the case study research process. Documentary evidence has 
been collated from a variety of sources including: both governmental. and non- 
governmental annual reports; local economic performance research; historical and 
current newspaper, magazine and local journal articles; transaction documents, 
including minutes of meetings, faxes, letters and memos; local and regional strategy 
documents; and an array of promotional material ranging from simple fact sheets, to 
glossy brochures, to multi-media inward investment portfolios and packages. 
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Commentaries on the historical development of cities and historical analyses of local 
politics have also been useful in identifying and clarifying important sets of local 
economic and social relations. 
Secondary information helped build a picture of the historical development of the 
respective cities, past and present economic circumstances, the nature of local 
politics and institutional relationships, and current issues within the local economy. 
Having gained this insight, I then embarked upon a series of semi-structured 
interviews (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Thomas, 1995; Useem, 1995). In-depth 
interviews were conducted with representatives from the major institutions involved 
in local place promotional strategy and the development of institutions, coalitions or 
Partnerships based around place promotion. Detailed interviews were conducted 
with senior personnel in local government, non-govemmental organisations, 
quangos, and the private sector, including: local authority members and officers; 
representatives of public-private partnerships; local business representatives, both 
domestic and multi-national; representatives of local Chambers of Commerce and 
Training and Enterprise Councils; and local academics. 
In each case, given the structure of local governance arrangements, the respective 
city (unitary) authority provided the starting point for research. The first interview in 
each city was conducted with the respective economic development department and 
in particular, the individual who had originally completed the questionnaire; the 
Primary Inward Investment Officer in Newcastle, and the Marketing Officer in 
Leeds. These initial interviews had two primary aims and were critical to 
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establishing subsequent interviews and the future direction of the research. In 
essence, these early interviews set the local scene in terms of both place promotional 
strategy and institutional roles and relationships, Subsequent interviews were 
similarly based around two major organising themes: firstly, to discuss local 
authority and other city promotional strategies and activities; and secondly, to build a 
picture of the organisations, partnership arrangements and individuals involved, and 
to identify the divisions of labour and interrelationships within and between these 
constituent parts; the complexity of which in Newcastle meant that the interviewee 
drew a Venn diagram in the attempt to describe and explain the pattern of 
participating individuals and organisations and their respective roles, relations, and 
capacities. 
While no formal sampling technique was used in the identification of potential 
interviewees, it was important to identify a sample which would clarify relations 
within and between cooperating and conflicting individuals, sectors and 
organisations. This would reveal the major chains and linkages in the process and 
facilitate causal analysis. On the basis of previous interview discussion, 
representatives were chosen from those participating in local promotional 
organisations, partnership initiatives, strategies and activities. At this stage, it is 
important to be aware of the dangers of only speaking to those individuals who have 
been recommended to you, since there is the possibility that you only discover a 
partial picture. The resulting story can therefore overemphasise cooperation and 
consensus at the expense of hidden rivalries, tension and conflict. There is the 
possibility of course that all interviewees, regardless of their source, will provide an 
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overly 'cooperative' rendition of the truth. In these instances, the interviewer is 
reliant on their own skills to move the interviewee beyond the standard public 
relations 'spiel'. 
After this second 'round' of interviews with the major participating organisations, I 
finally returned to the local authority where I interviewed Leaders, senior 
Councillors and the Directors of Economic Development. In both cases, this meant a 
return to the most active institution in both promotional strategy making and 
partnership formation. Retunung to the local authority towards the end of the case 
study in this way provided an opportunity to triangulate and correlate the 
information collected to date to enhance the validity and reliability of the 
information obtained. 
Interviews lasted approximately between one and two hours and covered a broad 
range of issues. In brief, these issues related to strategy development, institutional 
relations and arrangements, divisions of labour, local economic strengths and 
weaknesses, and political conditions. The interviews produced a wealth of 
information on the process of place promotional strategy development, and the 
pattern of institutional roles and relationships. T'he process of interviewing various 
stakeholders across several different sectors of the city facilitated insight into the 
local economic and political arena in which these actors were operating, and how the 
local political culture penneates the strategies, relationships and processes I was 
investigating. The use of mixed methods (Philip, 1998) and triangulation and 
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corroboration across interviews have produced a relatively consistent and reliable 
account of what is happening in each locality and why. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Finally, the two case studies were chosen primarily around three organising themes: 
firstly, the pattern of institutional arrangements surrounding place promotion; 
secondly, the presence of significant promotional activity; and thirdly, the 
characteristic regional and local economic and social relations within each locality. 
In the light of central-local state restructuring and heightened inter-urban 
competition, both cities wish to achieve greater institutional and policy coordination 
and yet the institutional form of governance in the two cities is very different. 
Despite attempts at centralisation, promotional activity in Newcastle is still relatively 
diffuse and uncoordinated across a range of development bodies. The plethora of 
agencies that characterise promotional strategy making in Newcastle contrasts 
sharply with Leeds. Local promotional strategy making in Leeds is facilitated and 
coordinated by a single overarching body. This is intended to provide a level of 
strategic coordination which Newcastle is evidently lacking. Hence, the complexity 
of the institutional terrain surrounding place promotion in Newcastle can be 
compared to the relative institutional simplicity that exists in Leeds. 
Secondly, the strategies of place promotion and partnership were placed on the local 
political agenda in Leeds much later than in Newcastle. This presents the 
opportunity to examine the reasons behind this differential and to empirically 
explore the nature and timing of the shift to entrepreneurialism in greater detail than 
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presently exists within the predominantly theoretical literature (Hall and Hubbard, 
1996; Harvey, 1989). This is especially important in the context of renewed 
scepticism over the notion of entrepreneurialism and given the uncertainties 
surrounding its definition that were outlined in earlier chapters (Jessop, 1998; 
Painter, 1998; Jessop et al, 1998; Wood, 1998b; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996). 
This relates closely to the third organising theme around which the two case studies 
were chosen, concerning the, regional and local economic and social relations 
operating within each city. The historical development of local politics and local 
economic performance plays a significant role in moulding local economic, social 
and political environments, and as already outlined, historical documentation has 
been reviewed in order to gain insights into these processes. Furthermore, the nature 
and balance of relations between central and local government, and the relative 
(in)dependence from and upon (inter)national conditions can affect the distinctive 
expenence of local politics. 
These three themes are then supported by a variety of other factors, for example, 
both Newcastle and Leeds are major provincial cities possessing the status of 
regional capital. Issues relating to the importance of regional identity and regional 
status can therefore be explored. For example, compared to the North East, which 
has a strong regional tradition, regional unity and identity in Yorkshire is relatively 
weak (Haughton and Whitney, 1994). The effect this has on intra-regional relations, 
the creation of strategic promotional strategies, and the establishment of regional 
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partnerships can therefore be explored. In all however, the three major themes serve 
to provide both complementary and contrasting evidence that can be used 
theoretically and empirically to develop the literature on place promotion, 
entrepreneurialism and governance. The conclusions drawn from the case studies do 
not claim to be representative, rather they illustrate theoretical themes and illuminate 
key processes in relation to the core conceptualisations and models outlined in 
Chapters Two and Three, which may, or may not be operating in other localities. In 
conclusion, the extensive-intensive approach has produced a well-rounded empirical 
base from which concluding comments can be drawn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLACE PROMOTION: AN A(,, GRE(. 'A, rE ANALVSIS 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the major findings of' a nationall survey of' place promotional 
strategies and associated patterns of' public and private sector involvcnicni in 
promotional policy making. As outlined in Chaptcr Onc, the litcraturc has cxlubitcd 
inany competing clainis regarding the nature and significance of' place promotion 
(Lovering, 1995-, Mayer, 1995; (iold and Ward, 1994-, Philo and Kearns, 1993-, 
I larvey, 1989), many of which have not been stipported by delifiled cinpirical 
research. To address this deficit and these concerns directly, a survey ol'British local 
atithoritics was undcrtaken to examine the nature of, and cxtent to which local 
authorities are conducting place promotional strategies. The findings provide a broad 
overview ol'current practice and policy, and in particular address three specific airns: 
firstly, to deten-nine the overall pattern of' local place promotional strategy 
development, secondly, at an aggregate level, to specify the institutional roles and 
functions of' the different public and private sector orgailisations mvolvcd in Place 
promotion; and thirdly, to examine ternporal and spatial diversify in both of' tile 
above. In so doing, the survey identifies aggregate patterns and trends in place 
promotional strategy development and associated institutional florniation. These 
patterns and trends can then be used to direct and inflorm further case sludy analysis 
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of the causal processes in particular contexts which manifest themselves in locally 
distinctive strategies and institutional arrangements. 
The information was derived from a postal survey questionnaire that was circulated 
in February 1997 and directed at local authority economic development departments. 
It was administered to a random sample of 306 (including the 6 valid pilot survey 
responses) of the 446 local authorities in Britain, which equates to 69% of all British 
authorities. The survey generated 226 valid responses (236 responses were received 
in total), and so an overall valid response rate of 74% was obtained. This figure is 
well above the average expected response rates for a survey of this nature (Burgess, 
1993; Bryman, 1989). In consequence, the sample represents a high proportion of the 
whole population; the resultant findings represent just over half (51%) of all the 
local authorities in Britain. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Figure I (overleaf), the 
sample population is a close approximation of the whole population in relation to its 
make-up by type of authority. The findings4 presented here therefore give a sound 
indication of general policy and practice with regard to the overall pattern of place 
promotional strategy development. Tables I and 2 (overleaf) demonstrate that high 
response rates were achieved across the board, with reference to both type of 
authority and regional location. These tables also show the relative significance of 
each category within the analysis by highlighting their relative proportions within the 
sample of responses, and within the population of local authorities as a whole. 
4 All figures refer to analysis undertaken on valid local authority responses. The number of valid 
local authority responses can vary for each question, and for each dimension of a question. Small 
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Figure 1: Sample and Whole Population byType of Authority 
Type of Authority Response Rate ('Y, )) 'Y(, of Sample 
Metropolitan 72 11.5 
Councils 
County Councils 82 8 
District COLincils 73 55 
Jnitary Councils 81 7.5 
London Boroughs 60 5 
Scottish I Jnita. ries 75 7 









Table 1: Response Rates and Relative Proportions by Type of Authority 
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Region Response Rate (1/6) 'yo of Sample of Whole 
North F. ast 59 6 52 
North West 79 15 72 
Yorkshire/I lurnberside 59 4 45 
West Midlands 66 8 48 
Fast Midlands 91 13 67 
F. astcrn 74 1 43 
London 57 5 36 
SOLIth FASt 76 15 46 
South West 77 1 45 
Scotland 75 7 47 
Wales 87 6 S9 
Table 2: Response Rates and Relative Proportions by Region 
5.1 Strategy development 
Firstly, given the many claims in the literature, it is necessary to determine to what 
extent British local authorities participate in local place promotional activity. For the 
purposes of' the questionnaire, and in accordance with the definition cited earlier, 
place promotional activity was defined as *the deliberate use of' marketing in the 
attraction of' inward investment and/or the development of new place knages'. 
According to this definition, 85% 5 of'responding British local authorities condLICtcd 
I I'his figure stands even when the analysis is weighted to , jccOtjjj( I'm non-responses (26"0 ol'tllc 
sample) and therefore strongly represents the widcr populmioll ol'British local atithoritics. 
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place promotional activity in the financial year 1997/98. This high figure is strongly 
supported by Millington (1995) who conducted a similar survey and discovered that 
93% of local authorities engaged in some form of promotional activity in 1995/96. It 
is important to note however that these figures are not directly comparable owing to 
geographical differences in how the survey was administered, and the fact that 
different definitions of promotional activity were used. 
Nevertheless, the general trend is clear. In 1984, only 22% of local authorities had an 
economic development policy relating to promotion and/or inward investmene 
(Mills and Young, 1986). As a local authority activity therefore, place promotion has 
grown dramatically over recent years. This is validated further by the fact that over 
half (54%) of the responding local authorities in this survey first initiated place 
promotional activities in the 1990s. Furthermore, despite the fact that place 
promotion is by no means a new phenomenon (Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Ward, 
1990), of those authorities responding to the question, 86% implemented place 
promotional strategies for the first time in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Clearly then, place promotion is a significant component of local economic 
development strategies, and an almost universal economic development function of 
local authorities (Lovering, 1995; Mayer, 1995; Wilkinson, 1992; Harvey, 1989; 
6 For comparative reasons, it should be noted that a more specific definition of promotional activity is 
not provided in the Mills and Young study. Further analysis revealed that 76% of responding local 
authorities undertook area promotion, however this figure may be greatly enhanced since it includes 
tourism promotion. Promotional activity was also modest at this time, limited largely to media 
advertisements and attendance at trade fairs and exhibitions. 
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Cox and Mair, 1988; especially). Yet despite the fact that 79% and 77% of 
respondents stated that over the last 5 years place promotional activity has become 
more important within the local authority and within the relevant department 
respectively, there is not sufficient evidence to claim, as Lovering (1995) does, that 
it is the core activity in local economic development. These high figures do however 
reveal that over recent years, place promotion has gained in salience within local 
authorities, and that despite experiencing increasing political and financial pressures, 
local authorities have been able to extend their involvement in this policy area 
(Mayer, 1995; Leitner, 1990; Pickvance, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Cox and Mair, 1988). 
As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 (overleaf), the large majority of local authorities, 
of all types and in all British regions, are conducting place promotional strategies. 
Within this overall context however, there is some differentiation across the types of 
authority and across regions between core-Periphery areas (which could also be 
broadly interpreted as North and South), and urban-rural areas. For example, all the 
responding local authorities in the North East and Wales conduct place promotional 
activities, with 90% in Yorkshire and Humberside and 88% in the North West. In 
Scotland however, which would normally be considered as part of the 'periphery', 
73% of responding authorities conduct place promotional activity. Although still a 
high figure, it is noticeably lower than other areas in the 'peripheral North'. 
III 
Type of Authority % Pr 
Metropolitan Councils 96 
County Councils 94 
District Councils 81 
I Jnitary Councils 94 
I ondon Boroughs 83 
Scottish Unitaries 73 
Welsh Unitaries 100 
Table 3: Prevalence of Place Promotion by Type of Authority 








Region I yo I Pre- 1997 IYO 
North East 100 100 
North West 88 85 
Yorkshire/I lumberside 90 90 
West Midlands 94 68 
East Midlands 87 93 
Eastern 78 70 
London 83 83 
South Flast 83 74 
South West 83 78 
Scotland 73 73 
Wales 100 100 
Table 4: Prevalence of Place Promotion by Region 
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This is interesting given Scotland's relative success (compared to the Eng is 
regions) in attracting inward investment, especially from the United States and the 
Far East. This lower figure may reflect the dominance of the national development 
agency 'Locate In Scotland' in this sphere of economic development activity. 
'Locate In Scotland' receives much greater financial resources than the Invest In 
Britain Bureau regional offices in England, and so local authorities in Scotland may 
deem it unnecessary to conduct additional promotional activity. There is however no 
evidence within the survey to deny or support this claim. The otherwise higher 
figures in the 'peripheral North' compare to the lower figures in the more southern, 
core regions; for example, 78% in the Eastern region, 83% in London, the South 
East, and the South West, 84% in the West Midlands and 87% in the East Midlands. 
The differentiation between core and periphery is further reinforced by data detailing 
which authorities have only recently developed a place promotional strategy. An 
examination of the pre- 1997 figures indicates that these authorities tend to be located 
finther south. Before 1997, only 68% of responding local authorities in the West 
Midlands undertook place promotional activities, with only 70% in the Eastern 
region, 74% in the South East, 78% in the South West and 83% in the East Midlands 
participating in place promotion. Although it is recognised that these high 
percentages reflect the widespread adoption of place promotion in general, there is 
evidence to suggest that the practice is more widespread in those areas of the country 
than can be regarded as more peripheral, for example the North East of England and 
Wales. 
113 
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that authorities located in the 'periphery' 
I 
developed and implemented place promotional strategies earlier than authorities 
located in more 'core' areas of Britain. 86% of authorities implementing place 
promotional strategies in the 1960s, and 71% during the 1970s, are located in the 
North of England and Scotland. Moreover, just under half (49%) of the authorities 
who first implemented place promotional strategies in the 1990s are located in the 
South of England. Overall then, at an aggregate level, a pattern emerges which 
suggests that local authorities in the 'peripheral North' are more active in place 
promotional activity generally, and became involved in place promotion earlier than 
authorities located in more 'core' southern areas of Britain. 
One possible explanation for the differentiation is that older, industrial areas located 
in the North suffered serious economic decline much earlier than the more 
prosperous southern regions. In accordance with Harvey (1989), it can be suggested 
that authorities located in the North, experiencing severe economic restructuring 
processes, were compelled to adopt self-help strategies in the form of place 
promotion in an attempt to attract inward investment and therefore employment 
opportunities. The longevity of economic decline, coupled with the need to 
restructure their local economies, ensured that northern industrial localities became 
early players in place promotional strategies; what have become known as the 
'growth strategies of the 1980s and 1990s' (Shaw, 1994,59). For example, the North 
East's economic history has been dominated by its dependence upon coalmining, 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering, Yorkshire and Humberside has been dependent 
upon the staple industries of coalmining and steel production, and the North West 
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has been heavily dependent upon the chemical industry. In support of' this 
explanation, 53% of authorities who stated that the 'decline oftraditional industries' 
was a ma . jor contributing 
Eactor in the development of' place promotional activities, 
are located in the North of England, Wales and Scotland, compared to the 26% 
located in the South ofFIngland. 
Secondly, one can see Crom Table 5 evidence ol'a dill'erctitiation in the number of' 
authorities participating in local place promotional activity between urban and rural 
areas. For the purposes ofthis analysis, the sample authorities have been divided into 
flour categories, the first three ol'which are deemed to be 'urban': London Boroughs, 
Metropolitan Councils, Shire 'Capitals', those authorities presiding over major 
towns and smaller provincial cities; and Shire Districts, those aUthorities presiding 
over smaller market towns and rural areas. 
Type of Authority Pre-1997 'Yo 
London Boroughs 83 83 
Metropolitan Councils 96 89 
Shire 'Capitals' 94 92 
Shire District 80 75 
Table 5: Prevalence of Place Promotion by Urban-Rural Classification 
Before 1997,75% ol'Shire Districts conductcd place promotional activity, with 80% 
participating in such activities since then. Although still a high figure, this is 
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noticeably smaller than the 96% of Metropolitan Councils and 94% of Shire 
'Capital' authorities who are active in place promotion. In addition, of the 11 
authorities developing place promotional strategies in 1997/98,8 are Shire Districts 
thereby demonstrating the relatively recent adoption of place promotion by more 
rural local authorities. As further supporting evidence for an urban-rural 
differentiation, 81% of District Councils (which tend to be located in more rural 
locations) conduct place promotional activity, compared to 96% of Metropolitan 
Councils. Although not necessarily urban, the large majority (94%) of County and 
Unitary Councils undertake place promotional activity. The high proportion of 
unitary authorities participating in place promotion is perhaps not surprising given 
that within a single-tier system, it is these authorities that have sole local 
governmental responsibility for this type of activity. The smaller number of District 
Councils and the larger number of County Councils active in place promotional 
activities, illustrates the fact that within the two-tier system of local government, it is 
the County Council that generally has responsibility for economic development and 
place promotion. 
An urban-rural differentiation within the overall pattern of place promotion is 
reinforced by analysis that investigates the time at which place promotional activity 
was first undertaken. For example, 71% of local authorities implementing place 
promotional activities for the first time in the 1990s are Shire District Councils. 
Moreover, using the urban-rural classification cited above, Figure 2 (overleaf) 
clearly demonstrates that the vast majority (61/86) of authorities first implementing 
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place promotional strategies in the 1990s, are situated in what can be decined to be 
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Figure 2: Implementation of Place Promotion by Urban-Rural Classification 
By I'ar the largest number of' authorities first implementing place promotional 
strategies in the 1990s are District Councils (56%), and these COUld tentatively be 
classified as more rural than urban. Furthermore, 82% of' those authorities who are 
not conducting place prornotional activity or have never undertaken place 
promotional activity are Shire District Councils; 
"I have never deerned it sensible to spend scant resources on sending 
messages into the 'void' when we are only now discovering who, where and 
what tile market is and what product we have to offier" (District Council, 
1997). 
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There is therefore considerable evidence to diflerentiate between core-periphery 
areas and urban-rural areas in the overall pattern of' local place promotional strategy 
development, both in terms of' the number of' authorities active in place promotion 
and the time at which they lirst became involved in such activities. Thcse findings 
have theoretical implications. As Chapters One and Two outlined, place promotion 
has become synonymous with the notion ofentrepreneurialism; a notion which has 
come to be firmly associated with the 1980s and 1990s (I lubbard and I lall, 1998; 
I lall and Hubbard, 1996; Shaw, 1994; 1 larvey, 1989). Yet Figure 3 demonstrates that 
local authorities have been undertaking strategies ofthis kind as early as the 1940s, 
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Figure 3: Year Place Promotional Activity First Implemented 
This raises questions thcretbre regarding tile nature of' tile managerial phase of' local 
government and the timing ofthe shill to entrepreneurialism. Shaw ( 1994) arrived at 
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similar conclusions in his analysis of urban regeneration initiatives in the North East 
of England. He highlights how; 
"place-marketing strategies have been developed as part of the increasingly 
competitive battle for post-industrial economic activities, [but] such 
approaches can also be seen as extensions of pre-existing policies rather than 
merely as a contemporary shift to entrepreneurialism" (Shaw, 1994,52). 
Place promotion has however gained in significance over recent years. As reported 
earlier, 79% and 77% of respondents stated that over the last 5 years place 
promotional activity has become more important within the local authority, and 
within the relevant department respectively. Figure 4 (overleaO demonstrates that the 
4need to attract inward investment' is the most cited reason (28%) for the increased 
significahce of place promotion. In the fight to remain economically buoyant, the 
second most cited (categorised) reason (18%) for its increased significance is the 
heightened competition that exists between localities for investment. These findings 
lend weight to the assertion in the literature that as competition increases, more and 
more localities are compelled into playing the 'place-marketing game" (Shaw, 1994, 
59) and fewer places are excluded from the compulsion to compete (Harvey, 1989). 
The perceived need to be proactive in the inward investment market is illustrated in 
the following survey responses; 
"Place promotion has become more important because it is a highly 
competitive market for limited inward investment opportunities and we have 
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to respond to changes and opportunities in it" (Metropolitan District Council, 
1997); 
"I'verywhere has become more aware ofthe gains to be made by attracting 
inward investors. Therel'bre, we need to be active to compete- (Metropolitan 
District Council, 1997). 
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Figure 4: Reasons for Increased Significance of Place Promotion 
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In all, the above findings go some way towards supporting the clairn made by 
Lovering ( 1995), and yet the data also reveals evidence that supports the contrasting 
claim made by Mayer, that 'instead of' competing with other Jurisdictions l'or the 
sarne investment, efTorts are made to strengthen existing and potential indigenous 
resources' (1995,234). As illustrated in Figure 5, whilst 78% of' responding local 
authorities stated that one ol'the major aims ol'their place promotional activity is tile 
attraction ot'inward investment, tile second most cited aiin is paradoxically to rctain, 
encourage and Support Indigenous business. 
Attract inward investment 
Retain / encourage 
indigenous business 
Raise awareness / profile 




Regenerate / diversify local 
economy 
Information / Service 
provision 
Boost local confidence 
160 
Figure 5: Main Aims of Place Promotion 
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This concurs with other commentators who have suggested that place promot, onal 
strategies aimed primarily at external investors are in decline. Millington identifies a 
'downwards shift in the level and intensity of' compctItIvc inward invcstincrit 
strategies' (1998,1 ) and a shil't from external to internal promotion. This obviOLISly 
resonates with the above linding. In addition, Figure 6 illustrates that 'assisting 
indigenous business' is the most cited reason flor a decline in tile importance ol'placc 
promotional activity over the last 5 years. 
Assist indigenous 
business 
Lack of resources 
Lack of perceived 
opportunity 
Policy changes 




Introduction of new 
agency 
Figure 6: Reasons for Decreased Significance of Place Promotion 
The 21% of'responding local aUthorities who 1elt that placc promotion had decrcased 




"We have adopted a more rational view of the value of this type of 
promotion. There are greater rewards to be had from concentrating on 
assisting existing employers" (Metropolitan Borough Council, 1997). 
"the realisation that positive, direct assistance to indigenous firms can be 
more successful in terms of job creation and retention! ' (Metropolitan 
Borough Council, 1997). 
Without dismissing this trend, it is of course worth remembering that the large 
majority (79%) of responding local authorities affirm that place promotion has 
increased in significance, and that this is due largely (78%) to the 'need to attract to 
inward investment'. In all therefore, the key survey findings show that the overall 
pattern of local place promotional strategy development is complex, more so than 
much of the literature suggests. This complexity is perhaps reflected in the 
competing claims evident in the literature (Lovering, 1995; Mayer, 1995), 
nonetheless, the findings of this survey provide an empirical base on which to base 
future claims. The causal processes which manifest themselves in these complex 
trends will be explored in subsequent case study research, owing to the limited 
nature of aggregate research. However, the specification, at an aggregate level, of the 
roles and functions of public and private sector bodies in place promotional strategy 
can be undertaken here. The identified trends can then be used to direct and inform 
the case study research. 
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5.2 Institutional roles and functions 
As outlined in Chapter One, few commentators (Ward, 1999a) have sought to 
specify the form of local governance arrangements that have developed in support of 
place promotion. Many questions therefore remain unanswered regarding the pattern 
of institutional involvement in place promotion, in particular, with regard to the 
respective roles and functions of local govenunent and other quasi-public and 
private sector interests, and the differentiated nature of their involvement in local 
promotional coalitions. The last decade especially, has witnessed a plethora of new 
agencies entering the economic development arena, raising questions over policy 
remits and patterns of institutional responsibility. The precise specification of this 
configuration of governance and the role of local government within it is important 
and yet remains unclear. An assessment of who does what, and where institutional 
responsibility lies is therefore warranted. In essence, one needs to identify: firstly, 
the types of organisations involved; secondly, the lead organisations; thirdly, the 
form of associated institutional structures; and fourthly, the spatial scales at which 
these institutional structures occur and operate. 
The survey reveals that, beyond the relevant department itself, 'Other local 
authorities/departments' are the most involved organisational body in place 
promotion, with 65% of respondents citing 'Other local authorities/departments' as 
being directly involved in their local place promotional strategy development. It 
must of course be noted that local authorities may overemphasise their own role and 
the role of neighbouring authorities. Nonetheless, two patterns emerge from the 
survey responses: firstly, relating to the breadth of departmental responsibility within 
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the local authority; and secondly, the extent of collaborative relations with 
neighbounng local authonties. 
It is clear that responsibility for local place promotional strategy is often shared 
mnongst a range of interests. 54% of responding local authorities share responsibility 
for the development and implementation of local promotional activity with other 
departments, other local authorities, or external agencies. The remaining 46% of 
authorities claim to have sole responsibility for these activities within their 
department. Of those sharing responsibility, 76% share responsibility for these 
activities internally, primarily amongst a core set of local authority departments: 
namely, Economic Development; Planning; Tourism and Leisure; Public Relations; 
Marketing and Media; and the Chief Executive's Department. In many of these 
cases, internal reorganisation has led to the creation of new departmental structures, 
for example, large Development or Strategic Policy Directorates incorporating those 
departments named above. 
Externally, it is clear that those authorities operating within a two-tier system of 
local government, are working collaboratively to produce joint promotional 
strategies. Many District Councils are evidently handing over (or County Councils 
are taking over) responsibility for local place promotion. It is often the case that 
District Councils retain responsibility for tlýe production of a local sites, premises 
and property register, but the larger scale, strategic marketing activity is generally 
pursued at the County Council level. It is also the case that human and financial 
resources allocated for promotional activity at District'level are being seconded to 
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larger, County-level economic development departments or sub-regional County-led 
development agencies. For example, the Somerset Economic Partnership, the 
Leicestershire Inward Investment Partnership, the Bedfordshire Economic 
Partnership, the Warwickshire Inward Investment Partnership, the Hampshire 
Economic Partnership, and the Cumbria Inward Investment Agency, to name but a 
few. All of which are based at, and led by the County Council, and most, if not all 
District Councils are participating members, together with other quasi-public and 
private sector organi'sations. 
This institutional reorganisation may reflect the realities of economies of scale, or 
perhaps the realisation. that it is more effective to have a single, overarching 
marketing programme that projects consistent and coherent messages, rather than a 
cacophony of voices creating confusion for any potential investor. Nevertheless, the 
pooling together of resources and expertise in collaborative partnership 
arrangements has a strong resonance with the territorially-based alliances described 
in the literature (Harvey, 1989; Cox and Mair, 1988). It is widely perceived that in 
the context of ever-increasing competition, localities are compelled to enhance local 
capacity in order to secure sustained economic growth. This may well entail finding 
public and private sector partners beyond municipal boundaries. Other agencies and 
organisations are however encroaching upon the promotional responsibilities of the 
local state. As can be seen from Figure 7 (overleaO, 64%, 61% and 53% of 
responding local authorities cited the involvement of Chambers of Commerce, 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), and Business Links respectively. 
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Figure 7: Public and Private Sector NvOlvelllent in Place Promotion 
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It would appear therefore that private sector, business-led organisations, are involved 
in the development and implementation of local place promotional strategy to a high 
degree. Their involvement however, is not devoid of controversy, especially with 
respect to the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). It is clear from the following 
survey responses that some local authorities believe the TECs are encroaching upon 
their areas of responsibility; 
"other agencies want more involvement, particularly the TEC which is 
looking to be more active in inward investment. Increasing TEC surpluses 
mean that they want to expand their remit without the necessary in-house 
expertise" (Metropolitan Borough Council, ' 1997); 
"some TECs are attempting to get a higher profile by moving in on inward 
investment. They also seem to be encouraged by central government" 
(County Council, 1997). 
However, the existence per se of business involvement does not necessarily imply 
that their engagement in place promotion is particularly active. It is the nature of 
their involvement that illustrates the role they actually play in the development and 
implementation of local place promotional strategy. On comparing the following 
graphs (Figures 8,9 and 10 overleaf), it becomes apparent that business-led 
organisations, whilst directly involved in local place promotion, generally assume a 
consultative role. 
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Figure 9: Training and Enterprise Councils 
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Figure 10: Business Links 
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Again, it must be noted that the respondents may underestimate the importance of 
private sector bodies, but it is nevertheless clear that business-led organisations 
participate in local promotional public-private coalitions to a high degree. The 
survey reveals therefore that place promotional strategy development draws together 
a particular set of local actors, with local alitliontics, Chamhcrs of' Commet-ce md 
TECs (and Business Links to a lesser extent) at the core. This core is then supported 
acturing Sector by the involvernent of Regional Development Organisations, Mallult 
Firms, Service Sector Firms, and Institutions of' I lighcr FIducation (see Figure 7, 
page 127). The involvement ol'thesc organisation's was cited by 56%o, 44%, 4l! /o and 
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34% of responding authorities respectively. It is apparent from the survey responses 
that representation from the private sector derives largely from major local 
employers, including both national and international firms. Service sector 
representation in particular derives primarily from retail, financial and legal 
organisations. 
With specific reference to the types of private sector organisations involved in place 
promotion, the survey highlights certain trends that have strong resonance with the 
US growth coalition model, particularly regarding the involvement of utility 
companies, thý local media and higher education institutions (Logan and Molotch, 
1987; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). In the US context, Cox (1997) specirically 
illustrates the widespread involvement of utility companies in place promotion and 
in the attraction of inward investment in particular. In the British context, the survey 
reveals that utility companies, the local media and higher education institutions are 
involved in place promotion and local associated coalitions. This suggests perhaps 
that, in accordance with the growth coalition model, these organisations have 
become important stakeholders in local economic development. As Figure II 
(overleaf) illustrates, utility companies are primarily involved in local place 
promotional strategy development through their participation in local promotional 
public-private coalitions and via a specific, consultative role. This is confinned by 
those respondents who indicated that utility companies are often called upon to 













Figure 11: Utility Companies 










Figure 12: Local Media Institutions 
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As can be seen from Figure 12 (previous page), tile involvernent of local mediii 
institutions is also characterised primarily by participation in local promotional 
public-private coalitions. It is clear that on the whole, local media institutions have 
continUOLIs, direct involvement in local place promotional activity. This may 
suggest, again in accordance with tile growth coalition model, Ilia( local mcclia 
institUtions are acting as 'growth statesmcn', gaining popular support fOr the 
governing coalition, promoting the benefits associated with economic growth and 
detracting popular attention away From tile benefits of' more socially-oricntatcd 
goals. 
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Figure 13: Higher Education Institutions 
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1) - /hIs aspecýfic' consultative role in local place promolional aclivilics: 
E- Participates in a local 'promolional, public-privalt, coalilioll, - 
F- Level (? f involvemew unknown. 
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Figure 13 (previous page) illu I strates that the involvement of Higher Education 
institutions is overwhelmingly through their participation in local Promotional 
public-private coalitions. This may suggest that they have yet to define or assert a 
clear, proactive role beyond a simple desire to be involved, or alternatively, it may 
suggest that they have a very clearly defined role; one that is perhaps related to the 
wealth of knowledge resources that are at their disposal. Unfortunately, the survey 
responses do not provide ftirther information upon which such claims could be 
based. However, the issues raised here can be followed up during the subsequent 
case stu y mvestigations. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that local place promotional strategy is directed by a core set 
of interests comprising, most notably, local authorities, Chambers of Commerce, 
TECs, Business Links, Rdgional Development Organisations, and representatives 
from the local business community. In comparison to this level of private sector 
representation, only 21% of responding local authorities stated that 'Voluntary 
Sector and/or Community Organisations' are involved in the development and 
implementation of local place promotional strategies. Moreover, as Figure 14 
(overleaf) demonstrates, there are very few, if any, organisations involved in local 
promotional public-private coalitions that may represent the views of the voluntary 
and community sectors. Whilst it is recognised that voluntary and community groups 
pursue economic goals and desire economic growth and development, it could be 
suggested, from the particular balance of interests portrayed in Figure 14, that local 
promotional coalitions are more likely to pursue economic policies (which benefit 
the local business community) than those which are more socially-orientated. 
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With reference to the 'core' organisations cited above, there is of' course an 
important distinction between involvement per se, and leadership. Figurc 15 
illustrates which organisations, and which combination oforganisations are regarded 
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51% of responding local authorities claim to be in a position of overall leadership 
and have ultimate responsibility for the development and implementation of local 
place promotional strategies. While Chambers of Commerce and TECs evidently 
have an important role to play in local place promotional strategy, both individually 
and as constituent members of public-private partnerships, the dominant position of 
the local authority must call into question claims regarding the fundamental erosion 
of local governmental control; 
"the dominant position of local government as the undisputed lead player in 
local economic development has been repeatedly undermined following a 
series of direct and indirect central government interventions" (Haughton et 
al, 1997,88). 
Clearly, local authority respondents could overemphasise the role of local 
government. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence to endorse those 
commentators who identify the continued importance of the local authority in British 
local economic policy making (VaHer, 1996; Mayer, 1995; Bassett and Harloe, 
1990; Cooke, 1988). Local governments maintain this role, however, within the 
overall context of governance, the pervasiveness of which cannot be denied. 81% of 
responding local authorities are involved in public-private partnerships that promote 
the locality, and 95% cited the involvement of 'other agencies/organisations' in the 
development and implementation of their local place promotional strategies. Figures 
15 and 16 (overleaf) illustrate that public-private partnerships occupy a highly 
significant position in such strategy development. 
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Figure 16: Organisations Leading Place Promotion 
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Public-private partnerships are prolific. A, total of 206 public-private partnerships 
involved in place promotion were cited from a valid sample of 226 questionnaires. It 
is clearly evident from the survey that these partnership arrangements represent an 
importance source of consultation and decision making. The dynamics that operate 
within these partnerships become central if we are to understand more about place 
promotional strategy development and the process of governance that surrounds it. 
This is beyond the scope of aggregate analysis, but will be extended in the case study 
research discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
To reiterate, 81% of responding local authorities stated that there was a partnership 
arrangement of some form operating in, and promoting their locality: 87% of these 
authorities are involved in public-private partnerships; 6% are involved in 
partnerships between local authorities and/or other public sector bodies; and 1% 
referred to partnership arrangements between private sector bodies (the remaining 
6% of partnership arrangements are of an unspecified nature). The pervasiveness of 
public-private partnerships is therefore patently clear. These findings, along with 
those cited earlier, clearly demonstrate the significance of private sector involvement 
in local promotional policy making. Also, we might note the number of public- 
public partnerships and private-private partnerships, which perhaps illustrate a new 
trend in the fonnation of institutional structures in support of economic 
development. 
Furthermore, whilst it is recognised that there is nothing new about partnership 
fortnation (Harvey, 1989; Shaw, 1994; Hall and Hubbard, 1996); for example, the 
139 
19th and early 20th Century alliances between civic leaders and prominent local 
businesses, the survey reveals the recent expansion of public-private partnerships. 
55% of the partnerships cited were formed between 1995 and 1998,39% were 
formed between 1990 and 1994, with just 6% in existence before 1990. The earliest 
account of partnership formation in the survey is 1985. These findings clearly 
demonstrate the contemporary nature of public-private partnership formation. This 
could perhaps reflect the increased need to engender effective local capacity, or 
perhaps the partnership requirement inherent in central government and European 
competitive funding regimes. Further analysis is clearly required, and the causal 
processes behind this trend will be explored in subsequent case study research. 
5.3 The scale of institutional involvement 
Fundamentally, there has been a significant shift away from 'organising for 
economic development' (Cox, 1997; Wood, 1993) at the national scale towards the 
regional, sub-regional and local scales, and it is evident from the survey that the 
institutional pattern at the regional scale has undergone significant transformation. 
The survey was administered two years before the introduction of the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) in April 1999. These have been established 
throughout England in the nine Standard Government Office Regions. Nonetheless, 
it is clear from the survey that regional and sub-regional dimensions of governance 
are significant, not least with the recent introduction of the East of England 
Investment Agency (EEIA), the West of England Development Agency (WEDA), 
and the Regional Investment Office for the South East (RIO SE). Regional' 
Development Organisations (RDOs) have since been subsumed within the new 
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RDAs, but the significance of their involvement and leadership in 1997 is apparent 
from Figure 16 (page 138), and frorn Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 17: Regional Development Organisations 
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D- Has aspeci/ic, consultative role in local place promotional activities; 
E- Participates in a local 'promotiontil'public--I)rii, 4ite coalition: 
F- Level qfinvolvement unknown. 
This is perhaps not surprising given their rernit of' economic development and 
inward investment promotion. It is interesting to note however, the significant level 
of' their involvement in local place promotional strategy given that their rcmit is 
fundamentally regional in scale. The survey reveals that RDO-local authority 
relations are cooperative on the whole, but as with the bUSiness-led organisations, 
this relationship is also not without controversy. Survey responses did indicate that 
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some local authorities are concerned about the equality of investment distribution 
across the region, with some areas believed to be favoured over others. 
Paralleling the empowennent of the regions, the survey reveals a definite trend 
towards the establishment of sub-regional and local development agencies, for 
example, the Tyne and Wear Development Partnership, the Tees Valley Enterprise 
Company, the Yorkshire Dales Promotions Partnership, North Devon Marketing 
Bureau, the South Coast Marketing Company, and the Thames Valley Economic 
Partnership, to nmne but a'few. It would appear that a substantial effort is being 
made locally to reduce the institutional complexity that exists by pooling all relevant 
resources and expertise under the remit of a single, overarching promotional 
organisation. (as described earlier with the sub-regional County-led development 
agencies). The proliferation of sub-regional and local development agencies may 
also reflect the 'localisation' (Lovering, 1995) of economic development strategies 
and institutional forms. It is often cited in the literature that localities feel compelled 
to amalgamate local expertise and resources into partnership arrangements so as to 
possess the ability, capacity and skills to negotiate with regional, national and 
international. government agencies and capital. The dynamics of these types of causal 
processes are investigated in the following two chapters, however it is worthy of 
note here that ftu-ther analysis on partnership arrangements reveals that 55% are 
fon-ned at the local scale, 41% are sub-regional in their geographical remit and 4% 
arc rcgionally-bascd. These figures perhaps reinforce the notion that local actors arc 
attempting to take control of their own destinies by introducing partnership measures 
designed to enhance local capacity. 
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It must not be forgotten of course, that competitive funding regimes introduced by 
central government 'require' local authorities to enter into partnerships, and compel 
localities to battle between themselves for ever-dwindling resources. Therefore, 
motivations behind public-private partnership formation may not always be altruistic 
or benevolent. Just as heightened competition for inward investment can lead to 
partnership formation, so can the need to compete in funding regimes; 
"more partnership working has been essential in a period of declining 
resources" (County Council, 1997). 
Again, causal processes such as these will be explored in the case study chapters, but 
for. now, whatever motivations lie behind partnership formation, the survey has 
demonstrated, with specific reference to local place promotional strategy and 
associated partnerships, that local authorities retain an influential role. The evidence 
presented here, strongly suggests that local authorities lead place promotional 
activity at the local scale, thus raising fundamental questions concerning the erosion 
of local government. The reduction of local government activity in the sphere of 
economic development is called into question when 85% of responding local 
authorities currently undertake place promotional activity, together with the fact that 
51% of these claim to be in a position of 'overall leadership' and have ultimate 
responsibility for the development and implementation of such strategies. These 
findings are surely testament to the continued centrality of the local authority in 
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British local economic policy making, and of their significance in local public- 
private coalitions. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the key fmdings from a national survey of 
local authorities. In so doing, it has revealed overall patterns and trends in local place 
promotional strategy development, and associated patterns of public and private 
sector involvement and institutional formation. Whilst providing a broad overview 
of current practice and policy, the survey also addressed three more specific aims: to 
determine the overall pattern of local place promotional strategy development; to 
specify, at an aggregate level, the institutional roles and functions of public and 
private sector organisations involved in place promotion; and to examine temporal 
and spatial diversity in both of the above. 
In addressing these aims, the survey has provided important empirical evidence on 
which to base claims regarding place promotion, and on which to base further case 
study research. In conclusion therefore, with 85% of local authorities conducting 
place promotional strategies, the current pervasiveness of place promotion is clear. 
The survey has revealed however that within this overall context, the pattern of place 
promotion is differentiated across core-periphery regions and between urban and 
rural areas. In general, authorities located in urban and (northern) peripheral 
locations are more active in place promotion and implemented promotional 
strategies earlier than those located in the more rural and (southern) core areas of 
Britain. Furthermore, whilst some urban and (northern) peripheral authorities 
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conducted place promotion as early as the 1940s, 50s and 60s, it is clear that the vast 
majority of authorities implemented place promotional strategies in the 1980s and 
1990s. Therefore, whilst place promotion is not a new phenomenon, there has been a 
dramatic expansion in the numbers of authorities participating in the practice over 
recent years. 
Turning to patterns of public and private sector involvement and associated patterns 
of institutional formation, firstly, it is clear that governance arrangements have 
developed in support of place promotion. 81% of responding local authorities are 
involved in public-private partnerships that promote the locality, and 95% cited the 
involvement of 'other agencies/organisations' in the development and 
implementation of their local place promotional strategies. Within this overall 
context of 'governance', the survey identified that place promotion draws together a 
particular set of local actors. Local authorities, which maintain a dominant position, 
together with Chambers of Commerce and TECs comprise the core of these 
governance arrangements. This core is then supported by the involvement of 
Regional Development Organisations, Manufacturing Sector Finns, Service Sector 
Finns, and Institutions of Higher Education. In all therefore, the empirical findings 
of this survey clearly demonstrate the pervasiveness of place promotion and 
governance, and the continued salience of local govenunent. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the pattern of place promotional strategy and associated 
patterns of institutional involvement and coalition formation is more complex than 
the much of the literature suggests. The survey has highlighted important patterns 
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and trends in local place promotional strategy development, and prior to these 
findings, there was little empirical evidence on which to base claims regarding place 
promotion or its supporting forms of governance. These aggregate patterns and 
trends inform the more detailed case study research presented and discussed in the 
following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE NEWCASTLE CASE 
6.0 Introduction 
It is, perhaps, a reflection of the industrial decline ofNewcastle upon Tyne that this 
once significant global centre of capitalist production now aspires to bc 'an 
important European Regional Centre' (Newcastle City COLHICII, 1997,4). Without 
doubt, the origins of industrial growth in Newcastle are to be found within the coal 
industry, which in turn, gave rise to tile production and use ofiron and stecl. During 
the 19th century, the city emerged as one of tile key centres of' the industrial 
revolution. By the end of the century, now characterised by a highly successful 
integrated economy based upon coalmining, metal man u fact tire and production, the 
city had become acknowledged as a world leader in shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering. rhe industries that led to Newcastle's success in the 19th century 
however, also led to the city's downfall in the next. Economically, the del-midencc of 
the city and the region on such a small number ofrelated industries became a major 
liability and in that dependence lay the seeds lor Newcastle's subsequent demise 
(Iludson, 1989; Quilley and Ward, 1999). By the 1920s and carly 1930s, the 
underlying weakness ofan over-commitment to these swple industries was exposed 
when global restructuring and foreign competition heralded the decline of' these 
sectors locally, and; 
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"For the first time, questions began to be asked about the soundness of the 
underlying economic model coupled with a growing recognition of the need 
for industrial diversification" (Quilley and Ward, 1999,25). 
During the 1930s, faced with such a potent economic threat, the more progressive 
capitalist companies within the region sought to defend their interests. They 
coalesced around, and embraced policies of industrial diversification and state- 
sponsored'modernisation (Quilley and Ward, 1999; Hudson, 1989). Afler some 
initial reluctance, prominent local authority and trade union leaders endorsed these 
policies and a broad consensus emerged (Hudson, 1989). The bitter class conflicts of 
the 19th century gave way to a distinctive accommodation between capital and 
labour as the progressive capitalists began to accept the legitimacy of trade union 
organisation, and in turn, trade union politics took on a 'very moderate hue' (Quilley 
and Ward, 1999,25). A regional problem had been identified and so a regional 
solution was sought in the form of a cross-class regional alliance, between capital, 
labour and their respective political allies, forged around a politics of state 
modernisation. (Hudson, 1989; Beynon et al, 1994). As the need for the state to 
redress regional imbalances became more generally accepted at the national level, 
the scene was thus set in Newcastle and the North East for significant state 
intervention in regional policy (Hudson, 1989). 
A commitment to full employment through state subsidy however, masked 
complacency and inaction. Local capitalists sought state solutions to regional 
problems instead of implementing aggressive reinvestment or reorganisation policies 
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(Quilley and Ward, 1999). For example, no commitment was made to technical 
innovation in the hope of heightening competitiveness, and so the economic decline 
of these sectors continued; as did state intervention. The North East of England thus 
soon became acknowledged as a state-managed region (Hudson, 1989; Garrahan and 
Stewart, 1994; Robinson, 1988), and so when attempting to specify the form of local 
politics in the North East, it is important to note that; 
"The region has certainly been a policy 'laboratory', being the target of 
policy interventions since the 1930s (from local as well as central 
govemment)" (Shaw, 1994,52). 
Moreover, when attempting to specify contemporary governance structures, it is 
important to recognise that; 
"the specific pattern of inter-organisational. coalitions that charactcrisc the 
North East in the 1990s reflect not only the [historical and] contemporary 
concerns of both.. [central government]-ministers and the business 
sector ... but also the more traditional localist response to the region's long- 
term economic decline" (Shaw, 1994,52). 
For this reason, the marketing of Newcastle, and the associated governance 
structures cannot be understood in isolation from the historical development of the 
city, and indeed the region. As the regional capital of the North East, Newcastle's 
fortunes have been, and still are intimately tied to those of the region. 
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6.1 Setting the city in context 
With representatives of local capital, labour and goverment adopting an 
interventionist role in the local economy, Newcastle and the North East of England 
have long been associated with corporatist political structures. As such, the North 
East is often portrayed as the archetypal corporatist region (Shaw, 1994,1993,1990; 
Byrne, ý 1993; Wilkinson, 1992; Cooke, 1988). In the 19th century, an alliance 
between John Clayton (Town Clerk), John Dobson (local architect) and Richard 
Grainger (local builder/developer) had a tremendous influence on the development 
of Victorian Newcastle and its city centre (Shaw, 1990). Referred to as Grainger 
Town, this historic core is now protected by Conservation Area Status and is being 
regenerated by the Grainger Town Partnership. 
These corporatist traditions continued into the 20th century as the regional rhetoric 
and cross-class consensus of the late 1800s found concrete form. Riding the tide of a 
strong regional planning and development movement, tripartite groups comprising 
capital, labour and government established the North East Development Board in 
1935 and the North of England Development Council in 1962. In addition, the 
Northern Economic Planning Council operated throughout the 1960s (Northern 
Economic Planning Council, 1969,1966) and the Northern Regional Strategy Team 
coordinated regional economic development efforts during the 1970s (Northern 
Regional Strategy Team, 1977). In consequence, the region has had some form of 
tripartite development agency promoting its assets since the 1930s, thus leading 
Shaw to proclaim that ever since this time; 
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"The area has ... provided an almost 'classical 
illustration' of corporatist 
political structures dominated by the labour movement, local/regional capital 
and representatives of regional goverment agencies" (1994,5 1). 
A similar constellation of interests (Shaw, 1994) lay behind the 'strongly local 
corporatist' grouping (Cooke, 1988,194) of unions, capital and public professionals 
that set about modernising the economic and social structure of the region during the 
1960s. Directed by Newcastle City Council (NCC) and its leader T. Dan Smith, this 
alliance lobbied fervently for industrial diversification and improved regional 
infrastructure. A strong case has been made therefore, stating that local'corporatism 
adequately describes the historical arrangements that have characterised economic 
development policy making in Newcastle and the North East. 
Undeniably, the longevity of economic decline in Newcastle and the North East led 
to the early formation of alliances between different factions within the local and 
regional economy. Realistic, perhaps even fatalistic attitudes towards the plight that 
faced the city and the region led to the prevalence of a 'stable political culture that 
emphasises pragmatism over ideology' (Moore and Pierre, 1988; cited in Shaw, 
1994,54). Such pragmatism is evident in the creation of alliances between the public 
and private sectors, and local trade union and labour groups much earlier than 
elsewhere in the country. The potential for conflict between different interests was 
subjugated to the "let's-sink-our-political-differences-in-the-interests-of-promoting- 
the-region! ' philosophy (Hetherington and Robinson, 1988,208). Whether this claim 
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is true of contemporary governing structures remains to be seen, and will be 
addressed later in this chapter. 
One characteristic response to economic decline that has registered a regional 
political pragmatism in Newcastle and the North East is place promotion; what has 
become known as a characteristic growth strategy of the 1980s and 1990s (Shaw, 
1994). During the 1960s, the regional development agencies cited above employed 
the more traditional policies of industrial attraction, whilst Newcastle City Council is 
well-documented as having conducted what would be regarded as more 
contemporary ýIace promotional strategies under the controversial leadership of T. 
Dan Smith (Shaw, 1994; Wilkinson, 1992; Robinson, 1988; Smith, 1970; Bums, 
1967). Indeed, the survey identified the North East as one of the earliest proponents 
of place promotion, with local authorities in the region undertaking promotional 
activities in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Hence, there is nothing new about the use of partnership arrangements to facilitate 
regeneration in Newcastle and the North East (Shaw, 1990), nor is there anything 
new about the use of place promotional strategies to attract inward investment into 
the city and the region. It is therefore important to acknowledge the historical 
trajectory of these policies and recognise that changes in governance have been 
superimposed upon 'an already complex patchwork of agencies' (Shaw, 1994,52). It 
could be argued therefore that recent transformations in governance and the 
supposed shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism are likely to be less marked 
in Newcastle than they have been in other major British cities. It is therefore worth 
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considering what, if anything, distinguishes contemporary politics in Newcastle from 
previous years. 
6.2 The shift to entrepreneurialism 
During the 1960s, Newcastle City Council was led by the charismatic T. Dan Smith, 
who, together with Wilfred Bums (NCC's Chief Planning Officer), developed an 
influential strategy based on a grand vision of Newcastle as the 'New Brasilia of the 
North' (Smith, 1970,55). Their united aim was to transform Newcastle (back) into a 
progressive and vibrant regional capital that would rival existing European regional 
ccntres. It was a vision that sought to build upon the success of the Victorian years 
and the afore-mentioned corporatist alliance and blend their 19th century traditions 
'with a visionary, modernist future' (Wilkinson, 1992,178); 
"In Newcastle, I wanted to see the creation of a 20th century equivalent of 
Dobson's masterpiece, and its integration into the historic framework of the 
city. If this could be achieved, I felt that our regional capital would become 
the outstanding provincial city in the country" (Smith, 1970,46). 
This visionary rhetoric was accompanied by a series of large-scale, comprehensive 
redevelopment schemes which still impact upon the city centre today. Indeed, 
strategies relating to image improvement and physical redevelopment have been 
classically associated with the 1980s and 1990s and the apparent shift from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). For example, during this 
period we have seen the return of these high-profile, flagship schemes in the 
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regeneration activities of urban development corporations. In Newcastle, the Tyne 
and Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) introduced several flagship schemes 
along the banks of the River Tyne (Newcastle Quayside, Royal Quays, St. Peters 
Basin) and The Newcastle Initiative (TNI) stimulated. high profile development 
projects in the inner city (Theatre Village, Chinatown). Questions must therefore be 
raised regarding the putative shift to entrcpreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990s 
given that Newcastle City Council were conducting strategies of this kind in the 
1960s. 
There arc also, however, important differences between the two promotional eras 
which should not be ignored or denied. Contemporary re-imaging - and 
redevelopment activities are often founded upon a 'postindustrial' vision of the city 
characteristic of any number of old industrial centres. Keen to dispel images of a 
'grimy, industrial town' (Principal Inward Investment Officer, NCQ and instead 
emphasise 'clean' architecture and a diversity of lifestyles, postindustrial strategies 
often result in the fragmented juxtaposition of different urban images. The delivery 
of the promotional message itself is also fragmented. Newcastle is marketed by a 
variety of public and private sector agencies, all of which have a slightly different 
spatial remit. For example, Newcastle City Council promotes the city of Newcastle; 
the TWDC markets the length of the waterfront of the Rivers Tyne and Wear; TNI's 
activities traditionally revolve around a series of individual flagship projects located 
across the city, however more recent initiatives concern the whole of the city; and 
the Northern Development Company (NDC) promotes the assets of the whole 
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Northern region, incorporating both the North East and Cumbria, with Newcastle as 
its regional capital. Consequently; 
"initiatives aimed at creating a new Newcastle have become fragmented and 
unfocused despite attempts to promote inter-agency 'coordination" 
(Wilkinson, 1992,206). 
The postindustrial city is therefore being re-imaged as a series of fragments, both 
geographically and as a set of different flagship projects. This contrasts markedly 
with the single, all-embracing vision of the Smith era in which comprehensive 
planning and redevelopment was seen as the key to creating a modernist city 
(Wilkinson, 1992). Founded upon utopian ideals, it was; 
"essentially a modernist vision with a- strong social welfare component, 
managed by the public sector on Keynesian functional principles" 
(Wilkinson, 1992,178). 
Smith's image improvement strategies were not solely concerned with the attraction 
of inward investment, but were also concerned with bolstering civic pride by 
promoting a positive vision of the city internally. In contrast, contemporary agencies, 
and the TWDC especially, are concerned with promoting the generation of wealth 
and attaining commercial profit. There are therefore important elements of both 
continuity and change in the way Newcastle has been promoted and developed over 
the years (Shaw, 1994). 
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The evidence presented in Newcastle indicates that the historical development of 
promotional policy and governance is more complicated than the general literature 
has hitherto suggested. This lends weight to the arguments outlined in earlier 
chapters that critique a vision of a straightforward shift from managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism. Although the Smith vision was founded upon managerialist 
principles, it is clear that some of the strategies conducted were speculative and 
innovative and so could be deemed 'entrepreneurial'. This would suggest that we are 
right to question the assumed axiomatic truth that local governance prior to the 
1970s was exclusively characterised by managerial politics, and that this form of 
politics is characterised solely by a concem for service delivery and social welfare 
(Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). It would. appear that urban 
governments can indeed pursue 'an amalgam of managerial (socially progressive) 
and entrepreneurial (growth-centred) policies' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,14). Indeed, 
as Hubbard and Hall (1998) note, the perpetuation of this dualism masks 'the fact 
that city governments, to a lesser or greater extent, have always pursued 
entrepreneurial strategies and played a crucial role in -local economic development' 
(Hubbard and Hall, 1998,14). The Newcastle experience highlights the fact that we 
should perhaps acknowledge a 'new relationship between entrepreneurialism and 
managerialism' (Wilkinson, 1992,210).. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that there has been no shift in the way cities are 
governed. However, the evidence, presented thus far, indicates the 'dangers in 
accepting the idea that entrepreneurial governance is distinct from other modes of 
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governance in all respects' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,15). 1 would argue that this 
further highlights the need to redirect our attention to accurately specifying 
contemporary governance structures and in this case, the role of place promotion 
within them. Given the above findings, correctly discovering the details of the 
configuration of governance is a necessary step before we can draw broader 
conclusions as to the nature, and extent of the shift to entrepreneurial ism, and/or the 
potential emergence of new regimes of accumulation (Valler et al, forthcoming). 
6.3 Local governance and place promotion 
The city of i4ewcastle is promoted by a plethora of public and private sector 
agencies; most notably by Newcastle City Council, the Northern Development 
Company, the Tyne and Wear Economic Development Company (TWEDCO), the 
TWDC (wound down in March 1998), and TNI. As outlined previously, all the 
above have different spatial remits, with only Newcastle City Council and TNI 
promoting the city of Newcastle. The following discussion therefore revolves 
predominantly around these two organisations, however, before attention turns to 
these, it is important to outline the evolution of Newcastle's entrepreneurial agenda 
with regard to place promotion, and further highlight elements of continuity and 
change. 
As discussed, alliances in the city of Newcastle and the North East region have 
historically sought to attract inward investment through conventional industrial 
location policies and more contemporary place promotion strategies. During the 
1960s, firms from the United States made substantial investments in the region (for 
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example, Caterpillar), and during the 1980s, significant investment came from the 
Far East (for example, Komatsu, Nissan and Fujitsu). Some commentators in fact 
argue that this Far Eastern investment simply replaced that from the US which was 
dis-invcsting at the time (Hudson, 1991), but nevertheless, agencies in the city and 
the region have historically based their promotional activities around the attraction 
of inward investment and made concerted attempts to heighten the profile of the city, 
both nationally and internationally. 
The need to pursue these policies was heightened with the introduction of the 
Thatcher Government in 1979. Thatcher's neo-liberal, laissez-faire philosophies 
signalled the collapse of the state modemisation project. The diminution of both 
regional policy and local government autonomy throughout the 1980s ensured that 
the North East ceased being a state-managed region, and thus needed to adopt self- 
help strategies. This heralded a period characteristic of Harvey's entrepreneurialism 
(Harvey, 1989). Here followed a period of aggressive campaigning with the above 
agencies, between them, seeking both overseas and domestic investment. Attempts 
were made to shift the city's position in the international division of labour using 
classic entrepreneurial strategies. For example, Newcastle City Council sought to 
attract, and continues to seek, both control and command functions and the 
redistribution of central government departments (Harvey, 1989; Eisenschitz and 
Gough, 1993); 
"we very much concentrate our efforts on UK based investment, on tracking 
individual companies and trying to attract UK companies to 
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Newcastle ... we've very much concentrated on central government 
relocations,, electronics companies, business services and engineering" (Chief 
Economic Development Officer, NCQ. 
In this, the Council were relatively' successful, attracting the UK headquarters of 
Procter and Gamble (the multinational manufacturing and advertising company), the 
Dcpartincnt of Social Security, and more recently the Child Support Agency. There 
has therefore been a shift in the policy emphasis away from the utopian ideals of 
social welfare towards municipal enterprise and 'more outward-orientated policies 
designed to fostcr and encourage local growth and economic development' (I lubbard 
and Hall, 1998,2; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Cooke, 1988). 
The 1980s and early 1990s therefore, marked a period of significant change in the 
stance of particular policies, and the institutional fonn of the agencies delivering 
them. For example, Thatcher's concerted attempts to eradicate trade union 
involvement in local politics and replace their role and that of local government with 
private business have made substantial in-roads into the local corporatist 
frameworks. The Northern Development Company was the only remaining 
organisation that could be said to reflect a traditional tripartite structure, and even' 
this has now been subsumed within the new Regional Development Agency for the 
North East. 
The increased involvement of private business has led some commentators to allude 
to a new form of corporatism (Shaw, 1994,1993; Wilkinson, 1992) in which 
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traditional tripartite groups remain prevalent, but their alliances incorporate a wider 
range of both public and private sector interests. Since 'corporatist forms of 
government can... take on entrepreneurial roles in the production of favourable 
business climates' (Harvey, 1989b, 295), Wilkinson suggests tlýat 'the public-sector 
actively engaging in the marketplace and assuming a more market-orientated 
approach compared with its traditional role as regulator and policy maker' (1992, 
210) is indicative of the changing nature of corporatism in Newcastle. In support of 
this view, Shaw declares that; 
"the key feature of experiences in the North East is how the existing local 
corporatist structures (rather than a business-dominated growth coalition) 
have been able to articulate a more entrepreneurial agenda! ' (1994,63). 
He therefore rejects the growth coalition model and, based on the following, strongly 
advocates using a corporatist framework to describe contemporary governance 
arrangements; 
"While there is some evidence in Tyne and Wear of the emerging 
representation of the sectors associated ... with the growth coalition, such 
representation is still limited ... Clearly, this does not amount to the 
widespread colonisation of the agencies operating in the region by a 'new' 
growth coalition of interests" (Shaw, 1994,56). 
This however, stands in marked contrast to earlier comments; 
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"What is emerging then, is ... the dominance of a small group of private sector 
representatives, particularly drawn from the property and commercial 
development sectors. The significance of such a development in Tyne and 
Wear.. Iies.. in the increasing role played in the region by what some observers 
have described as a local 'growth coalition' committed to a pro-growth and 
pro-business philosophy. Thus, while only the Northern Development 
Company corresponds to a traditional corporatist arrangement, the other 
partnership bodies are increasingly made up of representatives from the 
property -and commercial development sectors and related professional 
groups such as building societies, estate agencies and law firms" (Shaw, 
1990,10). 
This highlights the difficulties associated with applying models of urban politics to 
the complexities of govemance. Moreover, it surely testifies to, and thereby supports 
the claim made in earlier chapters that studies of urban politics need to demonstrate 
a renewed commitment to the precise specification of -the configuration and 
mechanics of local governance structures and relations. In so doing, certain elements 
of the promotional governing structures in Newcastle do parallel the growth 
coalition model. In 1994, Newcastle City Council launched its flagship 'Economic 
Regeneration Strategy' (ERS) which was instrumental in securing wide-ranging 
support for local economic development. The ERS Executive Steering Group 
comprises over fifty public, quasi-public, and private sector ifidividuals, including 
representatives from the Council, the Chamber of Commerce, local businesses and 
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city centre traders, local banks, building societies and other financial institutions, 
local property developers, surveyors, architects and builders, local manufacturing 
companies, utilities and universities. Clearly, in terms of membership alone, this 
would seem to reflect the characteristic form of a local 'growth coalition' of interests 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). 
Furthermore, the strategy revolves around three organising themes: 'Physical 
Development'; 'Business Development'; and 'Human Resource Development'; and 
incorporates thirteen clearly defined 'Action Programmes'. The emphasis within 
these Action irogrammes lies very much with Business and Physical Development, 
and so in accordance with growth coalition literature, the strategy is clearly project 
based, with a strong pro-growth agenda. The same can also be said of TNI. TNI's 
membership is virtually identical to that cited above, down to the same individuals, 
and so in this respect, it closely miffors a growth coalition. In addition, it too is 
organised on a project basis, with its activities revolving around six major schemes. 
Moreover, TNI is very much concerned with the economic revitalisation of the city. 
In 1988, at the time of TNI's inception, the envisaged regeneration process aimed to 
stimulate 'leadership, vision and flagship projects' in the creation of 'rising land 
values' and expanding business opportunities (TNI, 1988). In 1990, Shaw observes 
how; 
"The Newcastle Initiative is underpinned by a desire to engender a climate of 
'growth' that has a direct effect on land values and opportunities' for 
commercial development in Newcastle" (p. 10). 
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In brief then, both the ERS and TNI closely resemble a 'growth coalition' in the 
ways described. However, it is clear in the literature that growth coalitions emerge 
where local business interests, out of a desire to generate increased land values, 
profit and wealth, coalesce to exploit the democratic power base of local govcmmcnt 
and instrutnentally 'control' their agendas in order to pursue growth-orientatcd 
strategies that ftuther their own economic interests. This has not been the case in 
Newcastle. The ERS strategic partnership has been facilitated and coordinated by 
Newcastle City Council out of a recognition that, financially, they simply cannot 
achieve the necessary economic transformation alone; 
"Substantial financial resources [are] required to underpin the [ERS]. No 
single agency has sufficient resources alone to achieve success. It is only 
through partnership that the scale of resources can be secured to ensure 
economic regeneratiore' (Economic Regeneration Strategy, Newcastle City 
Council, 1997). 
Furthennore, unlike typical growth coalitions, it appears that without the support or . 
democratic clout of Newcastle City Council, TNI is not a particularly powerful or 
influential organisation. Neither is it well-resourced; 
"TNI are very well meaning but grossly under-resourced and just scratching 
at the surface in a number of areas" (Councillor, NCC). 
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TNI was launched in 1988 as the first Business Leadership Team in the UK as a 
result of a CBI National Task Force study into the role that business could play in 
urban regeneration. It is; 
4(a carapaign. led by leading figures in the life of the city to build Newcastle's 
status as one of the great regional capitals of Britain. It brings together 
leaders from business, the academic community and government into a 
partnership combining the strengths of both the private and the public 
sectors" (TNI, 1988,1). 
Formed to pursue the economic revitalisation of Newcastle, it was to act as a test- 
bed for a new type of public-private partnership. Public sector representatives are 
however, constitutionally excluded from the board, and so, in essence, INI, is a 
business-led coalition. Despite this, strategies are developed and implemented in 
close consultation with NCC and TNI is reluctant to conduct initiatives without first 
receiving endorsement from the local authority. Indeed, the TNI Business Plan 
certainly does not suggest that this is an organisation which aspires to control the 
local authority or the city's agenda; 
"In some areas TNI will be the leading partner playing a pro-active part in 
stimulating and implementing new MItiatives. In other areas TNI will be a 
less active partner playing a mainly supportive role. At times a light, reactive 
role, perhaps doing little more than watching and loosely coordinating will be 
most appropriate' (TNI, 1996,4). 
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The Business Plan states ftirther that TNI seeks to avoid duplication with other 
organisations in the city in order to maximise its impact, suggesting perhaps that it 
does not intend to usurp the local authority's role, or even compete with NCC over 
economic development. The fact that M exerts little leverage over Newcastle City 
Council is indeed confmned by one of their officers; 
"TNI are not trying to do the Council's job and the Council don't feel 
threatened by TNI, it's an additional set of resources that we can call upon" 
(Chief Economic Development Officer, NCC). ' 
Rather than feeling threatened by INI's presence or their remit of activities, it is 
clear that Newcastle City Council recognise the need to work in partnership for 
added value and resources; 
"In terms of how we market ourselves, the budget has been cut progressively 
over the years, and it's become apparent that to get added value you need to 
work in partnership with other organisations ... I can't however, envisage a 
situation where we would hand over the marketing of the city and our 
marketing budget to TNI. INI are part of a broader collaboration" 
(Councillor, NCC). 
It is evident therefore, that TNI is not a dominating force in the city, exploiting the 
local authority and compelling other institutions to adopt its agendas. On the 
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contrary, it is the business-led arm of a public-private partnership that fonns one 
constituent part of a collaborative framework between various public and private 
sector actors in the city. This framework is quite clearly dominated by quite a small 
group of individuals: namely, representatives from Newcastle City Council, Procter 
and Gamble, Northern Electric, Northumbrian Water, Barclays Bank, the Northern 
Rock and Newcastle Building Societies, Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd, Tyne 
Tees Television, and the Universities of Newcastle and Northumbria (TNI and NCC 
transaction documents). It is this group of individuals that forms the core of the ERS 
Executive Steering Group and comprises the various boards of INI. This core is 
then surrounded by a looser federation of transport, retail, hotel and leisure interests 
(TNI and NCC transaction documents). The fact that these core interests are 
represented on so many of the boards that govern Newcastle and the North East, 
leads Robinson and Shaw to declare that; 
"the region is still effectively run by a small coherent and cohesive local 
elite. Looking across the various agencies one sees not just the same interests 
represented but also the same handful of narnes" (1991,280). 
It can therefore be argued that the power wielded in Newcastle transcends 
institutional boundaries and operates more as a governing 'regime of interests'. 
Responsibility for certain initiatives is pragmatically assigned across the regime 
according to particular areas of expertise. As a result, representatives from Procter 
and Gamble have become some of the most proactive private sector agents in the 
city. The Director of Marketing Services chairs the ERS 'Image Improvement' 
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Action Programme, and both he and the Vice-President of UK operations are active, 
influential and enthusiastic board members of TNI and the new 'Newcastle 
Marketing Initiative'; 
"it's probably not in, the least bit surprising that if the City Council were 
looking at things like marketing, that because we're probably the leading 
marketing company in the world ... it only seemed fair that we should try and 
help in a subject area that we could probably be of some assistance with" 
(Director of Marketing Services, Procter and Gamble). 
Newcastle City Council coordinates this broad collaboration of interests, owing to 
the fact that historically, it has been a strong local authority, and because; 
"In reality, all the partnerships that I've been involved in end up being led by 
the City Council, whether we like it or not, mainly because we're the 
enabling body, the body that's financially responsible, and that's almost 
inevitable in any partnership arrangement, unless we give some money to a 
private company to do it ... essentially because everybody else can go bust in 
the end, but the City Council is always there to pick up the tab basically" 
(Deputy Leader, NCC). 
It therefore continues to be the major power broker in the city, and further evidence 
of this will be presented shortly. The Council also has a well-documented history of 
pursuing growth-orientated strategies (albeit more aggressively in the 1980s), and a 
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history of working in partnership with the private sector. I would therefore suggest 
that the present situation in Newcastle is indicative of a strong local authority 
encouraging, facilitating and coordinating the involvement of a proactive private 
sector. Rather than a growth coalition of interests, this parallels a form of regime 
politics which Stone originally defined as the 'informal arrangements by which 
public bodies and private interests flinction together in order to be able to make and 
carry out governing decisions' (1989,6, emphasis added). Owing to the nature of the 
strategies cited above, and the nature of relations between the public and private 
sectors, Newcastle's Promotional governing interests and structures can be 
characterised as an 'entrepreneurial regime' along the lines described by Painter; 
"Following Harvey's definition of entrepreneurial urban governance, I define 
an entrepreneurial urban regime as a coalition of interests including the 
public sector and private firms which is organised. through partnerships and 
whose goal is the enhancement of the competitiveness of the urban region 
with regard to (a) the location of production and consumption activities and 
control and command functions; and (b) the spatial rcdistribution of 
surpluses by the state and quasi-state bodies" (1998,265). 
Painter believes that this characterisation would 'not slot neatly' (1998,265) into 
existing regime typologies, but suggests that a regime in which; 
"urban politics and governance were increasingly focused on the promotion 
of economic competitiveness.. [andl.. place marketing to attract inward 
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investment ... (often linked to a shift away from an earlier emphasis on welfare 
services for urban residents) ... would be partly an 
instrumental regime and 
partly a symbolic revitalisation regime" (painter, 1998,264-5). 
This concurs with the evidence in Newcastle. To reiterate the principles outlined in 
Chapter Tbree, instrumental regimes are project-oriented with the main participants 
motivated by achieving specific goals and producing tangible results. Symbolic 
revitalisation. regimes occur where cities are striving to revitalise their fortunes 'with 
a change in image as well as in circumstance' (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994,200). 
These regimes are fundamentally concerned with establishing a future role and 
vision for the city, and in so doing, concentrate upon changing a city's image in 
order to attract investment. 
In accordance with these more recognised regime typologies (Stoker and 
Mossberger, 1994; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b), both the ERS and TNI 
are organised around clearly identifiable projects with well-defined goals, 
underpinned by strategies designed to change Newcastle's image, heighten its 
profile, attract inward investment, and thereby enhance the city's position in the 
international division of labour. Furthermore, regimes which are organised around 
specific projects and the achievement of tangible results are more likely to include 
certain interests and exclude others (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994), and Newcastle's 
regime is indeed characterised. by a relatively small, but consistent, core group of 
interests. 
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Newcastle's entrepreneurial regime has therefore been driven by these instrumental, 
economic concerns. Marketing the city has been an issue high on the local political 
agenda for many years, and this continues to be the case today. In 1997, the regime 
partners established the new 'Newcastle Marketing Initiative' (NMI) which provides 
a good example of how the Newcastle regime operates in practice. The activities 
undertaken by the NMI are also consistent with accounts of symbolic revitalisation 
regimes in which emotive symbols are used to arouse commitment and sustain 
political activism; 
"By fostering positive attitudes about a city that has experienced serious 
erosion of its economic base, [symbolic] regimes aim to create a new 
image ... This image change assists the city 
in attracting new investmenf, 
(Stoker and Mossberger, 1994,20 1). 
In relation to marketing, there has been a 'constant debate on what we want to 
achieve, identifying the resources to do that, and identifying who is responsible for 
what, where the public sector is responsible and where the private sector is 
responsible' (Marketing Coordinator, NMI). The regime partners recogniscd that 
Newcastle was being promoted in a number of different ways by a variety of 
different organisations, and so in response to this, the NMI was established in an 
attempt to overcome the existing fragmentation of Newcastle's promotion; 
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"one of the problems in Newcastle is that everything has happened on an ad 
hoc basis. Different groups all have their own marketing budgets and spend it 
in different ways" (Marketing Coordinator, NMI). 
For example, Newcastle City Council were seeking inward investment and 
promoting the city as a place in which to li've and work. Northumbria Tourist Board 
were promoting local tourist attractions, festivals and events. The hotel and leisure 
industry, together with Newcastle Airport, were marketing the city as a business, 
conference and leisure location, whilst the major retail interests (the Metro Centre, 
Eldon Square, 'Boots, Marks and Spencers, and the locally-based department stores, 
Fenwicks and Bainbridges), were promoting the city as a major retail destination. In 
an attempt to reduce duplication of effort and enhance both the simplicity and 
efficiency of the promotional message, the partners embarked upon establishing the 
'Newcastle Marketing Initiative'. Funded by the interests cited above, together with 
Procter and Gamble, Northern Rock Building Society, Northern Electric and the 
local universities, amongst others, this acts as a focal point and aims to coordinate all 
the various bodies who are marketing Newcastle; 
"we felt we needed to do the job the Council were doing, but separately have 
someone responsible for marketing the city, but it was important that the 
Council felt very strongly that they were behind it and that it was useful to 
them and that it was well coordinated with the things they were doing, but at 
the same time, it was actually helpful to have it slightly separate from the 
Council because that would allow an individual to be able to leverage more 
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of the private sector to help and also it would break down some of the 
political boundaries you can get between the NDC, the TWDC, and the City 
Council, because they have all got some responsibility for marketing the city, 
but are all coming from different angles" (Director of Marketing Services, 
Procter and Gwnble). 
In the first instance, the NMI is a three year promotional campaign, designed to 
coordinate the activities and minds of those marketing Newcastle. Its activities 
revolve primarily around the creation of a new city logo, developing marketing 
project groupý, and gaining both public and private sector commitment, membership 
and support for the campaign. Symbolic politics for example, are as much about the 
discourse of doing things as they are about actively doing them. A marketing 
initiative such as this can bolster local business confidence and enhance civic pride 
without actually altering physical and economic circumstances. So far, it has been 
successful in creating a city logo and brand that major stakeholders, small 
businesses, and residents are happy with. It has also raised awareness of the need to 
coordinate the city's marketing activities. It has however, achieved little more than 
this. Whilst the major stakeholders have contributed financially to the initiative, they 
still retain control of their own marketing budgets and spend it accordingly, based 
upon their own target audiences. 
This has sparked off a further debate concerning the potential establishment of a 
'Newcastle Marketing Office' (NMO), a central, coordinating promotional agency. 
This would be a 'one-stop-shop' for all the information and promotion services of 
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Newcastle, to which the marketing budgets of the above stakeholders would be 
transferred. The NMO would then be responsible for image improvement, inward 
investment promotion, tourism promotion, accommodation, concert and conference 
bookings, and festivals and events. It is envisaged that the establishment of such an 
organisation would bring an end to the fragmented approach that has characterised 
Newcastle's promotion over recent years; 
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"structurally, the Marketing Initiative still has some way to travel to become 
what I perceive is the type of organisation that can effectively deliver 
marketing programmes for the city. Structure is really important, but not 
everyone shares this view ... we need to move on from here and get the 
structure right, although the last thing I want to do is create yet another 
separate body to add to all these other bodies" (Marketing Coordinator, 
NMI). 
The negotiations that have taken place over extending this 'initiative' into a concrete 
organisational. structure, illuminate the. internal machinations of the regime and 
reveal the important role played by Newcastle City Council. Indeed, recent attempts 
to form a Newcastle Marketing Office have failed given Newcastle City Council's 
current lack of commitment to the scheme. The Council is divided on the matter. 
Some officers strongly believe that if all the above promotional functions were 
combined in one organisation; 
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"we can get more, jointly and collectively, for our money than we can 
singularly. The argument that we've got to make is that if those promotional 
functions came back into the organisation [NCC], you couldn't carry out 
those functions for the same amount of money" (Principal Inward Investment 
Officer, NCQ. 
Other officers are concerned about the operational costs of setting up a new 
overarching promotional service in new premises; 
"it quickly became apparent that if you were going to set one [NMO] up, the 
actual running costs of such an office in terms of overheads, staffing, 
premises and so on, would quickly subsume all our marketing budgets and 
we would have nothing left to spend on marketing" (Chief Economic 
Development Officer, NCQ., 
They argue that scant resources would be expended on rent, rates, and overhcads, 
when they could in fact be better spent on promoting the city. Critics believe that 
available monies would be far better spent on a coordinated campaign, undertaken in 
partnership by existing bodies; 
"we prefer to stick to the original model of appointing someone in the private 
sector to coordinate all the various bodies who are marketing Newcastle, 
funded by quite a broad base of people" (Chief Economic Development 
Officer, NCC). 
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Moreover, Councillors in particular, are very sceptical about setting up a Newcastle 
Marketing Office; 
"there's always a suspicion in setting up anns-Icngth, free-standing 
agencies ... because the Councillors think that you're removing control and 
removing local democracy" (Principal Inward Investment Off icer, NCQ. 
The NMO would be jointly funded by all those with a vested interest in the 
promotion of Newcastle, and so NCC would not have absolute control. In a city 
where the local authority has historically held a prominent position in the broader 
framework of collaborating bodies, it perhaps comes as no surprise that the NMO 
project has been greeted with scepticism and indecision, and has subsequently been 
postponed. A Newcastle Marketing Office is indeed unlikely to emerge until it 
receives endorsement from the Council. This is testament to the Council's power , 
and influence across the city, and also to its leading role within the entrepreneurial 
regime. Even the most proactive of private sector partners are reluctant to pursue this 
project without the support of NCC; 
"I'd be driven a lot by whether the Council wanted to do it. If the Council felt 
strongly that they thought it was a sensible and useful thing to do, then I 
would support them and back it. If they were resistant to it, or reluctant about 
it, I wouldn't push them" (Director of Marketing Services, Procter and 
Gamble). 
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Councillors do not wish the scheme to proceed, but if they were convinced otherwise 
and the NMO went ahedd, it would be led by the City Council. Chiming with earlier 
comments made by the Deputy Leader of NCC, this leading role appears to be 
accepted, and even regarded as inevitable by their private sector partners; 
"I think there will be some friction, but having said that, I still scc this as 
being led by the City Council, in partnership with TNI. If you look at the 
promotion of the city, the body that can affect change is the City Council. 
The Chamber of Commerce can't,, the private sector can't, they can all 
contribute but the key body is the City Council. However, what the City 
Council must be prepared to do is to dilute their absolute power for the 
overall benefit of the city" (Marketing Coordinator, NMI). 
The NMO however, is not going ahead precisely because the Council is unwilling to 
dilute their powers any fixther. If the Council did this, it would be much harder for 
them to change agendas in the city, as they are doing at the present time. Originating 
from the City Council, and particular Councillors within it, the entrepreneurial 
agenda and its associated approach have been called into question. The mid to late 
1990s heralded a period of significant change for Newcastle City Council, and for 
the economic development department in particular. These changes are now having a 
knock-on effect on the city's agenda, and yet again, the marketing of the city and 
issues surrounding how and why Newcastle should be marketed have become focal 
points for debate. 
176 
Firstly, the Leader of the Council had remained unchanged for seventeen years. Sir 
Jeremy Beecham had been an influential Leader and, as Chairman of the 
Development Committee and a prominent local businessman, he had also been an 
ardent advocate of the economic development of Newcastle. During his leadership, 
he developed strong ties with the national Labour Party, and as a result, successfully 
raised Newcastle's profile on the national stage. He stood down aý Leader in 1995, 
and as Chairman of the Development Committee in 1997, to bccome a full-time 
advisor to the Labour Party, and subsequently the new Labour Government. 
Secondly, not'only was there a new Leader, but over the two years that followed, 
there was a new Chief Executive, a new Director of Development, and the old 
Development Department was disbanded. At the time of the research, a new 
'Enterprise and Enviromnent' Directorate had yet to be established. Hence, this was 
very much a period of transition for Newcastle City Council, and with it came the 
opportunity to review operations. 
As part of this review, certain influential members expressed their increasing 
concern. and disillusionment with the marketing approach the Council and the city 
were taking. They felt that the way Newcastle was being marketed was not 
impacting upon the problems facing the city, or its level of unemployment. Since the 
late 1980s, the Development Department have appointed a London-based advertising 
company to assist in raising the city's profile and 'improve the image of Newcastle 
at a national level' (Principal Inward Investment Officer, NCC), principally because 
an agency in the South East can access national media institutions and influential 
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opinion-formers more easily than the Council. J. Walter Tbompson, and more 
recently, Hill and Knowlton were contracted 'to get Newcastle and Newcastle's 
image positively promoted down in the South' (Principal Inward Investment Officer, 
NCQ. However, as part of an attempt to raise awareness of their efforts locally, Hill 
and Knowlton placed adverts for inward investment on the local light-rail public 
transport system. This, it appears was the proverbial 'straw that broke the camels' 
back'; 
"the idea of the City Council spending an awful lot on marketing was 
brought into disrepute by the old Development Department, they basically 
seemed to be wasting our money. Advertising for major inward investment 
on the 'Metro' was the icing on the cake as far as a lot of our members were 
concerned and it led to a massive row in the Labour Group at the time" 
(Councillor, NCC). 
Marketing activities therefore gained a poor reputation and the Marketing Strategy 
Sub-Committee was regarded as largely 'ineffective' (Vice-Chair, Marketing 
Strategy Sub-Committee). The composition of this sub-committee however, ensures 
that it still maintains a high profile within the Council; 
"Whilst it's a sub-committee, it's got a lot of power and influence because 
it's chaired by the Leader of the Council, and the Deputy Leader is the Vice- 
Chaie' (Chief Economic Development Officer, NCC). 
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In fact, the Deputy Leader has decided to revolutionise the marketing strategy in two 
major ways. In short, he wishes to see a shift down in focus from a national to a 
regional level, and an incorporation of social and cultural issues into an otherwise 
economic strategy. Championed by the Deputy Leader therefore, there has been a 
mounting attack on the economic development department owing to the belief that 
substantial sums of money have been wasted during a period of increasing financial 
stringency; 
"we've wasted an awful lot of money on a London-based approach to raising 
the city's profile in inappropriate areas ... it's not about kudos, it's not about 
status ... we've concentrated too much on Newcastle being marketed at a 
national and international level, simply to raise its profile with no clear 
objectives as far as I'm concerned and there has been a political debate about 
that" (Deputy Leader, NCC). 
The city of Newcastle has traditionally lacked appropriate large sites for investment, 
yet despite this, for many years the Council have pursued a strategy centred upon the 
attraction of inward investment; 
"I think the marketing ran ahead of the product. The marketing has been very 
successful, Newcastle now has a much better image than it ever had, but sites 
and premises have lagged behind" (Chief Economic Development Officer, 
NCQ. 
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Therefore, with the exception of two large strategic sites (the Northern Development 
Area and Newburn Haugh), that have only recently become available, the Deputy 
Leader feels that the economic development department have; 
"been focusing in the wrong directions. I think there needs to be a rc- 
focusing of approach... there's a fundamental common sense about looking 
after your core business. If you have the capacity to go for things that are 
peripheral and marginal, which frankly, inward investment is, apart from the 
two big strategic sites, then do so, but we haven't" (Deputy Leader, NCC). 
However, it seems officers have yet to be convinced of this, since at the time of 
research, the economic development team were just embarking upon a new direct 
mail campaign to companies located in the South East. In the words of the Deputy 
Leader, 'it is a debate that is moving on, but different people are at different stages at 
the moment'. So, whilst 'all of the marketing to date has been done on a national 
level' (Chief Economic Development Officer, NCC), the preferred approach of 
Councillors at least is to market Newcastle locally and regionally in an attempt to 
sustain the city's 'core business' and even its role as regional capital of the North 
East; 
"What's clear to me, the big thing we're not doing at the moment is properly 
marketing Newcastle to the region. That is our key business, that's where 
most of our employment comes from. We're going for inward investment, 
we9re going for a national profile, we seem to be missing the major thing that 
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we do, where there's the potential for most growth ... we should be selling 
Newcastle to the region ... because we are a regional capital, there are a 
large 
number of businesses in the city who very much rely on us being a regional 
capital ... I would 
like to see us focus much more on marketing the city to 
local customers rather than to national inward investors" (Deputy Leader, 
NCQ. 
The reasoning behind his argument is very simple. Over recent years, Sunderland, 
the region's second city, has embarked upon a competitive strategy to undermine 
Newcastle's role and become the North East's regional capital itself; 
"there's always been an historical rivalry but it's got worse in recent years, 
you have a political leadership in Sunderland who are obsessed with the issue 
of status and being bigger and better than Newcastle ... probably because of 
the extreme economic pressure the region's been under, people are 
scrabbling around for every scrap and fighting for things they probably 
shouldn't be fightingfoe, (Councillor, NCC). 
In contrast again, officers 'do not perceive Sunderland to be a major threat' 
(Principal Inward Investment Officer, NCC), however, whilst not regarded as a 
major threat, it is widely recognised that competition within the region has increased 
since the demise of the Tyne and Wear County Council in 1986. Prior to the County 
Council's abolition, the Tyne and Wear Structure Plan determined the location of 
new investment thereby reducing intra-regional competition. Owing to the relative 
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buoyancy of Newcastle's service sector economy and lack of appropriate industrial 
sites, manufacturing investment was directed to the A19 corridor in an attempt to 
boost Sunderland's declining economy. With the demise of the County Council, 
individual authorities have been able to plan for, and attract their own commercial 
and industrial allocations. Newcastle City Council therefore pursued a more 
aggressive inward investment campaign, and in turn, Sunderland City Council 
sought to enhance their service sector role, rival Newcastle, and mount their own 
campaign to become the North East's administrative capital. 
It could be arjued therefore, that having pursued an aggressive inward investment 
campaign, those responsible for promoting Newcastle have become complacent 
about its regional standing. They now find themselves having to rc-assert the city's 
position as the regional capital and 'settle some issues about the status of the city. 
This is one thing the marketing strategy can help with' (Deputy Leader, NCC). In re- 
asserting the city's role as regional capital, the Deputy Leader wishes to see 
'Newcastle marketed holisticoly as a cultural centre, as a retail centre, and as a 
leisure centre, for the region' (Deputy Leader, NCQ. In so doing, he wishes to see 
an otherwise economically-driven marketing strategy incorporate more social and 
cultural elements. The restructuring of Newcastle City Council into larger 
directorates, such as the 'Enterprise and Enviromnent' Directorate is regarded as 
assisting this 'corporate' approach to regeneration; 
"we"ve really just started to shift our regeneration approach in the city to 
being much more holistically based on social, cultural and economic issues. 
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It's been very much economic-led in the past and we don't think that it's 
worked necessarily -that well because it's missed out core opportunities of 
enriching people's lives and gaining employment ... that culture of people 
being very much economically-focused is going to take a while to change but 
the restructuring of the local authority will reinforce the corporate approach 
to regcneratioW' (Deputy Leader, NCC). 
These sentiments have gathered momentum across the regime and have siýcc been 
welcomed by its private sector partners. The Marketing Coordinator of the NMI 
believes that; 
"the City Council has struggled to effectively market the city because of its 
departmental culture, rather than a corporate culture"; 
and the Director of Marketing Services at Procter and Gamble has become; 
"increasingly aware of the fact that.. [NCC].. weren't very well geared up to 
market the city because the Council's structure is to have a department which 
is in charge of economic regeneration that fundamentally is very single- 
mindedly focused on things like 'can we attract this factory here' or 
whatever, and what we felt was needed in addition to that was looking at the 
totality of the city". 
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It is clear therefore, just how changes within the City Council impinge upon the city 
and the city's regime. This latest political debate has already impacted upon the 
marketing of the city, how it is delivered and by whom. Stemming from this 
movement within the Council, the flagship ERS is now under review. Council 
departments are being asked to identify and prioritise social and cultural issues and 
develop social and cultural strategies in anticipation of them being incorporated into 
the revised strategy. Furthermore, the NMI has curtailed its original promotional 
aspirations. Initially, the intention was to conduct high-profile, national media 
campaigns to promote Newcastle and its assets extemally. This type of approach has 
since been described by the Marketing Coordinator of the NMI as 'putting 
information and resources into a black hole'. Instead, it has been decided that it will 
be more cost effective to direct promotional efforts internally in the hope of raising 
local awareness, and bolstering local business confidence and civic pride. 
TNI has also shifted its agenda slightly. Although TNI is concerned with crcating 
opportunities for economic growth, and economic and physical development are of 
vital importance to TNI, it appears that it is not the overriding commonality that 
binds the partnership together. Growth per se is no longer the sole driving aim. The 
key objective now is to; 
"achieve outcomes which are beneficial to the City of Newcastle and its 
population7'(TNI, 1996,4). 
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A profit motive no longer appears paramount as social objectives are pursued 
alongside other, more economically-driven goals. Amongst a range of aims, TNI 
seeks to; 
"provide appropriate advice and contacts to organisations with so6ial 
objectives wishing to enlist the support of the private sector" (TNT, 1996,4). 
TNI conducts six major project initiatives, one of which is the TNI Community 
Challenge. Under this umbrella initiative, seven individual community projects 
receive public and private sector resources, involvement and coordination, including 
the well-documented Cruddas Park Community Trust and the West End City 
Challenge (Gilroy, 1996; Wood et al, 1995). This Community Challenge project 
aims to; 
"focus private sector support on specific projects aimed at economic and 
educational improvement in areas of underprivilege and social need" (TNI, 
1996,10). 
All these developments suggest something of a redirection away from the 
entrepreneurial agenda that has for so long dominated the city and its regime. It is 
clear that the agenda is beginning to shift from an outward-orientated growth agenda 
to one more concerned with sustaining and maintaining existing economic activity. 
The entrepreneurial agenda stressed the importance of creating and nurturing the 
conditions conducive to out-and-out growth. Rather than attracting new investment 
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and new opportunities for growth, this alternative agenda concerns itself with 
managing the opportunities for growth that are already present in the city and that the 
city already has in its possession. This perhaps more closely resembles that of a 
'caretaker' regime (Stone and Sanders, 1987), a 'maintenance' regime (Stone, 1993), 
or an dorganic' regime (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). These regime types seek to 
sustain, preserve and maintain the status quo. In this case, Newcastle's governing 
regime is becoming increasingly concerned with maintaining the city's position at 
the top of the regional hierarchy and protecting the economic, social and cultural 
benefits that arise from this. 
The entrepreneurial agenda is therefore showing signs of unravelling. Whether the 
actual regime of interests will unravel with it remains to be seen. However, the 
evidence presented reveals how the private sector partners have embraced the new 
sentiments of the Council. It is perhaps more likely therefore that the regime will 
simply evolve to accommodate this new agenda. Any transition however, is unlikely 
to be smooth given that some of the City Council's officers are yet to be convinced 
of the need for these changes. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The trends are therefore clear to see. The city and the region have historically been 
characterised by corporatist structures. From the turn of the century, a regional cross- 
class consensus between capital, labour and government emerged in response to the 
impending collapse of the region's staple industries. This consensus found concrete 
form in various corporatist structures, which dominated the local institutional scene 
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for many decades. Whilst these structures continued well into the 1960s and 1970s, 
local leaders at that time were compelled to act speculatively, take more risks, and 
adopt more innovative strategies in the hope of stemming the continuing decline of 
the region. This embryonic form of entrepreneurialism was then enhanced during the 
1980s by the pro-business, anti-local govenunent policies of the Thatcher 
Govenunent. 
As demonstrated however, Newcastle City Council appears to have survived this 
downgrading, despite the introduction of a proliferation of non-clccted government 
institutions ana publid-private partnerships (for exwnple, the TWDC, Tyneside TEC, 
and TNI). Illustrating this point, the relationship between Newcastle City Council 
and TNI has been discussed, as has the role the Council plays within Newcastle's 
regime. In addition, it is apparent that Newcastle City Council adopted a pragmatic 
attitude towards the introduction of the TWDC, accepting Councillor seats on the 
board, thereby enabling the Council to continue to exert at least some influence over 
the TWDC's statutory area; 
"ufflike a lot of other authorities, we took a very positive view, despite the 
fact that they were imposed by a right-wing Thatcher Government saying that 
local authorities had failed to do theirjob. Despite all that, we said 'right OK, 
well politically we don't like what you're doing, we think it should be within 
local control, but we've got to accept that it is a fait accompli, let's just get 
on with it. We don't like it, but we're still going to be involved in discussions 
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at the table', because then you can at least direct the money, to some extent, 
to where you want it to go" (Principal Inward Investment Officer, NCC). 
The picture that emerges from the Newcastle experience therefore, is one in which 
the local authority continues 'to play a key role: private sector involvement may 
prove useful - but public sector involvement is vital' (Shaw, 1994,54). Thus, Shaw 
concludes further that we therefore; 
"need to highlight, not the demise of local government's role in urban 
regeneration, but how this has altered to accommodate both the increased 
role of the business community and the need to ensure coordination bctwccn 
different agencies" (1994,54, emphasis added)., 
Indeed, this is not unique to Newcastle. Several commentators have found this to be 
true in other parts of the country. The local authority is often the focal point around 
which various public-private coalitions form (Ward, 1997a; Valler, 1996; Bassett 
and Harloe, 1990; Cooke, 1989,1988). Admittedly, 'gone are the days when local 
govemment could dictate terms' (Cooke, 1988,199, emphasis added) without 
referring to other organisations or sectors, but what continues to be the case is that; 
"Without exception, the democratically elected municipality has been the 
lightning rod attracting the various sources of social energy to it" (Cooke, 
1988,195; also cited in Valler, 1996,386). 
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It is for this reason that many commentators have, rejected the growth coalition 
concept when attempting to apply it in the UK. The problems associated with its 
transferability from the US have been widely documented and presented in Chapter 
Three (Ward, 1997a, 1995; Wood, 1996; Harding, 1995,1994,1991). In essence, 
local authorities have historically played a central role in local economic 
development and the formation of associated coalitions, and indeed, this continues to 
be the case. It is this facet that often precludes the development of powerful and 
proactive business-led coalitions in the UK, especially those that are successful in 
gaining control of local govermuental agendas. 
Nonetheless, Newcastle's entrepreneurial regime has pursued a growth-orientated 
agenda for many years. Recent events indicate however, that this may be superseded 
by an alternative, one which is much more concerned with sustaining current growth 
and maintaining existing economic activity rather than continually seeking new 
growth opportunities. It is perhaps worth considering some of the wider implications 
of this new approach. For example, as outlined in Chapter Two, using somewhat 
different theoretical approaches, both Cox and Mair (1988) and Harvey (1989) 
emphasise the potential for enhanced intra-regional cooperation. 
Cox and Mair (1988) suggest that organisations, and individuals with a major stake 
in local economic development have in common various place-specific relations that 
immobilise them, or at the very least, limit their spatial alternatives to particular 
local, sub-regional (metropolitan) or regional economies. This 'local dependence' 
forms the basis of a political system in which competition among places has come to 
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outweigh conflict within them. Locally dependent interests view their locality as a 
crucial sphere of activity and therefore actively seek to support its renewal by 
becoming involved in local political coalitions. Harvey (1989) argues that coalitions 
come about as a result of the emergence of 'territorial' politics; 
"the ideology of locality, place and community becomes central to the 
political rhetoric of urban governance which concentrates on the idea of 
togetherness in defence against a hostile and threatening world of 
international trade and heightened competition" (p. 14). 
These commentators therefore suggest that 'local dependence' and an ideological 
commitment to place, are important mechanisms in consolidating public-private 
relations and public-private partnerships. Cox (1997) extends this logic to 
incorporate public-public relations and public-public partnerships. Ile criticiscs the 
established regime literature for prioritising the public-private divide over the 
public-public divide, and questions why local governments should not enter into 
arrangements or understandings with each other as well as with private agents (Cox, 
1997,100); 
"there is no a priori reason why the relations through which cooperation for 
local economic development is secured should stop at municipal boundaries. 
In metropolitan areas, the metropolitan provides a significant arena of action 
not just for developers, utilities; and other private agents with interests in 
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local economic development but also for the local governments thcmselvce' 
(Cox, 1997,106). 
I would argue that these accounts underestimate the potential for intra-regional 
competition and conflict; facets which are currently driving local political debates in 
Newcastle, the metropolitan area of Tyneside, and other rival cities in the North 
East. Newcastle and the North East are renowned for their characteristic 'Geordie' 
identity, and yet within the region, and even within the city, the strongly parochial 
nature of different areas results in many competing identities. In fact, local culture 
dictates that those living north of the River Tyne should not associate with those 
living to the south, and vice versa. Therefore, as the agenda in Newcastle shifts to a 
concern with the city and re-establishing its pre-eminence over the rest of the 
metropolitan area and region, the regime and its interests are likely to become even 
more parochial and much less concerned with forging collaborative relations with 
rival, neighbouring authorities. The same obviously applies to these neighbouring 
authorities. Indeed, because they are operating in Newcastle's shadow, evidence 
suggests that they arc even more parochial, and even more conccmcd to establish an 
identity and distinguish themselves from the rest of the metropolitan region. 
For example, in the past, Newcastle City Council and North Tyneside Council have 
worked collaboratively on the Balliol Business Park. This association grew out of 
the fact that boundary changes during local government reorganisation in 1974 
meant that parcels of inward investment land were jointly owned. More recently 
however, the successful attraction of Siemens to the Hadrian Business Park in North 
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Tyneside has caused some parochial tensions. Testament to the regressive nature of 
branch plant economies, it is worthy of note that this multinational micro-clectronics 
company closed down after just eighteen months in operation. However, when it first 
arrived, the local, national and international media reported that it was locating in 
Newcastle. North Tyneside Council made persistent requests for the reporting to be 
accurate. These requests failed owing to the fact that; 
"Newcastle is the stronger narne outside the region, it is the bettcr name to 
take outside the region because it is better knowW' (Inward Investment 
Officei, North Tyneside Council), 
and much conflict ensued. Efforts could be more effectively channelled if these 
municipalities worked collaboratively rather than in opposition, especially when; 
"from the standpoint of the firm making the investment, what may be 
attractive may be less one particular local government in a metropolitan area 
and more the metropolitan area as a whole. So although local economic 
development initiatives may be supported, even financed, there is no 
assurance that they will result in payoffs for the local tax base rather than for 
the tax base of some other local government in the metropolitan area" (Cox, 
1997,110). 
This was indeed the case. The managing directors of Siemens wanted to be seen to 
be locating in Newcastle since this is stronger brand narne to take outside the region 
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to their international customers. They were in fact so keen to be seen to be locating 
their new operations in Newcastle, they asked Royal Mail if they could include 
Newcastle in their address and have a Newcastle postcode. Their request was 
politely refused, but the managing directors were not so easily discouraged. They 
simply included Newcastle in their letterhead address and amended all their 
corporate information. 
This kind of intra-metropolitan parochial conflict does not bode well for the 
increasing numbers of sub-regional partnerships identified by the survey. On the 
other hand, the introduction of sub-regional strategic partnerships may go some way 
towards eradicating this increasing trend. In the North East, the new Regional 
Development Agency is planning to create four sub-regional partnerships to act as a 
mediating point between itself and the local authorities. 
In conclusion, the Newcastle experience has highlighted many facets that can be 
taken forward, and used to infonn and interrogate the second case study. Firstly, 
despite the gloomy predictions of the demise of local government, Newcastle City 
Council clearly plays a key role in forming the agendas for the city, and in the local 
regime. Its role as facilitator and coordinator can be examined in relation to Leeds 
City Council and their role within the 'Leeds Initiative' partnership. Secondly, the 
evidence presented here has highlighted the importance of accurately specifying 
who, what, why and when, in relation to the types of policies pursued and the 
governance structures supporting them. It is clear from the Newcastle experience 
that the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurial ism is perhaps not as 
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straightforward as it has been portrayed in the literature. T'herc are also signs of a 
shift away from entrepreneurialism and an economical ly-driven approach, to an 
agenda more concerned with the holistic amalgamation of economic, social and 
cultural issues. It is increasingly perceived that economic policies have not addressed 
the fundamental, underlying social problems facing the city, or the quality of lives of 
the majority of the city's residents. 
The picture of both place promotion and governance is therefore more complicated 
than has been traditionally suggested in the literature. This case study points to flic 
fact that there are important elements of both continuity and change in the evolution 
of a city development trajectory (Shaw, 1994), and that putative 'modes' of 
governance are not different in all regards (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). In this respect, 
it can be argued that the transformation in governance in Newcastle is perhaps less 
marked than in other major cities in the UK. The evidence presented in this case 
study concerning the longevity of economic development policy, public-private 
partnership, place promotion and entrepreneurialism, suggests that further research 
needs to be conducted in a different urban context in order to specify more precisely 
what the shift to entrepreneurialism implies. This, together with the other major 
themes highlighted, can be investigated further in the following chapter, in which 
reinforcing or contrasting evidence may arise. From this, and the survey findings 




LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE LEEDS CASE 
7.0 Introduction 
As a brief' introduction to this chapter, it is worth reiterating the reasons behind the 
selection of' Leeds as a second case study. Firstly, whilst diflercnt bodies in I. ceds 
conduct their own tailored marketing, a single, overarching organisation is 
responsible Ior the overall promotion of' the cilY of' Leeds. This contrasts sharply 
with the Fragmented organisational landscape that characterises the promotion of' 
Newcastle, and therefore makes it possible to explore diffcrent institutional 
configurations of governance. As we shall see however, the situation in l, ccds 
becornes more complex when we examine recent events in (Ictail. Sccon(jlv. 
strategies relating to place promotion and partnership were place(] on the local 
political agenda in Leeds much later than they were in Newcastle. This, in turn, 
facilitates the exploration of the shýfi fo entrepreneurialism in more detail. I )csl)ite 
these partiCUlar differences, striking similarities between the two cities cinerged 
clUring the analysis, which are perhaps testament to the presence of' certain incta- 
narratives operating across cities and particular local economics. This second case 
study therellore provides both contrasting and reinforcing evidence to Newcastle that 
can be used theoretically and empirically to develop the literature on governance. 
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7.1 Setting the city in context 
Historically characterised by light engineering, manufacturing, printing, clothing and 
textile industries, the economic base of Leeds has been strongly founded upon 
indigenous, small and medium sized enterprises. The city has therefore largely 
avoided over-reliance on a few, dominant industries; a tendency which has been 
evident in many other northern cities, such as Newcastle. This 'heterogeneity has 
cushioned Leeds from cyclical extremes' (Financial Times, 1995) by enabling the 
city to respond effectively to shifts in national and international economic profiles. 
The city has therefore fared considerably better than many other UK cities, and it is, 
in part, for this reason that Leeds has developed its distinctive economic profile. 
During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the Leeds economy was comparatively healthy in 
relation to the UK as a whole, and as such did not necessitate the adoption of 
proactive industrial location policies (Mawson, 1983; 11aughton, 1996). In the 
absence of any attractive packages therefore, new and expanding manufacturing 
investment simply located elsewhere. In addition, owing to its relative success, local 
planning policies in Leeds were restrictive, especially when compared to those in 
neighbouring towns and cities such as Bradford, Dewsbury, Batley, and even 
Manchester (Haughton, 1996). Therefore, not only was there little new 
manufacturing investment, but manufacturing companies were relocating away from 
the city in favour of these other locations; 
"I had increasing frustration with the local authority in Leeds, who would not 
give pennission for this, that and the other... [so] eventually we moved 
196 
out ... One of the reasons Leeds has become a 
financial centre is bccause there 
was such a lot of bureaucracy in the '50s, '60s and '70s" (business leader, 
Haughton, 1996,27). 
However, the Leeds economy was not unduly hanned by these events. On die 
contrary, commentators have claimed that the city has demonstrated a quite unique 
resilience to the economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Haughton 
and Williams, 1996; Campbell, 1996; Bateman, 1986). The foundations were in 
place for the city to become a regional service sector capital, and it emerged from the 
last recession as a leading light in financial and professional services 'mounting a 
direct challenge to London' (Financial Times, 1995); 
"Leeds' development as a financial centre has been both recent and rapid. On 
both quantitative and qualitative measures, the city has emerged as one of the 
UK's fastest growing and most self-confident financial centres over the past 
decade" (Tickell, 1996,104). 
The financial services sector in Leeds now employs 45,000 people which almost 
equals the success and prominence that the clothing and textiles industry enjoyed in 
the city during the 1950s (Financial Times, 1995). Clearly, Leeds has been 
successfid in negotiating the transition from a manufacturing to a service-based 
economy, and thereby shifting its position in the (inter)national spatial division of 
labour. In consequence, Leeds has been portrayed both within the media and 
academic literature as the entrepreneurial city of the north, laying claim to the titles 
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of 'Corporate City', 'European City', 'Intelligent City', and the 'Financial Capital of 
the North' (Haughton and Williams, 1996; Haughton, 1996; Haughton and Whitney, 
1994; Financial Times, 1997,1995; The Daily Telegraph, 1994). 
Economic success per se should not, however, be conflated with the entrepreneurial 
characteristics described by Harvey (1989). Such claims need to be examined 
directly, especially in light of the current scepticism that surrounds the concept of 
entrepreneurialism. Several commentators have recently highlighted uncertainties 
regarding its over-application, utility and definition (Jessop, 1998; Painter, 1998; 
Jessop et al, 1998; Wood, 1998b; Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As such, this chapter 
examines the shift to entrepreneurialism in Leeds by exploring and specifying 
governance. In so doing, the chapter reveals what is distinctive about the shift to 
entrepreneurialism in Leeds. For example, it is evident that the city has not endured 
sustained economic decline for long periods, and so unlike other northern cities and 
especially Newcastle, it has not experienced the same overwhelming need to 
regenerate the local economy by attracting inward investment or promoting'itsclf-, 
suppose there is a question mark as to whether Leeds needs to improve its 
image or to improve its marketing in that it has been a very successful city 
over the past 15 years ... there hasn't been the same sort of dcmand for 
marketing campaigns as there might have been in other places, but that partly 
reflects the economic background of the city which has seen a relatively 
. smooth transition 
from a manufacturing-based to a scrvicc-based economy 
without any of the horrific glitches or cataclysmic events which seem to 
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affect places like Birminghani, Liverpool and Sheffield back in the 1980s" 
(Director, Leeds Development Agency, Leeds City Council). 
The political process in Leeds has been greatly influenced by this structural context. 
Local actors have not experienced the same overwhelming need to coalesce in 
pursuit of a particular issue, campaign or project, as in Newcastle. In Chapter Six, I 
examined how the length and severity of economic decline in the North East 
galvanised local public and private sectors into forging economic development 
partnerships as early as the 1930s. The 'cataclysmic' collapse of the coalmining, 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering sectors demanded a level of entrepreneurial 
activity that was not matched in other parts of the country until much later. This gave 
rise to organisational. and political innovations that were not developed in Lecds 
until relatively recently. Indeed, Ward defines local politics in Lceds as a 'politics of 
catch-up' (1997b). By examining critical moments in local politics therefore, this 
chapter explores the shift to entrepreneurialism in Leeds and, in turn, reveals how, in 
contrast to Newcastle, it was stimulated by different factors at a different time. 
7.2 The shift to entrepreneurialism - better late than never 
Initial attempts at both promotion and partnership were made in the late 1970s in the 
form of 'Project Leeds', a joint venture between Leeds Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (LCCI) and Leeds City Council (LCC). Recognising that other cities were 
implementing campaigns to lure investment, they developed the concept of 'Lccds - 
the Motorway City of the Seventies' (Burt and Gmdy, 1994; Ilaughton, 1996; Ward, 
1997b). Senior Councillors felt however that local economic circumstances did not 
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warrant such an active approach and so it was thwarted (flaughton, 1996). In its 
place, the Council adopted industrial location policies; policies which had 
characterised economic development in other cities for many years (Mawson, 1983); 
"it has been undertaken really for a number of years, going back through to 
the late 1970s, that's really in my mind when Lecds started to put itself in a 
position where it was able to respond to inward investment enquiries ... and 
the need to, or the recognition that we were in competition with a number of 
other cities in terms of investment was acted upon" (Director, LDA, LCC). 
An approach founded upon responding to inward investment enquiries, characteriscd 
economic development in Leeds throughout the early to mid 1980s. By the late 
1980s and early 1990s however, several key developments had changed the local 
economic and political landscape and this rather reactive approach was replaced by 
one that was far more proactive. 
Following a period of relative economic boom, the late 1980s witnessed an 
(inter)national recession that was felt most markedly within the property and 
development markets. In response to this, the LCCI strongly believed that the city 
needed to do more than just participate to compete if it was to sustain its competitive 
edge, and so called for a more proactive approach to local economic development. 
They publicly criticised what they saw as complacency on - behalf of the local 
authority and urged the Council to embrace a new 'growth, agenda as a means of 
shifting the city's position in the (inter)national division of labour (Eisenschitz and 
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Gough, 1993). The LCCI went as far as forming a 'Future City' Working Party and 
published a document entitled 'Leeds - International City of the Future' (Leeds 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1988). This outlined their concerns that Lccds 
generallyýwas lacking in ambition and that no one was setting a strategic vision for 
the city's future. The document marks the beginning of a period that runs to date in 
which the LCCI challenge the Council on their approach to economic development, 
and in particular, their approach to promoting the city. It also marks the beginning of 
a critical period in local politics, during which a strong sense of the 'nced for 
change' pervaded the city and its main economic and political actors. 
Whilst the city's business leaders were stimulated into action by the onset of 
economic recession, the city's political leaders were encouraged to act by the 
threatened imposition of the Lceds Development Corpomtion (LDC). This non- 
elected, quasi-government institution would have statutory planning powers over the 
riverside areas of the inner city, and so the City Council, unwilling to lose 
democratic control over these areas, created the Leeds City Development 
Corporation (LCDC) in 1988 as an attcmpt to sec off its imposition. Just as the LDC 
would do, the LCDC had a property focus and drew in private sector partners. It was 
hoped that these measures would convince central government that an urban 
development corporation was not needed in Leeds. They were unsuccessful however 
and the LDC was established in the same year. The LCDC represents another 
attempt at joint public-private working within the city, and yet this too was soon 
replaced by the Council-controlled Leeds Development Agency (LDA). Public- 
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private partnership did not truly appear on the local political agenda until there was 
a change in Council leadership. 
One individual in particular recognised that the strong sense of the 'need for change' 
would stretch to politics as well as economics. The late 1980s therefore heralded a 
period of considerable change in Leeds and brought about political as well as 
institutional manoeuvring. Having advocated a new 'growth' agenda and a 
4visionary' approach to economic development, Jon Trickctt became Leader of 
Leeds City Council in 1989. He replaced the long-standing George Mudie, and in so 
doing, introduced a new agenda to the Council's economic development policies; 
"in terms of overall marketing and marketing lifestyles and visigns for the 
city, that came in very much with Jon Trickett when he became Leader ... the 
whole idea about cafd culture and European-style originated from his line of 
thinking. Marketing was recognised at the very highest level for a time ... he 
had a strong vision of where the city should be going" (Marketing Officer, 
LDA, LCC). 
As new Leader, he set about putting his stamp on the nature and direction of 
economic development in Lccds. In line with the wishes of the LCCI, he founded his 
approach upon developing and promoting Leeds as a 'Corporate City', in which his 
primary goals were to revitalise the image of Leeds, promote it as a vibrant, dynamic 
and competitive European city, and ensure that it received a national profile that 
hitherto had not been achieved; 
202 
"Jon Trickett did a lot for the city in terms of raising its profile ... he ran a 
number of initiatives like 24 hour city, European City, Intelligent City, which 
clearly started to give Leeds a profile nationally and in the national press" 
(Director, LDA, LCQ. 
These aspirations and initiatives were greeted with enthusiastic support by the LCCI. 
Not only were they addressing the concerns outlined in their stratcgy documcnt 
(Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1988), but they were achieving a higher 
national profile for the city, around which a strong consensus emerged between the 
Chamber and Trickett. In terms of the economy, the Chamber wanted their emerging 
financial services sector to gain notoriety with leading companies and influential 
opinion formers in London (Haughton and Williams, 1996; Tickell, 1996). Assisting 
the LCCI to develop a prestigious financial services sector second only to London 
could only help Trickett's cause, since politically, he had aspirations; 
"to become an MP and so it was probably important to him to make sure that 
Leeds was on the national stage" (Senior Officer, LCC). 
In addition, throughout the 1980s, local authorities had been increasingly 'required' 
to enter into partnerships with the private sector in order to qualify and compete for 
particular central goverranent and European resources. After a decade of these 
Thatcherite measures, it was not until 1990, under Jon Trickett's reign, that Leeds 
responded to this central government dictat (Ward, 1997a). In a mutually reinforcing 
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approach of attracting central government attention, and winning the resources 
necessary to enhance Leeds', profile further, Trickett, the Council, and the LCCI, 
created the flagship 'Lccds Initiative' partnership. Charged with establishing a 
comprehensive economic development strategy for the city, this partnership was to 
pave the way in terms of the future governance of British cities, and comprises Ole 
major public and private stakeholders in the city; most notably, the City Council, the 
LCCI, Leeds TEC, the local newspaper group, both universities, and the Government 
Office for Yorkshire and Humberside (Leeds City Council, 1997a). It has been the 
vehicle which has carried the 'Corporate City' approach forward, prioritising 
economic development and, in particular, place promotion for almost a decade. 
Advocated by Trickett and strongly endorsed by the LCCI, the Lccds Initiative 
embarked upon a 'postindustrial transformation' of Leeds, economically, physically 
and culturally. To achieve a heightened national profile, the coalition needed to 
implement high profile strategies that would wan-ant national media attention. In this 
they succeeded. Indeed, the chosen entrepreneurial strategies were also a success 
coinciding as they did with the restructuring and deregulation of finance capital both 
nationally and globally. Throughout the early to mid 1990s therefore, Leeds 
benefited from rapid indigenous growth and the successful inward investment of 
banks, building societies, insurance and legal firms, together with the more recent in- 
flux of telephone-based operations like First Direct Bank and Direct Line Insurance. 
The city has also been successful in attracting major relocations, for example the 
Medical Protection Society, Barclays Mortgage, and British Telecom, together with 
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the Department of Social Security, the Benefits Agency and the NIIS Management 
Executive (Leeds City Council, 1995). The latter reflect the success Leeds has had in 
attracting governmental redistributions; one of the entrepreneurial strategies 
advocated by Harvey (1989; see Chapter Two). Indeed, Lceds is now home to a long 
list of regional and national headquarters, including the National Westminster Bank 
and Halifax Building Society. In February 1995, the unemployment rate was below 
the national average at 7.7% (Campbell, 1996), and during the early to mid 1990s, 
the city consistently had one of the lowest unemployment mtcs of any conurbation in 
northern Britain (Financial Times, 1995). 
The city's rapid transformation from a centre of manufacturing to a regional capital 
of financial services attracted national media coverage and Lccds was soon dubbed 
'The Financial Capital of the North' (The Daily Telegraph, 1994) and 'The Pinstripe 
City' (Ibe Economist, 1993, cited in Tickell, 1996). The national broadsheets also 
covered the physical and cultural transformation of the city (The Daily Telegraph, 
1994; Financial Times, 1995,1997), charting the postindustrial development of the 
riverside (including Granary Wharf and the Tetley Brewery Museum) and the 
renaissance of Leeds as a major cultural and retail centre (through ventures like the 
Royal Armouries, Opera North and Harvey Nichols). 
The shift to entrepreneurialism in Leeds is therefore definitively charactcriscd by the 
'Corporate City' approach. A strong consensus between the city's major public and 
private stakeholders emerged around enhancing the city's (inter)national economic 
standing and profile. This consensus found concrete form in the Leeds Initiative 
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partnership, which chose to pursue and attract control and command functions, 
production and consumption activities, and governmental redistributions (Painter, 
1998; Harvey, 1989). In so doing, the Council embraced municipal enterprise and 
the prevailing public-private coalition implemented policies designed to foster local 
economic growth and development (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 
1996). With respect to the motivations of Jon Trickett, the City Council, and the 
LCCI, I would suggest that the agenda behind this shift to entrcprcneurialism was 
more attuned to events happening at an extra-local or national level, than those 
happening locally. 
For example, during the late 1980s,, widespread recession both nationally and 
internationally compelled the private sector and the LCCI to act. They recognised 
that the city needed to actively compete if it was to maintain its standing in the 
(intcr)national urban hierarchy. For economic reasons therefore, the LCCI were keen 
to attract the attention of national decision makers in the financial services sector in 
order to boost the economic fortimes of their own emerging sector (Ilaughton and 
Williams, 1996; Tickell, 1996). The City Council on the other hand, were 
encouraged to adopt a more active approach to local economic development by the 
imposition of the LDC by central government (Haughton, 1996). Riding this wave, 
Trickett advocated a new 'growth' agenda, secured the Council leadership, and for 
political reasons of his own, sought the attention of central govenunent and national 
media institutions. In collaboration with the Council and the LCCI, he successfully 
achieved this by implementing high profile economic development strategies and 
creating the flagship Leeds Initiative partnership. With regard to the balance of 
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central-local relations, it is also worthy of note that local voluntary and community 
groups were not incorporated into the Leeds Initiative partnership until their 
representation was a requirement of central government and necessary to attain 
competitive resources through the Single Regeneration Budget (Ward, 1999b, 
1997a). 
In relation to the timing of the shift, and in contrast to Newcastle, relative economic 
success over the years has meant that local stakeholders have simply not necdcd to 
promote the city. Moreover, they have not been encouraged through economic 
necessity to form public-private coalitions in pursuit of transforming economic 
development strategies. In this context, the City Council continued to exert its 
influence over the city until relatively recently; 
"For most of the twentieth century a consensus existed that leadership in 
Leeds was to be in the hands of the local authority" (11aughton, 1996,25). 
The city of Leeds has therefore been a late entrant into both place promotion and 
partnersMp. As Ward observes; 
"the institutions at work in Leeds were relatively slow in embracing 'urban 
entrepreneurialism'. The coupled effect of a historically strong local 
authority and a broader reticence about joining the rush to achieve 'world 
city' status, shaped any movement towards regime formation" (1997a, 1501). 
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In comparison to Newcastle therefore, recent transformations in governance are 
noticeably marked. Furthermore, the political process in Newcastle was moulded by 
its economic dependence on declining sectors. Its early shift to entreprcneurialism 
can therefore be characterised as largely a response to economic restructuring. In 
contrast, whilst governance in Leeds has of course been moulded by economic 
conditions and the global effects of restructuring (for example, the emergence of a 
strong financial services sector), the agenda behind its shift to entreprcneurialism can 
be seen as more of a response to central-local relations; 
"The city ... bears the hallmarks of central government's search for a 'local 
institutional fix' to the scripted national crisis" (Ward, 1997a, 1500). 
The creation of the Leeds Initiative was part of this search for a 'local institutional 
fix'. Responding to the will of central govemment, Jon Trickett moulded a 
partnership that prioritised the needs of business and the pursuit of economic 
growth. Since its inception, its major objectives have been to: 'promote Leeds as a 
major European centre'; 'ensure the economic vitality of the city'; 'improve the 
quality and visual appeal of the city'; and 'develop the city as an attractive centre for 
visitors' (Leeds City Council, 1997a, emphasis added). In pursuing these objectives, 
place promotion has been at the centre of emerging governance forms in Leeds 
throughout the 1990s. 
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73 Local governance and place promotion 
The 'Corporate City' approach undeniably characterised local politics in Lceds 
throughout the early to mid 1990s, dominating local political agendas and skewing 
them in favour of marketing the city in pursuit of economic growth. Equally, the 
Leeds Initiative undeniably transformed the local institutional landscape by 
introducing a powerful public-private board that carried this approach forward. 
Bctwccn 1989 and 1996, rcprcsentatives from the public and privatc scctors workcd 
collaboratively towards securing economic growth and development for the city. 
Indeed, regime politics are often used to describe a situation in which; 
"the effectiveness of local goverment depends greatly on the cooperation of 
nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with 
nongovernmental resources" (Stone, 1993,6). 
Commentators have thus suggested that a 'regime' of public and private interests 
characterised governance iný Leeds during this particular period (John and Cole, 
1998; Ward, 1997a, Haughton, 1996). Governance in Leeds has oflen been said to 
resemble a 'pro-growth corporate regime' (John and Cole, 1998; Ward, 1997a; 
Haughton, 1996; DiGaetano, and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b) which seeks 'to bring 
public and private sector activists together around a vision of economic development 
for the city' (Haughton, 1996,22) and boosts the local economy by 'building a 
favourable image of the city that attracts investment' (Pierre, 1999,385; Stone and 
Sanders, 1987). 1 would concur with this. However, there are processes in Lceds that 
are characteristic of other specifications of urban governance, and so the insights 
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these other specifications can offer should not be dismissed outright. For example, 
given its explicit growth agenda, it might also be appropriate to suggest that the 
Leeds Initiative is a 'growth coalition', along the lines described in earlier chapters 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). According to the US literature, from 
which the growth coalition concept originates, groups of local business interests 
coalesce to exploit the democratic power base of local govemment and 
instrumentally 'control' their agendas in order to further their own economic 
interests. Despite the fact that; 
"some 13ritish- cities have found themselves at a stage where their dominant 
vehicle for economic development strategy often appears remarkably similar 
to those of their US counterparts" (Haughton, 1996,22); 
observers in the UK have been reluctant to classify indigenous governance fonns as 
growth coalitions. This reluctance has derived ostensibly from the problems 
associated with transferring the concept from the US to the UK. These have been 
widely cited (Harding, 1995,1994,1991; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; Logan and 
Molotch, 1987). On the whole, it is recognised that the UK provides a much less 
fertile ground for the development of growth coalitions than the US (Ilarding, 1994) 
owing, most notably, to the fundamental difference in the spatial distribution of 
capital. Private businesses in the UK are often much less financially dependent on 
local markets than their US counterparts, and so arc less inclined to participate in the 
determination of local growth policies. Fonnal business participation in local politics 
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and its instrumental control over local political strategies is therefore much less 
marked in the UK (Harding, 1994,1991; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). 
However, whilst conceding that a 'US-style' growth coalition may not be replicated 
in the UK in all respects, it would seem reasonable to suggest that elements of the 
concept may be present, especially when, as Harding (1994) points out, some of the 
UK characteristics that initially undermined the formation of growth coalitions have 
been transformed. For example, private sector involvement in local politics has been 
on the increase, largely as a result of Thatcherite pro-business policies. Furthermore, 
global restructuring has gived rise to a heightened inter-urban competition, and 
putative shifts to entrepreneurialism have seen a change in policy emphasis away 
from social welfare, towards the prioritisation of local economic growth and 
development. Consequently, UK coalitions often; 
"bear a close resemblance to their US counterparts ... in terms of private 
interest-group representation, the general strategic directions followed, and 
the limited priority put on the distributive consequences of redevelopment in 
comparison to previous UK initiatives (Harding, 1994,356). 
Indeed, with respect to governance in Leeds, there are elements which do, and do not 
conform to the growth coalition model. For example, rather than a group of 'local 
business interests', the composition of the Initiative's partner organisations reflects 
an even mix of public, quasi-public, and private sector bodies. Along these lines 
therefore, the composition of the Leeds Initiative does not resemble a growth 
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coalition. Moreover, growth coalitions are typically comprised by those interests 
whose activities arc more 'place-bound' in their nature; for example, land and 
property-orientated interests whose returns are more intimately tied to the economic 
fortunes of their locality. Economic interests with an explicit land or propcrty focus 
are not represented on the board of the Leeds Initiative. Having said that however, 
the auxiliary members of a growth coalition are represented; for example, local 
media institutions who act as 'growth statesmen' (see Chapter Three) and local 
financial, legal and insurance organisations. 
More convincingly perhaps, the City Council is not 'controlled' per so, by these 
private sector interests. As in Newcastle, the 'strong local authority' (Ward, 1997a, 
1501) continues to enjoy its historically prominent role in local policy making; 
"the ... council is a powerful economic player, and it is not possible to 
understand policy making in Leeds without reference to its. power and 
legithnacy" (John and Cole, 1998,390). 
Thus, despite the evolution of partnership within the city, commentators allude to the 
fact that the creation of the Leeds Initiative 'did not mark a complete decoupling of 
past trends' (Ward, 1997a, 1501); 
"In the 'new' coalition, Leeds local authority has positioned itself as the 
'natural' leader in local economic development' (Ward, 1997a, 150 1). 
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Moreover, the Council's leadership is largely accepted by the Initiative's partners; 
"Although there is some criticism locally that "What the Leeds Initiative has 
developed into now, is largely a department of the city council" (business 
leader), most players accept the inevitability and even the legitimacy of the 
local authority's dominant role" (Haughton, 1996,34). 
Importantly however, these accounts underestimate the degree to which the private 
sector in Leeds has influenced the city's style of economic development and 
governance over recent years. They underestimate the extent to which Leeds City 
Council has acted in response to the LCCI and the wishes of the local private sector. 
This chapter has already highlighted how the LCCI have challenged the Council on 
their, approach to economic development, and in particular, on their approach to 
promoting the city. In 1988, the LCCI and the publication of their document 'Leeds - 
International City of the Future' (Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1988) 
pushed a new agenda onto the local political scene. This was an agenda that 
explicitly ý furthered the economic interests of the local business community, and 
resulted in a change in the policy emphasis of the Council, and a change in Council 
leadershiP. 
Admittedly, the imposition of the LDC and the actions of Jon Trickctt played a large 
part in stimulating the Council to adopt a more proactive approach to economic 
development, but I would argue that the significant role played by the LCCI and its 
private sector members has been underestimated and consequently downplayed. For 
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example, with regard to place promotion, whilst the lead role of the Council in this 
activity is accepted, the nature and extent of their involvement in it has been 
stimulated by pressure from the private sector; 
"basically there was a feeling that the Council wasn't doing enough in terms 
of marketing the city and so there was pressure from the private sector for the 
Council to do more, take on board more of a role and to take a lead in-that" 
(Marketing Officer, LDA, LCC). 
The LCCI's most recent challenge also culminated in the publication of a document; 
one which outlines restructuring proposals for the Leeds Initiative (Leeds Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, 1996). The significance of this latter publication will be 
discussed shortly. Suffice to say, it stimulated yet another response from the City 
Council and heralded another transitional phase in local politics. Perhaps it could be 
said therefore that, in some senses, local business interests do exploit the democratic 
power base of the City Council and instnmentally 'control' its agenda in order to 
fin-ther their own economic interests. Governance in Leeds is characterised by a 
pubIic-private coalition that prioritises the needs of business and pursues an explicit 
growth agenda, and this is consistent with the growth coalition literature (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). Therefore, whilst a 'US-style' growth coalition may 
not exist in the city, or may not exist at all times, particular processes are evident at 
particular times which are consistent with 'growth-coalition-like models' (Harding, 
1991,301). One key difference between classic growth coalition models and the 
situation in Leeds lies in the role of the local authority. In collaboration with the 
214 
private sector, it is the local authority that leads this coalition, and this leadership is 
widely recognised across the city. Again, with regard to promoting the city, those in 
the quasi-public sector feel that; 
"there is only one body that is specificafly responsible for the marketing of 
Leeds as a city and I think that has to be the City Council. The City Council 
is democratically accountable and its role is to govern the city. " (Chief 
Executive, Leeds City Centre Initiative, Leeds Initiative); 
Whilst those in' the private-sector believe that; 
"whilst we are here to say what business thinks and what business would like 
and to put its view in terms of marketing the city, it's not actually our job to 
do it ... we're not so much the 'doers' in this fortun [the Leeds Initiative] really 
as contributors to the process... I think the City Council is the natural leader 
for it" (Chief Executive, LCCI). 
This may of course suggest that there is a UK variant of the growth coalition; one 
that is perhaps led by the local municipality. Indeed, much of the UK governance 
literature testifies to the continuing importance of local authorities within public- 
private coalitions (Jessop, 1998; Ward, 1997a; Valler, 1996; Bassett and Harloc, 
1990; Cooke, 1989,1988), so the fact that Leeds City Council is the driving force 
behind the Leeds Initiative may not come as much of a surprise. Therefore, whilst 
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there are clearly differences between the Leeds experience and the classic growth 
coalition model, there are certain elements that parallel this particular typology. 
This discussion begins, more generally, to highlight the problems associated with 
characterising local governance as one form or another. If the defining criteria of a 
particular model are not all Present, the conceptual isation is often rejected as a 
whole. It is also clear from this discussion that specifications of the form of 
governance have tended to abstract significantly from particular events and. 
governance processes in Leeds. In this sense, whichever model one chooses to 
attribute, it is considerably less important than the accurate specification of the 
processes, strategies, actors and institutions that produce and define the historically 
and spatially contingent phenomena that is 'governance in Leeds'. It is this which is 
the object of investigation, rather than the search for a distinctive model of urban 
politics. 
For example, the years 1989 to 1996 have been portrayed as a relatively harmonious 
period in local politics, during which the city's public and private interests formed a 
'regime' which adhered to a policy of aggressive city marketing, (Leeds City 
Council, 1995,1997a; Ward, 1997a; Haughton, 1996). This masks the fact that 
during this period, marketing the city was a particularly contentious issue betwccn 
Leeds City Council and the Leeds Initiative, and the LDC. The LDC were 'never 
willing to join in a partnership for marketing Leeds' (Director, LDA, LCQ, and 
'despite overtures from the City Council' (Director, LDA, LCC), it appears that, in 
an attempt to prove their success to central government, the LDC wished to focus 
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their promotional activities on themselves, rather than market the area and the city 
they were trying to develop; 
I think as an organisation they felt that they had to be seen to be distinct and 
successfid and therefore the marketing of the organisation became for them 
[LDC], more important than the marketing of Leeds, which is unfortunate, 
and I think that's probably one of the key reasons why in the early 1990s 
when Jon Trickett was really trying to focus on the image of the city, that 
wasn't one where we could all come together" (Director, LDA, LCQ. 
The 'Corporate City' consensus was therefore formed within and between the 
founding members of the Leeds Initiative. It did not stretch right across the city and 
include all locally dominant institutions, nor did it endure, at least internally, for as 
long as we are led to believe (Leeds City Council, 1995,1997a, Haughton and 
Williams, 1996). The Leeds Initiative has been described as 'the official image setter 
for Leeds' (Smales, 1994,48), and yet beneath this overarching, umbrella 
framework, there are several different agencies that promote the city, each of which 
have their own agenda and conduct their own tailored marketing campaigns. I'lie 
most notable of these are the LDA, the Council's Leisure Services Department, the 
Leeds City Centre Initiative, the Leeds Financial Services Initiative, the Leeds 
Manufacturing Initiative, Gateways Yorkshire and the City Centre Management 
Team. These agencies adhered to the 'Corporate City' approach for the first few 
years of the Leeds Initiative existence, until it became apparent that as a result of this 
approach, some initiatives were enjoying more success than others. Conflicts began 
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to arise, but they were concealed so as not to distort the appearance of a unificd city 
and a unified city partnership (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCC). Ward rightfully 
highlights how damaging local contestations are 'subsumcd to allow flic 
` entrepreneurial city' to be marketed to an external audience' (1997a, 1503), whether 
this be to inward investors or governmental funding bodies, until this promotion 
gives rise to material considerations; 
"Partnerships that had previously been concerned with the discursive 
promotion of the city are now faced with material projects that may reveal 
intracoalition tensions" (Ward, 1997a, 1496, original emphases). 
For example, the Leeds Financial Services Initiative (LFSI) and its - tailored 
marketing activities have been so successful that 'nobody in the financial services 
sector needs to be told about Leeds, they all know about it' (Chief Executive, Leeds 
City Centre Initiative, Leeds Initiative). As a result, Leeds is often uni-dimensionally 
perceived as a service sector city, contradicting the fact that it still has a signiflcant 
manufacturing base centred upon engineering, clothing and textiles; 
"We're still the second largest manufacturing base outside London and it was 
felt that that was being neglected" (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCC). 
To try and redress this imbalance, the less successful 'Engineering Initiative' and 
'Printing Initiative' have merged to become the 'Manufacturing Initiative' in an 
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attempt to support and sustain their activities, and compete with the LFSI. Illis has 
only occurred recently however, despite the fact that; 
"it has been felt for some time that there has been too much emphasis placed 
on the financial services sector" (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ, 
As these competing concerns became more pronounced, the various sub-initiativcs 
of the larger Leeds Initiative began to carve out their own distinctive roles; roles 
which targeted and serviced their own customer base; 
"Now the difficulty of course is that when you start taking scctbral 
approaches, sectoral interests start jumping out of the wood-work and I think 
it is quite interesting that it became necessary for individual sectors to 
promote to their own audiences, and certainly the LFSI and the Enginccring 
Initiative and the City Centre Initiative did just that and continue to do 
so ... the approach we've taken is effectively to try and draw a dividing line 
between the city of Leeds and its city centre" (Chief Executive, Leeds City 
Centre Initiative, Lceds Initiative). 
In further illustration, the city of Leeds suffers from acute skills shortages in the 
professional and financial services owing to the unparalleled success of these 
sectors. The LFSI therefore, did not want the city, or the city's markcteers to attract 
any more call centrcs because they felt any new business would, in cffect, poach 
their staff. In consequence, the LFSI; 
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"basically thought that the city was full up and said as much to the press, 
which was a major difference of opinion from the people here [LDA], who at 
the same time were dealing with major enquiries from potential call ccntrcs 
wanting to set up in the city ... so when you get 
differences of opinion like 
that, it can get quite nasty and that particular case did involve many heated 
discussions between us [LDA] and LFSI to sort out what the party line was 
going to be" (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ. 
Within the Le6ds Initiative, as a whole, these competing concerns proved harder and 
harder to dismiss. As a result, two inter-related debates have opened up %rithin the 
city; one regarding the city's policy emphasis, and in particular the marketing of 
Leeds; and the other concerning a review of the structure of the Leeds Initiative. 
Despite the duration and pre-eminence of the 'Corporate City' approach, 'marketing 
is [still] not understood by the majority of politicians' (Marketing Officer, LDA, 
LCC), and 'so when these sectoral divides came to light, it provided the, ideal 
opportunity for certain Council members to re-open;, 
"prolonged debates that have taken place over a long period of time, at very 
senior levels within the Council, about, how Leeds should market itself' 
(Director, LDA, LCC). 
These 'discussions have not so far come to a satisfactory conclusion' (Director, 
LDA, LCQ. Suffice to say that these discussions revealed clear institutional divides 
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across the city, which in turn undermined the 'Corporate City' approach, and 
brought about a change in Council leadership. Once again, the city of Lccds was 
pervaded by a strong sense of the 'need for change', and in 1996, Brian Walker 
replaced Jon Trickett as Leader of Leeds City Council. With regard to the marketing 
of the city, many Council members felt that Jon Trickett had gone 'too far in that 
direction' (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ and were attracted by the 'back-to-basics' 
approach that Brian Walker offered. 
Despite the recent pre-eminence of local economic development, Council members 
were keen to protect core services, and so there followed a backlash to the 
'Corporate City' agenda that had dominated local politics for seven years. Its grand 
visionary approach came under extensive attack from local voluntary and community 
groups, local politicians, and local academics (Haughton and Williams, 1996; 
Stillwell and Leigh, 1996). In their eyes, the 'Corporate City' approach had done 
little to enhance the employment opportunities and quality of life of those Lccds' 
residents living in the inner city, given that over the last ten years, the city had 
attracted an additional 20,000 commuters daily from surrounding areas, and 30,000 
people, almost exactly the same as ten years ago, remained unemployed in the city 
(Financial Times, 1997). The 'Corporate City' strategies were therefore criticiscd for 
actually enhancing social polarisation and marginalisation across the city by 
emphasising economic growth and neglecting social policies. Ironically, this also 
attracted national media attention and resulted in the following headlines: 'Urban 
problems: A city of stark contrasts' (Financial Times, 1997); 'Social issues need 
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action'; and 'Regeneration fails to benefit poor' (Financial Times, 1995). Tlius, 9 
commentators have recently concluded that; 
"The days of the corporate city approach appear to be numbcrcd, as the 
policy momcntum gathcrs for a changc from a narrow cntrcprcncurialism to a 
more inclusive social agenda for the city" (Haughton and %ile, 1997,7). 
The city is however divided. There are those, primarily from the private sector, who 
argue strongly that the momentum gained since 1989 is in danger of being lost, and 
that the marketing of the city will become 'something of a reactive process, rather 
than a proactive process' (Chief Executive, Leeds City Ccntre Initiative, Leeds 
Initiative); 
"Councillor Walker does have a very different emphasis in that he is very 
much 'back-to-basies' and back to service delivery, and although a lot of the 
work that Councillor Trickett put in place, like the big event programmes, the 
things that were actually attracting national attention to the city, wililst those 
are maintained, it must be said that the public relations side has diminished 
somewhaf'(Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ. 
The city's marketing activities are therefore currently under review. Questions 
relating to how the city should be promoted, to what extent, and by whom, are highly 
salient and politically charged issues within the city at this present time; 
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"we9re trying to establish a clear viewpoint from the City Council side about 
what it sees as being the best way of marketing the city and improving its 
image, although I'd have to say at this stage, whilst it's been raised on a 
number of occasions, I think the City Council's own position is still not 
complete" (Director, LDA, LCC). 
The LCCI are again applying considerable pressure, demanding that the Council 
strike a satisfactory balance between the economic growth-orientated strategies of 
the 'Corporate City' agenda and the more socially inclusive and redistributive 
strategies of Brian Walker's 'Citizen City' approach; 
"Councillor Walker obviously does want Leeds to be promoted, but I think 
he feels very strongly, and I wouldn't wish to put words in his mouth, but I 
think he feels very strongly that we are here primarily to scrvc Lccds' 
residents and how much do you serve Leeds' residents with the promotion of 
Leeds? " (City Centre Manager, City Centre Management Team, LCC). 
In an attempt to balance these competing priorities, a solution is being sought in the 
form of the 'Vision for Leeds' exercise. This intends to; 
"give the people of Leeds some say into what the priorities of the city should 
be" (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ. 
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With the sub-heading 'Your city, your choice, your chance to have your say', the 
'Vision for Leeds' initiative claims to be the largest consultation exercise ever 
undertaken in the city, and from the results, the partners aim to establish a strategic 
vision for the city for the next twenty years. The balance that Leeds City Council and 
the Leeds Initiative partners are trying to strike is clearly reflected in the five main 
themes that the 'Vision for Leeds' document focuses upon: 'Competing in a Global 
Economy: Leeds - an international city', with the sub-heading 'City Image'; 'Making 
the most of people: Opportunities for all'; 'Better Neighbourhoods and Confident 
Communities: A good place to live'; 'Ensuring Sustainable Development: Concern 
for the environment'; and 'Information and Communication' (Lceds City Council, 
1997b). 
The act of balancing these economic and social agendas, with marketing at the core 
of the debate, is having a profound influence on the process and structure of 
governance in Leeds. The emergence of an alternative agenda for the city and 
associated changes in policy emphasis have led to a period of institutional flux, in 
which the Leeds Initiative partner organisations and Leeds City Council are 
reconsidering their roles and rethinking their alignments in respect of the two 
alternative agendas. The result is twofold. Firstly, in conjunction with these changes 
in policy emphasis, Leeds City Council have initiated intcrnal rcorganisation 
procedures in an attempt to overcome the fact that; 
"the local authority [LCC] was for too long harnpcrcd by rigid, vertical 
integration. There were too many departments and committees, each 
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reporting upwards and each autonomous with poor sideways linkages, co- 
ordination was usually attempted too late as policies were set in stone by the 
time they reached anyone with a wider overview" (Financial Times, 1997). 
Secondly, the structure of the Leeds Initiative, and more importantly, the Council's 
role within it, are being reviewed. Over recent months, there has been growing 
disquiet amongst the Leeds Initiative partner organisations regarding the Council's 
commanding role; 
"Until iecently, it's been very much the City Council, they go off and do the 
things, they tell us what's going on and we try to put our two-penncth in, but 
in the end Leeds City Council drives if' (Chairman, Lecds TEC). 
Unable to stem the gathering momentum of these opinions, the Council arc in the 
process of implementing changes to the Leeds Initiative structure that will enable 
'existing stakeholders to have a bigger say' (Chairman, Leeds TEC); 
"the partnership will definitely be outside the Council rather than in it, 
because that's been one of the moot points really, about whether it's part of 
the Council or whether it's separate from the Council ... it will be a sort of 
semi-detached am, with the City Council being the lead partnce, (Director, 
Lecds Initiativc). 
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In anticipation of these changes, the major partners are pursuing sclf-marketing 
campaigns in an attempt to secure prominent positions and influential roles within 
the revamped structure. At the centre of this, the Chamber are yet again challenging 
the Council on their approach to economic development, and in particular, their 
approach to place promotion. So having been central to the process of institutional 
coalescence with the Leeds Initiative, the marketing of Leeds is now central to 
processes of institutional restructuring and sectoral repositioning which threaten to 
destabilise the city's governing coalition; 
"Much of the rhetorical appeal of urban regimes rests on the assumption that 
somewhere, beyond the political posturing of the council chamber and the 
intenninable bureaucracy of the town hall, lies a nirvana of shared beliefs 
and community interests ... But rhetorical appeals to localism, to social 
responsibilities, to partnership and to shared visions are one thing, the 
complex and often acrimonious reality of local politics and governance 
failure is another" (Jessop, 1998,3 1). 
The somewhat 'acrimonious reality' of local politics can be illustrated with the 
actions of the LCCI. Recently, they produced a critical report of the Lccds Initiative 
and its activities, claiming that it had lost momentum and focus (Lccds Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 1996). They reasserted the statement made in 1988, prior to 
Jon Trickett's reign, that 'the marketing of the city.. [should be].. a major priority, 
(Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1988,25) and reflected this in their 
proposals for a 'new' Leeds Initiative (Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
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1996). They proposed that the partnership should focus on four main areas of 
operation: land and property use, the labour market, the physical environment and 
marketing the city (Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1996). Tlicy also 
proposed that an executive holding company be created which would be supported 
by three subsidiary committees: the Leeds City Development Company (LCDC); the 
Leeds Initiative Regeneration Board (LIRB); and the Leeds Marketing Initiative 
(LMI). In response to the recent changcs in policy emphasis, the Chamber appear 
particularly concerned that the marketing of the city should not be neglected; 
"The Chamber believes that there is a clear need for co-ordinatcd markcting 
of the city to further promote our ongoing success. It recommends that a 
Leeds Marketing Initiative is convened with the responsibility of drafting a 
business plan that will address how the strategic marketing needs of the city 
can be met and also to give consideration to the incorporation of the body to 
act as a vehicle for future marketing action" (Leeds Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 1996,3). 
By asserting such economically-driven proposals, the Chamber has, in effect, placed 
itself in opposition to the City Council. This stands in marked contrast to comments 
made earlier by the Chamber attesting to the legitimacy of the Council's Icad role in 
marketing the city, and perhaps highlights the fragility of the foundations upon 
which public-private relations are formed. It suggests that the private sector in Lccds 
are only willing to accept the Council's lead role for as long as flic LCC arc 
endorsing and pursuing strategies that are of benefit to them, for cx=plc, during the 
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years of the 'Corporate City' approach. However, it does appear that the LCCI and 
the local authority have reached a compromise. 
In place of the Chamber's proposals, the existing modus operandi and existing 
decision making structures are being clarified in an attempt to enhance and 
strengthen the interrelation between the various sub-initiativcs. Furthermore, the five 
themes identified in the 'Vision for Lceds' exercise have rcplaccd-thc Chambcr's 
suggested four main areas of operation, and a steering group has been put in place to 
oversee each of these. These objectives mark a significant departure from those 
originally pursued in 1990. Given that the three operational sub-committecs 
advocated by the Chamber have also been substituted by a working group that 
comprises the City Council, the LCCI, Leeds TEC and the Director of the Leeds 
Initiative, it appears that, for themoment at least, the LCCI are willing to adhere to 
these new objectives. 
It is notable how in Newcastle also, the City Council were unwilling to support the 
creation of a 'Newcastle Marketing Office', despite considerable private sector 
commitment. Yet, much of the literature detailing the lincaments of local 
government restructuring testifies to notions of decentralisation and strategic 
enabling in which traditional local authority functions are out-sourccd to 
nongovernmental bodies (Cochrane, 1991; Stewart and Stoker, 1989). In contrast, 
the evidence presented from these two case studies suggests that local authorities are 
reticent to devolve responsibility and influence into an arena that would facilitate 
greater private sector control; 
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I can't see Leeds going down that- road, partly it's a control issue, I can't 
imagine this particular Council wanting a hands-off relationship with what 
people might be saying about the city" (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ. 
Bearing similarities again with opinions expressed in Newcastle, those in the public ' 
sector believe that the creation of a 'Leeds Marketing Initiative' is superfluous. They 
wholeheartedly believe that if you bring the relevant parties together, greater 
coordination can be achieved without the unnecessary expense of setting up a 
separate organisation; 
"institutionally, what would be the right way of dealing with it? It is possible 
to bring together some of the key players who have an interest in marketing 
the city. I think the question that we've been asking ourselves within the City 
Council is, are there any tricks we're missing which would give us some 
added value about bringing and coordinating operations more carefully, 
which is a separate question from do we need a separate city marketing unit" 
(Director, LDA, LCC). 
Consequently, the public sector are instead choosing to focus upon the; 
"ways in which there can be some sort of central coordination and ways 
which perhaps may unify some of the messages coming out of the city and 
how you might also perhaps direct some of the initiatives that are going on in 
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the private sector so we all look like we're singing from the same hymn 
sheef' (Marketing Officer, LDA, LCQ. 
One of the fundamental problems with the current approach is that the local business 
community are approached by several different agencies, all asking them to fund 
separate and distinct city marketing campaigns; 
"they're calling on the same market for people to join in, contributing to 
different funding for different aspects of marketing and that's wherc the 
retaileis say well hold on, you get your act together and we'll contribute 
centrally, but we can't be contributing in three different ways because you've 
got three different acts going, and that's certainly one of the issues that's 
stopping us getting it sorted now, that's one of the hurdles that we haven't 
got over yef '(Director, Leeds Initiative). 
So despite their different viewpoints on implementation, both the public and private 
sector in Leeds -recognise that, at the very least, a coordinated markcting strategy 
would benefit the city, and would offer an opportunity to clarify the promotional 
message. There are however clear obstacles to both the creation of a coordinated 
marketing strategy and the potential establishment of a central marketing 
organisation. Firstly, each and every sector wants the strategy to address their 
particular requirements. So despite agreement in principle, no sector wishes to lose 
control over what they say about the city, let alone forsake their aspect of marketing 
to another for the greater good of an overarching strategy. Secondly, the 
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establishment of a 'Leeds Marketing Initiative' is not only being haltcd by the lack 
of public sector support, but also the lack of financial commitment on behalf of the 
private sector. It would appear that the private sector are more than happy to suggest 
ideas, but are less than willing to fimd them; 
"going back five years there was a feeling that we ought to have some group, 
somebody driving the marketing of Leeds in a coordinated way, but where 
we ground to a halt was when we said, what a good idea, that needs to be 
done, that'll cost x millions, where do we get it from? Thcn everybody dircw 
their hands up and said not from us ... this is the nub of it all, unless we can 
break that and say look we can put money in for properly organiscd city-wide 
promotion, I think we've got a real problem" (Chairman, Leeds TEC). 
As a further example, the LCCI suggested that the city centre would benefit from the 
introduction of uniformed people who would, in effect, 'police' the city ccntrc, 
provide help where and when it was needed and generally make the city ccntre a safe 
and secure place for tourists and families to visit. The Leeds Initiative partners 
unanimously agreed that it was a good idea and set the scheme in motion. However, 
'when it carne down to a question of brass-tacks, there was a deafening silence' 
(Chair, DSG, LCC), and so, in the words of the Chair of the Development Scrviccs 
Committee (LCC); 
"Who do you think paid for it? Leeds City Council of course. Not one penny 
came from the Police, the private sector or anybody else. It was us [LCC] 
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that found the money within the budget and when you're going for cut-backs 
year after year, that does rankle slightly ... we were never going to get it to 
work if we waited for the private sectoe'. 
Local businesses are therefore widely -criticised for adopting the attitude that 'die 
Council ought to do it shouldn't they, we pay our taxes, that's the job of the Council 
isn't it' (Chief Executive, Leeds City Centre Initiative, Leeds Initiative). So witli 
regard to the LMI, the Council simply believe that the private sector will not provide 
the amount of match funding required to pursue such a scheme; 
"from the City Council's point of view, there's been a concern that its 
partners in the Leeds Initiative would see the Council as being by far and 
away the main source of funds for a scheme of that nature and thcn as a 
Council you get back into the local political debate about how much should 
be spent on marketing versus schools, social services, housing, or any of the 
other things" (Director, LDA, LCC). 
The questionable level of local business commitment is also acknowledged by the 
private sector themselves. At the admission of the Chamber; 
"most local business aren't interested in local politics, fliey're just not 
interested unless or until something goes wrong that affects them ... tile 
marketing of the city is not a top prioritý for them,, or even in the priorities 
for most businesses ... you won't find many willing to contribute, partly 
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because of the arguments, 'I pay my taxes, what's the Council there for', so 
on and so forth" (Chief Executive, Leeds Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry). 
The Council have therefore tried to hold the business community, and the LCCI in 
particular, accountable for the contradictions they impose on local politics. On the 
one hand, the Chamber believe that 'the key to success lies in the city government 
and the business community acting in concert' and as such, believe they should be at 
the 'heart' of the Leeds Initiative (Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1996, 
27), and yet, according to the City Council, they are unwilling to provide the 
financial resources necessary to implement initiatives of their choice; 
"in terms of punching their weight, they like to assume grcatcr importance 
than they actually have, which is irritating because they can be so pompous 
about what they want the city to do" (Chair, DSG, LCC). 
This resentment however, breeds both ways. The LCCI feel very strongly that the 
local authority are unduly benefiting from the Leeds Initiative partnership; 
"other people are not only carrying out the City Council's duty, but now 
they're also funding it. Now of course the City Council could well sit back 
and relax and rub its hands with glee and say this partnership thing is bloody 
wonderful because we've got all these businesses in Lccds, they're coming 
up with all the ideas, they're coming up with a marketing campaign and now 
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they're paying subscriptions and putting money in, they're bloody paying for 
it as well, that's absolutc hcav&' (Chicf Exccutivc, Lceds Cliwnbcr of 
Commerce and Industry). 
Therefore, if one portrays local politics in Leeds as a unified 'corporate regime', 
these are the types of 'processes of govemance' that can be concealed. For example, 
a coalition of public and private interests did coalesce around economic development 
and the promotion of the city, and this did endure for several years. I lowcvcr, it was 
perhaps not as long-lasting, consistent, or as widespread as the presentation of a 
seven year 'corporate regime' would suggest; 
"marketing, whilst it's been talked about amongst members of tlic [Lccds] 
Initiative, for one reason or another, has not been one of those where I think 
people have felt comfortable with one another. To create a 'Lecds Marketing 
Initiative' and to have that sort of partnership with a city-wide officc, tlicn I 
think you need a level of partnership and a partnership which sees that as a 
priority and I'm not sure that in Leeds, that was the way round that it was 
seen, so I think there wasn't the institutional framework or comfort to do 
that, but equally, the economy wasn't in quite such a severe state of recession 
and therefore the thing that might have galvaniscd all those institutions to be 
comfortable with that sort of arrangement, just hasn't occurred" (Director, 
LDA, LCQ. 
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Using typologies can therefore detract from these defining processes by cxaggcrating 
the degree of consensus, or for that matter, underestimating the extent of 
intracoalition conflict. The operation'of such a 'regime' has been marrcd by 
intracoalition. tensions and sectoral. divides between the public and private sector and 
the manufacturing and financial services sector. Latterly, these tensions and divides 
had more profound consequences for the city and its putative regime as the dominant 
partners chose to pursue alternative economic and social agendas. 
7.4 Conclusion 
It is therefore dlear to see just how much the marketing of Lccds inputs into the local 
governance process, both in terms of creating the discourse of the 'Corporate City'. 
to which the public and private sectors adhered to for a time, but also in tcrms of 
actually causing tensions and conflicts to arise. I therefore conclude that place 
promotion has played a key role in establishing the processes, structures and 
strategies that have defined governance in Lccds throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It 
is of course still vital to rccognise, its position within the broader policy framework 
of core service provision, but whilst not overstating its importance, it is evident from 
this chapter that the marketing of Leeds has been highly influential during critical 
4momcnts' in the city's politics, both in terms of its rise to prominence, and also its 
decline. 
In summary, the city of Leeds came through successive recessions relatively 
unscathed owing to a diverse economy and an historical abundance of indigenous 
enterprise. By the 1970s therefore, its main economic development strategies were 
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being conducted, not out of economic necessity, but out of a recognition that other 
cities were doing the same. By the late 1980s however, the story had changed 
somewhat. The LCCI believed that if such complacency was allowed to continue, 
the city would be in real danger of losing its competitive standing within 
(inter)national urban hierarchies, and so demanded change in the form of new and 
innovative economic development policies. 
Jon Trickett rode this particular wave, advocating the pursuit of entrepreneurial 
strategies; a transformation of the city's image and the prioritisation of business 
needs. In so doing, he secured the leadership of the Council, and there followed a 
period of strong consensus between himself and the Chamber, during which time 
they developed the 'Corporate City' approach. A growth-orientatcd 'regime' of 
interests coalesced around this agenda, based as it was upon economic development, 
place promotion, and public-private partnership, and found concrete form in the 
Leeds Initiative. Place promotion therefore played a critical role in specifying the 
style of governance that characterised local politics in Leeds from 1989 to 1996. 
It also played a critical role in the period that followed, although for very different 
reasons. There was a growing recognition that the policies of the economically- 
driven 'Corporate City' approach were causing as many social problems as they 
were solving economic ones. In response to this, and more social ly-oricntated 
directives, from central government, a new socially inclusive agenda gathered 
momentum, and gave rise to another change in Council leadership. With strong 
pressure from the private sector, the Council have been compclled to find a 
236 
satisfactory balance between the old economic and the new social agenda, or risk 
destabilising the coalition. Questions relating to the marketing of the city have bccn 
at the core of this debate and have, in turn, revealed a clear public-privatc divide as 
the main institutional stakeholders entered a period in which they redefined and 
reasserted their roles, aims and objectives in respect of the two alternative agcndas. 
Therefore, whilst the nature of 'the comPrising interests remain the same, the 
entrepreneurial 'Corporate City' coalition has given way to one more wholly 
concerned with the redistribution of wealth and addressing the social inequities that 
the 'Corporate City' agenda left behind. 
In conclusion therefore, the Leeds experience has highlighted many faccts that can 
be taken forward into the final chapter, and used alongside the Newcastle case study 
and the findings from the survey chapter, to inform and interrogate the thcorctical 
propositions outlined in Chapters Two and Tbree. Where there have been obvious 
similarities or differences between Newcastle and Leeds, these have been 
highlighted throughout the chapter, however, overall, there are four themes that 
clearly distil from these two case study chapters. These are:. the prominent role of the 
local authority; the complex nature of the shift to entrepreneurial ism; the transition 
from an economically-driven agenda to one more holistically concerned with the 
amalgamation of both economic and social issues; and finally, in association with 
this transition, the evolution of the city's politics from a form that parallels 
entrepreneurial 'regime' politics to that which more closely resembles a socially 
progressive and/or growth maintenance 'regime. These themes form the structurc of 
Chapter Eight and will be examined accordingly. 
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The final chapter also explores the benefits and limitations associated with the use of 
governance typologies and labels, since both case studies have highlighted their 
equivocal nature. The exploration and specification of governance is not wholly 
dependent on their use. As both case study chapters have highlighted, spccifying tile 
configuration of governance accurately, depends not on the identification of a 
distinctive model of local politics, but upon the identification of the types of 
processes summarised above. It is vital to specify who, what, why and when in 
rclation to the types of policies pursued and the governance structures supporting 
them. Only in this way, can the role place promotion plays in specifying 





Fhe overarching aims of this thesis have been twolold: firstly, to specify the form of 
local governance arrangements that have developed in support of' place promotion, 
and secondly, to contribute to a greater understanding of* the relmonship between 
shills in governance and plaee prornotional practicc. It' one rclCrs back to Chaptcr 
One, it was important to specify the role of' place promotion within contcniponirý 
governance structures in this way becausc many compoing clainis ha(l Ivell 111,1(ic 
regarding place promotion and changes in governance more generally. This tlicsis 
therefore set out to inform both the place promotion and governance litcratureN by 
addressing some of these claims. 
To summarise briefly, while Lovering for example declares that place promotion has 
become 'virtually the core activity in local economic devclopnicnt' (1995,117), in 
the same year, Mayer argues that, rather than compete for the s. inic linitc 
investments, local goveming bodies are instead putting their clTorts into 
ýstrengthenjingj existing and potential indigenous resources' ( 1995,234). Thus, in 
tackling these diverse readings, a survey of' British local ati(hol-ItIcs these 
concerns directly (Chaptcr Five) by examining, hat'l. alia, tile nature 01" and extent to 
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which place promotion occurs and by whom, and case study chapters explored 
governance affangements in Newcastle and Leeds. 
It has been widely acknowledged that over the last twenty years, the nature and 
balance of policies pursued by local governtnent, and the ways in which local 
government pursues them, have changed considerably. In the face of technological 
advance, deindustrialisation, global restructuring and intensificd competition, local 
authorities have had to become proactively engaged in 'promoting the capacities of 
their respective economic spaces' (Jessop, 1998,80) in order to secure continued 
economic growth. As such, there has been a reorientation in local government away 
from the local provision of welfare and services towards 'a more outward-orientatcd 
stancc dcsigned to fostcr and encouragc local growth and local cconomic 
dcvclopment' (Hall and Hubbard, 1996,153). This rcoricntation has bccn 
accompanied by changes in how these policies are delivered and by whom, and is 
classically referred to as the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurial ism (I larvey, 
1989). 
Characterised. by a, political prioritisation of local economic development, most 
notably via the adoption of place promotional strategies, and an institutional shift 
from public sector government to public-private governance, the shift to 
entrepreneurialism has fundamentally changed the way places are governed. 
However, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, notions of governance and the 
shift to entrepreneurialism have been plagued by ambiguities and points of 
contention. Whilst the broad principles of a shift to entrcprencurialism have been 
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widely accepted, there has been much less agreement regarding the nature and extent 
of the shift. Hall and Hubbard note how; 
"an objective assessment of the extent of this transition.. [has bccnl.. difficult, 
if not impossible, given the empirical silences that permeate work in this 
field" (1996,15 5). 
Commentators thus called for empirical studies that more preciscly examined the 
shift to entrepreneurialism and its implications for changing structurcs and stratcgics 
of governance. By using survey and case study analysis, this thesis set out therefore 
to address this 'empirical silence' by contributing to the debate and shedding light on 
the extent and precise forms of change., 
8.1 The shift to entrepreneurialism - overall findings and conclusions ' 
Chapters One,, Two and Three have shown how and why place promotion has 
become integral to the process of contemporary governance and the shift to 
critrepreneurialism (Hall, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Jessop ct al, 1998; 
Griffiths, 1998; Harvey, 1989). In order to directly address the claims cited above, a 
national survey was undertaken to produce an informed account of the nature of, and 
extent to which British local authorities are conducting place promotional strategies. 
The findings were unequivocal. With 85% of responding local authorities 
conducting place promotional activity in 1997/98,, 81% involved in a public-private 
partnership that promotes the locality, and 95% stating that other agencies and 
organisations are directly involved in the development and implementation of local 
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place promotional activities, the overall trends are clear to see. The results from the 
survey provide vital information, and enable the more detailed case study findings to 
be located within a broader, national context. However, the prevalence of place 
promotion and partnership does not equate to entrepreneurialism, and aggregate 
research does not interrogate the ambiguities evident in the governance literature. In 
light of the constraints inherent to aggregate research, case study analysis is nccdcd 
in order to examine the more precise claims relating to the shift to 
entrepreneurialism. 
As Chapter Seven concludes, there are five major themes that distil clearly from dic 
case study analysis. In brief, these relate to the prominent role of the local authority, 
the complex nature of the shift to entrepreneurialism, the rccent transition from 
economically-driven agendas to ones that are more socially inclusive, associated 
changes in the style and form of local politics and local political strategies, and 
finally, reflections on the benefits and limitations of governance typologics. 
Firstly, both case studies reveal that the local authority continues to possess a 
prominent and influential role within local economic policy making. In Newcastle, 
the City Council clearly coordinates the group of individuals and organisations that 
comprise the governing regime' of public and private sector interests. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, partner organisations, for example Ile Newcastle 
initiative, are unwilling to pursue initiatives without the endorsement of the Council. 
Moreover, the private sector partners have not challenged Newcastle City Council 
regarding the potential creation 'of a Newcastle Marketing Office. Despite 
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considerable private sector support, the scheme has been postponed, due largely to 
the fact that the Council do not wish to dilute the powers they possess any further by 
devolving responsibility and influence for marketing the city to an arms-Icngth 
organisation. 
Furthermore, Newcastle City Council plays a key role in formulating and steering 
local political agendas. For example, having pursued an entrepreneurial agcnda for 
many years, the Council have redirected the 'regime', its interests and the city's 
Economic Regeneration Strategy away from an outward-oricntated growth agenda 
towards one more concerned with sustaining and maintaining existing economic 
activity. Newcastle City Council therefore, is still the major power broker in the city. 
This role is accompanied however by financial responsibility. Harvey bclicvcs that 
this is the 'risk-absorption by the local ... public sector which distinguishes the 
present phase of urban entrepreneurialism. from earlier phases of civic boosterism in 
which private capital seemed generally much less risk averse' (1989,7). In 
accordance with'this claim, it would appear that Newcastle City Council is the major 
risk-taker that under-writes the various development schemes and initiatives. In die 
words of the Deputy Leader of the Council, 'all, the partnerships that I've been 
involved in end up being, led by the City Council ... because we're the ... body that's 
financially responsible ... the City Council is always there to pick up the tab 
basically' (Deputy Leader, NCC). In all therefore, and reiterating the conclusions of 
Chapter Six, the picture that emerges from the Newcastle experience is onc in which 
the local authority continues 'to play a key role: private sector involvement may 
prove useful - but public sector involvement is vital' (Shaw, 1994, S4). 
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In Leeds also, the local authority appears to be 'the lightning rod attracting the 
various sources of social energy to it' (Cooke, 1988,195). Chaptcr Seven 
demonstrates how representatives from both the public and private sector affirm flic 
legitimacy of the Councils' lead role in the Leeds Initiative, and in formulating and 
implementing local policy. For example, with regard to promoting the city, whilst 
the Leeds Initiative partnership is putatively 'the official image setter for Leeds' 
(Smales, 1994. - 48), it is clear from the comments made in Chapter Scvcn that this 
function is actually conducted by the City Council; 'whilst we arc here to say what 
business thinks andwhat business would like and to put its view in tcnns of 
marketing the city, it's not actually our job to do it ... we're not so much the 'docrs' in 
this forum-as contributors to the process' (Chief Executive, Leeds Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry). 
The potential fragility of the acceptance of this leading role has howcvcr bccn 
highlighted, and it is the case that the local private sector in Leeds does exert 
considerable influence over the City Council. Neverfficlcss, the Council has 
successfully resisted and moderated the Chamber proposals for restructuring within 
the Leeds Initiative. Moreover, the Chamber have adhered to these modcratcd 
proposals. The Council have also successfully steered local politics away from the 
'Corporate City' agenda (concerned with creating and nurturing the conditions 
conducive to out-and-out growth) to the 'Citizen City' agenda (one more wholly 
concerned with the redistribution of wealth and addressing the social inequities that 
the 'Corporate City' agenda left behind). Furthermore, as in Newcastle, the local 
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authority appears to be absorbing most of the risk associated with local economic 
development, although it is recognised that this is a moot point within the city. 
So, despite the evolution of partnership and after almost a dccadc of the 
prioritisation. of business needs, Leeds City Council continues to play a key role in 
formulating local agendas, and in facilitating and coordinating the city's regime. 
This finding reinforces the conclusion made at the end of Chapter Six that we nccd 
to highlight, not the demise of local government, but how local govcrnmcnt has 
altered to accommodate the increased involvement of the local business community 
and the need to develop enhanced coordination between different agencies (Shaw, 
1994). For example, in their account of local politics in Leeds, John and Cole 
conclude that; 
"although business is important in Leeds politics, the rcgimelike qualities of 
the city's politics need to be qualified by the power of the city council, the 
predilections of the city leadership, and the role of the other public-sector 
organisations in the citY" (John and Cole, 1998,3 94). 
Ilese findings contrast with much of the. literature that testiries to notions of 
decentralisation and strategic enabling in which traditional local authority functions 
are out-sourced to nongovenunental bodies (Cochrane, 1991; Stewart and Stoker, 
1989). They are however, clearly supported by the results of the survey, which rcvcal 
that 51% of responding local authorities claim to be in a position of overall 
leadership and have ultimate responsibilRy for the development and implementation 
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of local place promotional strategies. These findings also reinforce existing claims 
(Valler, 1996; Stone, 1993; Bassett and Harloe, 1990; Cooke, 1989,1988) and more 
recent claims (Jessop, 1998) that whilst the lead role of local authorities has been 
challenged, they remain- important- facilitators and coordinators within new 
institutional affangements; 
"local authority involvement in economic development is now as much about 
shaping the overall context within which partnerships ... can be forged, as it is 
about developing specific strategies and initiativce' (Jcssop, 1998,92). 
Moreover, with particular regard to entrepreneurial strategies, Jessop declares that; 
"What the[se strategies] share is the key role of local authorities in their 
overall framing and promulgation. In this sense, for all the talk of the crisis 
of the state (at whatever level), public authorities still appear to have a major 
role in organising entrepreneurial policies for the city ... and narrating such 
policies in entrepreneurial temis" (1998,92). 
Tbc findings of this thesis support this claim empirically. It is clear that whilst the 
I 
private sector 'say what business thinks and what business would like', they believe 
that it is not their job to implement or deliver policies designed to market the city 
and stimulate economic growth. Equally, whilst it has been demonstrated that local 
authorities often actively seek private sector involvement, and arc willing to be 
influenced by the local business community, they arc reluctant to devolve 
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responsibility for marketing the city into arenas that would facilitate greater private 
sector control. Therefore, whilst it has been demonstrated in both Newcastle and 
Leeds that the process of governance involves many different actors and agencies, it 
is the local authority that is ultimately responsible for coordinating, framing and 
delivering entrepreneurial policy. 
Secondly, it is clear from the evidence presented that the shift to entrcprcncurialism 
is more complicated than it has often been portrayed in the literature. Chaptcr Six 
details how in Newcastle, the local political process has been moulded by its 
economic dependence on declining sectors. The 'cataclysmic' collapse of - flic 
coalmining, shipbuilding and heavy engineering sectors galvanised local public and 
private sectors into forging economic development partnerships. Ile severitY of 
economic decline demanded 6 level of entrepreneurial activity that was not matched 
in other parts of the country until much later. Its early shift to cntrcprcneurialism can 
therefore be characterised as largely a response to economic restructuring. 
In contrast, the Leeds' economy has performed comparatively well historically. It 
has not experienced 'any of the horrific glitches or cataclysmic events' (Director, 
LDA, LCQ that have affected other provincial cities in the UK, and so local actors 
and agencies have not experienced the same overwhelming need to coalesce in 
pursuit of transforming economic development strategies. However, the processes of 
economic restructuring cannot be dismissed altogether in Lceds. Ibc LCCI and the 
city's business leaders were stimulated into action by the onset of (intcr)national 
economic recession. Fearing that the city's economic standing would suffer, they 
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were keen to attract the attention of national decision makers in the financial services 
sector in an attempt to boost the economic fortunes of their own emerging sector. 
The shift to entrepreneurialism in Leeds was therefore moulded by cconomic 
restructuring processes, and how these distilled locally. However, the processes of 
change were soon dominated by responses to central-local relations. Chaptcr Seven 
highlights how the City Council were encouraged to adopt a more proactivc 
approach to local economic development by the imposition of the LDC by central 
government, whilst Jon Trickett was motivated by the need to respond to central 
government dictat. In order to become an MP, he needed to attract the attcntion of 
central goverment, and so, in collaboration with the LCCI and the Council, Trickctt 
created the flagship Leeds Initiative partnership and embarked upon a high-profile 
marketing and economic development campaign for the city. 
In all therefore, the shift to entrepreneurialism in Newcastle was stimulated by 
economic restructuring processes and could be said to have occurred as carly as the 
1950s and 60s. The equivalent shift in Leeds was influenced to a much greater 
degree by political restructuring processes and occurred in the 1990s. The picture 
that emerges from each city therefore does not parallel the oft-citcd, characteristic 
shift to entrepreneurialism in the 1980s, suggesting that the shift to 
entrepreneurialism is not as straightforward as it has often been portrayed in the 
literature. 
The evidence presented here supports the arguments presented in Chapters One, Two 
and Tbree regarding the need for an holistic interpretation of both local and extra- 
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local processes, and how these mediate contingently. For example, we have seen 
how in Newcastle and Leeds, both local economic and political conditions and 
broader processes of macro-economic restructuring and central government policy 
have been implicated in the locally distinctive shift to entrcprencurialism, Whilst 
recognising that these shifts are locally distinctive, both cities have of course 'tak-cn 
aýbroadly similar direction' (Harvey, 1989,5). Harvey (1989) cites a number of 
factors as to why this might be the case. These include the globalisation of capital, 
deindustrialisation, (inter)national recession, the 'rising tide of neoconservatism' 
(ibid., 1989,5) and the prioritisation of market forces, the hollowing out of die 
nation-state, and the increased salience of the actions of the local statc and locally 
dominant individuals, organisations and sectors. 
Within the literature, one strong theme argues that the shift to cntrcprcncurialism is 
intimately connected with the collapse of postwar Fordism, the subsequent transitory 
phase in the organisation of capitalism, and the associated search for new types of 
capital accumulation. In this sense, there is a danger that commentators may ascribc 
too much importance to wider structural imperatives. Equally of course, within the 
governance literature, there are tendencies to reify local agency. These; 
"bottom-up analyses tend to assign causal power to local political networks; 
and thereby suggest, unintentionally perhaps, that spatial variations in urban 
fortunes are merely a by-product of the geography of charismatic city 
leadership" (Jessop et al, 1998,6). 
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The case studies have therefore demonstrated empirically that governance analysis 
needs to be broadened to encompass the contingent interaction of both local and 
extra-local forces. The evidence also suggests that there has not been a 
straightforward shift from managerialism to entreprcneurialism; from a form of 
politics concemed with 'broad-based welfare and social policies' (Hubbard and I lall, 
1998,13) to a form that Prioritises economic growth and development. For example, 
the adoption of 'entrepreneurial-like' strategies in Newcastle as carlY as the 1950s 
and 60s, alongside 'a strong social welfare component, managed by the public 
sector' (Wilkinson, 1992,178), suggests that we are right to question the assumcd 
axiomatic truth that local governance prior to the 1970s was exclusively 
characterised by managerial politics. This would support Hall and Hubbard's claim 
that 'city goverrunents, to a lesser or greater extent, have always pursucd 
entrepreneurial strategies and played a crucial role in local economic development' 
(1996,155). 
As discussed in Chapter One, the literature lacks 'consideration of the cxtcnt to 
which urban governments can pursue both objectives in tandem or whether both 
modes can coexist' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,14; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). From 
the Newcastle evidence at least, it would appear that urban governments can indeed 
pursue 6 an amalgam of managerial (socially progressive) and entrcprcncurial 
(growth-centred) policies' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,14). 11is has not however, been 
the case in Leeds, and so in reaching this conclusion, we must not mask the variable 
nature of urban economic and political trajectories and the variable nature of the 
shift to entrepreneurialism. Overall therefore, the empirical findings suggest that we 
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should indeed be acknowledging a 'new relationship between entrepreneurial ism and 
managenalism' (Wilkinson, 1992,210). 
Thirdly, reinforcing this point further, there has been a growing recognition within 
both cities that the entrepreneurial strategies pursued have not addrcsscd the 
underlying social problems facing the city or the lives of those living in the city. In 
consequence, the governing 'regimes'. in Newcastle and Leeds have undergone a 
transition away from an economically-driven agenda towards one more wholly 
concemcd with social welfare, social equity and growth management. Both citics 
have therefore demonstrated a renewed concern for a form of politics that is based 
on income redistribution. This may suggest perhaps that Newcastle and Lecds arc 
entering another phase of governance, a period of 'after-entrepreneurial ism' perhaps 
in which governing bodies trý and seek a balance between those policies designed to 
foster local economic competitiveness and those designed to redistribute economic 
wealth. This may also reflect the ongoing search for a 'local institutional fix' to 
continuing crises, given that; 
"Local authorities appear to be increasingly required to engage in a proccss 
of near permanent institutional and organisational innovation in order to 
maintain the possibility (however remote) of sustained economic growth" 
(Jessop, 1998,92-93). 
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These findings again reinforce claims made by Hubbard and Hall, that there has not 
been a 'wholesale abandonment of managerial policies' (1998,14), and that there are 
indeed important continuities in the evolution of governance as well as change. 
Fourthly, as the policy emphasis has changed, both cities have cxpcricnccd the 
evolution of local politics from a form that parallels corporate or cntreprcncurial 
regime politics, to one that is more socially inclusive and far less growth-orientated. 
For example, we have seen how in Newcastle, in response to heightcncd intra- 
regional competition, Council leaders have become increasingly concerned about 
maintaining the city's role as regional capital. As a result, mther than continue to 
focus efforts on attracting new investment, they have strcsscd the importance of 
serving the needs of the economic activity that supports Newcastle's regionatroic. 
Consequently, there has been something of a redirection away from the 
entrepreneurial agenda that has for so long dominated the city and its 'regime', away 
from an explicit focus on growth towards one more concerned with sustaining and 
maintaining existing economic activity. Chapter Six concluded therefore that the 
current form of Newcastle politics more closely resembles that of a caretaker, 
maintenance, or organic regime; regime types which typically seek to sustain the 
status quo. 
In a manner similar to this, senior Council members and representatives from local 
academic, community and voluntary sectors, became increasingly disillusioned with 
the 'Corporate City' agenda that had dominated local politics in Leeds for seven 
years. The 'Corporate City' strategies came, under extensive attack, as they were 
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blamed for actually enhancing social polarisation and marginalisation across the city. 
Leeds City Council therefore initiated a change in agenda, from an economically- 
driven approach to one that was more concerned with redistributing economic 
wealth and tackling issues of social welfare. However, strong pressure from die local 
business community has meant that the governing 'regime' arc lcft trying to 
formulate an agenda that is an amalgamation of both economic and social issues. 
The form of politics in Leeds has therefore evolved from one that paralleled a pro- 
growth corporate regime or resembled a UK variant of a growth coalition, to one that 
is wholly more socially inclusive and incorporates elements of a socially progrcssivc 
regime. 
Finally, this thesis set out to specify the character and form of local governance 
arrangements that had developed in support of place promotion. Whilst rccognising 
the importance of specifying particular configurations of governance adequately and 
accurately, it sought to do this in a way that at least recogniscd the debates that were 
emerging at the time; debates regarding the shift away from the catcgorisation of 
regime types, towards a concern with specifying and understanding the practices, 
mechanisms and processes contributing to regime formation, maintenance and 
decline. In so doing, the use of conceptual models has not been dogmatic. As 
Chapters Six and Seven illustrate, if all the defining criteria of a particular typology 
have not been present, the conceptualisation as a whole has not been rejected out. 
right, rather elemcnts of the conceptualisation have been used to guide the analysis. 
For example, during the 'Corporate City' years, the governing 'regime, in Lccds did 
not resemble a US-style growth coalition in all respects, but some characteristics did 
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parallel the US experience, and may even suggest the emergence of a UK variant of 
the growth coalition. It is therefore important to recognise that the form of urban 
politics is often more varied than a single model will allow; 
"What is thus cvident about the changing naturc of urban politics in dic 
entrepreneurial em is that although the private sector is becoming morc and 
more involved, in the evolution and implementation of policy, the typc of 
partnerships which underpin entrepreneurial strategies arc morc varicd'than 
the original US thesis of the 'growth coalition' suggested" (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998,11). 
, 
Furthermore, owing to the proliferation of these typologies, several different models 
can be used to describe a similar form of urban politics. For cxarnple, growth 
coalitions, and pro-growth, corporate and entrcpreneurial regimcs all dcscribe a form 
of urban politics in which the pursuit of economic growth is prioritised ovcr other 
more social concerns. Analyses of urban politics therefore need to look beyond 
policy outcomes and examine the complexities of govemance. As Jessop ct al 
highlight; 
"Ibe limitations of regime approaches emerge clearly in their scvcral 
attempts to 'develop' local political analysis through proliferating case 
studies and through the purely taxonomic 'adjustment' of regime typologics" 
(1998,6). 
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In consequence, whichever model one chooses to use, it, is considerably less 
important than the accurate specification of the processes, stratcgics, actors and 
institutions that produce and define the historically and spatially contingcnt 
phenomena that is 'local governance'. It is this which is the object of investigation, 
rather than the search for a distinctive model of urban politics. Models of urban 
politics help guide the analysis, but they do not, in themselves, facilitate a rigorous 
examination of the complexities of structures, strategies and relations that produce 
particular forms of governance in particular places. In recognition of this fact, Ward 
(1996) wams us of the dangers of adopting a blinkcrcd approach to the use and 
application of urban political typologies, and argues that while; 
"the construction of typologies deepens the understanding of the breadth of 
possible policy alternatives, they do not, in themselves, say anything about 
the material processes that underpin regime formatioif' (Ward, 1996,434). 
In order to avoid the 'purely taxonomic' (Jessop et al, 1998) use of typologics, it is 
the actual strategies, structures and relations that drive the analysis in Chaptcrs Six 
and Seven, and not the particular conceptualisations of urban politics in thcmsclvcs. 
In this way, both the usefulness and limits of a variety of conccptualisations, and 
individual aspects of conceptualisations have helped guide the analysis to identify, 
describe and explain the emergence of particular forms of governance in particular 
contexts. Both case suidies have highlighted how the exploration- and specification 
of governance is not dependent on the use of these models. Rather, the accurate 
specification of governance depends upon the identification of the types of processes 
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surnmarised above. It is vital to specify who, what, why and when in rclation to the 
types of policies pursued and the governance structures supporting them. Only in this 
way, can the role place promotion plays in specifying contemporary govcmance bc 
identified and detennined. 
Chapter Three discussed how the specification of who does what, when and flow is 
often neglected or masked behind larger claims. In consequence, Chapter Tlircc 
concluded that in order to explain the restructuring of local governance, we must 
first and foremost adequately identify and describe the processes underpinning this 
restructuring. This thesis has therefore uncovered the processes 'beneath' the 
overarching trajectories of entreprcneurialism and governance, and has demonstrated 
renewed commitment to the accurate specification of the processes, strategies, actors 
and institutions that produce and define contingent forms of govcmancc in particular 
places. The examination of these processes has revealed that the shift to 
entrepreneurialism in particular places is more complicated than it has often been 
portrayed in the literature. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that models of, urban 
politics do not adequately capture the complexity of this slýift. 
8.2 Recommendations for further research 
Several avenues of investigation are revealed that would be of great interest to 
pursue. I will briefly review some of them here. This thesis has examined the shift to 
entrepreneurialism. using one of its integral features, the practice of place promotion, 
in other words, place promotion has been the vehicle of examination. In order to 
cxaminc the shift to cntrcprcncurialism morc comprchensively, furdicr rcsearch 
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could be conducted using a different vehicle of examination. For example, within 
local economic development, further research could perhaps specify the form of 
local governance arrangements that have developed around particular physical 
redevelopment schemes, information and technology transfer schemes, or the 
enhancement of skills and training. An alternative approach might also involve the 
examination of a characteristic feature of the managcrialist phase of local 
government (the provision of a particular social service) to cstablish the cxtcnt to 
which its structures and strategies have altered over recent years. As outlincd in 
Chapter One, place promotion is just one of 'the myriad ways in which new modes 
of governance are implicated in the economic, social and cultural transformation of 
Westem cities' (Hubbard and Hall, 1998,3). Over the last twenty years, many 
different policy areas have been implicated in the restructuring of local government, 
and partnerships have proliferated around all manner of policies, both within and 
beyond local economic development. The type of examination presented licrc could 
therefore be extended to incorporate these other policy fields. In this way, the extent 
to which local government retains a prominent role in other policy areas could be 
investigated. 
Equally, this type of analysis could be extended to incorpomte other locations. nis 
would facilitate greater insight into the distinctive nature of the shift to 
entrepreneurialism in particular places, and could highlight the extent to which other 
cities have also shifted away from economically-drivcn agendas to ones that arc 
more socially-orientated. The overall findings and conclusions of this thesis have 
derived from a national survey and the more detailed analysis of two provincial cities 
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in the north of England. VAiilst the survey provides a national context within which 
to locate the case study findings, growth trajectories are of course more varied than 
the experiences of just these two cities. Firmer conclusions could be made thcrcforc 
regarding the nature and extent of the shift to entrcpreneurialism, and the nature and 
form of governance if comparative research was conducted in more locations. 
For exaznple, further analysis might reveal the existence of morc 'growth-coalition- 
like models' (Harding, 1991,301), thereby supporting the notion of a UK variant of 
the growth coalition. Indeed, if research was conducted in several different locations, 
conclusions could be made as to whether there was any differentiation in 
cntreprcncurialism and govcmance betwcen the typcs of, and locations of citics. For 
example, between those who possess an important regional role, and those who do 
not, between those that have enjoyed relative economic success, and thosc that have 
not, and between those located in more northern locations, and those located further 
south. Research could also be conducted in smaller settlements. Vallcr at al 
(forthcoming) for example, have recently examined the politics of local business 
representation in three disadvantaged English towns. Analysis such as this could 
determine whether these smaller sized settlements are experiencing similar types of 
restructuring processes to the larger cities. 
Finally, whilst this thesis has explored and specified the form of local govcmance 
that has developed in support of place promotion, it has not assessed the impact of 
these forms of governance, either on the effectiveness of the policy itself, or on the 
locality. Again, Valler et al have recently highlighted how the relative cff icacy of 
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new governance arrangements remains 'empirically limited and theoretically 
underdeveloped' (forthcoming, 1). An avenue of further investigation would 
therefore be to assess the impact of these new governance and policy arrangements. 
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SECTION A- INTRODUCTION 
AI Name of Authority: ............................................................................................................................ 
A2 Name of department: .......................................................................................................................... 
A3 Name of respondent: ........................................................................................................................... 
A4 Job title: ............................................................................................................................................. 
AS 
(a) 'Place promotion' is used here to mean the deliberate use of marketing in the attraction of inward 
invcstmcnt and/or the development of new place images. According to this definition, would you say 
that your authority currently undertakes place promotional activities? 
Ycs Fj Go to (b) No [: ] GotoA7 
(b) Please indicate the level of responsibility your department has for the development and 
implementation of these activities? 
Sole F-1 GoloA6 Partial/sharcd F-I Goto(c) None [: ] Goto(d) 
(c) Which dcpartmcnt(s) sharc rcsponsibility for thcsc activitics with you? 
.................................................................................................................. 0 ........................... 0 *.. 0 
............................................................................................................................... GotoA6 
(d) Which dcpattment(s) have responsibility for these activities? 
....................................................................................................................... a ........... 0s0a 
.......................................................................................................................................................... * 
I ifapplicable, p1case couldyou pass this questionnaire onto the qforementioned department I 
A6 In what ycar wcrc promotional activitics first undcrtakcn? 
GoloA9 
A7 
(a) According to this dcrinition, is your authority currently developing place promotional activities, 
either in your dcpartmcnt or elsewhere within the authority? 
Ycs F-I Go to (k) No F-I GotoA8 
(b) Which dcpartmcnt(s) arc responsible for the development and implcmcntation of these activities? 
............................................................ .00.......................... . ........................................ 
I ifopplicable, please couldyou pass this questionnairc onto the qfo"menlioneddeparli? jent 
(c) Whcn will thcsc activitics bc implcmentcd? 
..................... oo. o .... 0........... o..... o.. o ..... o....................... 0........ GoloAlO 
2 
A8 
(a) According to this definition, has your authority ever undertaken place promotional activities over the 
last 5 years? 
Yes F-I Go to (b) No r-'j Go to end ofquestlennalre 
(b) Wbich dcpartmcnt(s) have previously had responsibility for place promotional activities over this 
period of time? .................................................................................................................................. 6 
............................................................................... 0a6................ . .......... 0* 
I .................................................... Go to end ofquestionnalre 
A9 
(a) Havc any othcrdcpartments within your authority previously had responsibility for place 
promotional activity? 
Yes F-I Go to (b) No r-ý GotoA10 
(b) Please name the dcpartment(s): ........................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... *6 6 
(c) In which year did your department take ovcrrcsponsibility for place promotion? ................................. 
AIO 
(a) flow many full-time staff (equivalents) are there in your department in total? ...................................... 
I low many of these are directly involved in place promotional activity? ............................................... 
(c) Please provide brief details of the posts directly involved in place promotional activity (for example, 
specify the year(s) In which posts were Introduced or ceased to exist, whether the number ofstaff 
directly Involved In place promotional activity has Increasedor decreased over the last Syears): 
............................................................................................... 6 .......... ....................................... 
......................................................................................... ................................................................. 
...................... 0 ................. I .............................. I ................. .................... ................................ 
....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
.................................................................................................................................... 0 ...................... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 4 0.6 ..................................... 
..................................................................... o ............. o .................. ooo............ o#.................. 
3 
All 
(a) I low much is your total departmental economic development budget? ................................................ 
(b) If it can be assessed, how much of this is spent on direct marketing activities (or equivalent policy 
area I istcd in your budget)? (for example, the design andproduction oftnedia aAertising lit 
newspapers, magazines, commercialjournals, promotional videos, fact packs, brochures, 
exhibitions andpresentations, stafflime involved In answering Inward Investment enquiries and the 
collation andpreparation of Information) ........................... 4 ....................... 0 ............... * ...................... 
(c) PIcasc can you scnd your annual financial statcmcnt in your rctum. 
SECTION 11 - PLACE PROMOTION. POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
BI Mat are the main aims of flie promotional activity conductcd by your dcparimcnt? 
............................................. 6 .......... 4 ....................................... 6 
................................................................................. 6 ................ 
............................................ oo.. ooo oo................... oooo o ............. 60.0- 0 ..................... 4 $. $ .......... 
112 Mat main factors stimulated the development of place promotional activities? 
........................................................................................................ 4 .......... f ...................... 
...................................... t ................................................................ 6 .......... 0.. $ ....................... Ato. 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................................................... . ................... 4 





F-I EA ibitions/Prescntat ions* 
F__j On-line services (Infernet1dalabave*) 
Postcrs/B il I boards* 





ED Otlicr - pleasc spcc i fy: 
............................................................................... 0... $ 0 .................. 0................. 6.. 
4 
114 Does your department carry out any of the following promotional activities? 
(a) business location service for inward investors (* delete as applicable) 
sitcs/prcmiscs* enquiry scrvice 
liaising with dcvelopcrs/planncrs* 
I iaising with ccntral/E uropcan government* 
liaising with local TEC 
arranging location visits for inward investors 
other - please specify: 
...................................................................................... 4 ................................... 4 ...................... 
............................................................................................... 0 
............................... to 6. 
(b) promotional exhibitions to domestic audiences 
to European audiences 
to global audiences - please specify: 
.......................... o .............................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................. 
0 .................................. 0 
othcr - p1caso spceiry: 
1: 1 
........................ o ........................................................................ 
o* ............................................... 
115 
(a) Does your department pursue promotional activities which attempt to aitcr/rcconstruct the image of 
the local area? 
Yes F-1 GO to (b) No F-1 Go to B6 
(b) Please could you briefly describe the particular images you are trying to dispel and the images you 
arc trying to promote? .................................................. * ..................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................ 04 
............................................................................................... 0 ............ 
*.. # ................................... 0 
116 
(a) Over the last 5 years, has place promotion become more, or less important as an activity within; 
your department: ............................................................................................................................... 
ý, our authority: ................................................................................................................................... 
(b) Please explain why you think these changes have occun-cd: ................................................................. 
....................................................................................................... 0 ................................................... 
..................................................... 6 
...................................... 60*.. s* 00 st 40 
............................. I ........... 6 ........... 0 ............................................................... 0 ........................ 0.. * 60 
............. 0 .......... 6 ................................. 
oo ................................................................ 0 .............................. 
............................................................................................................. 
0 .................................... 0 
-SECTION C- INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS 
CI Beyond the local authority, are there any other agcncics/organisations which arc directly involved in 
the development and implementation of local place promotional activities? 
Ycs F-I Go to C2 
C2 
No 71 Go to end of questionnaire 
Is therc any othcr organisation, dcvotcd entircly: Ycs -, No 
- to promoting your locality 
- to attracting inward invcstmcnt 
- to providing a busincss location scrvice 
If yes to the above, please could you provide brief details (for example, name, t)pc of 
organisation, year established, when became Involved in place promotion): 
........................................................................... 0$ .*................. 04 4.60 .......... 6.0 
6 ............................................................................................ 0................. 
4........... 44. t66 ............. 6 
0 ............................................................................................................................. 66e.......... *to 
................................................ 0. # ........................ 0.. $ .............. 0 4. ý ................... 6.0 0 b. 6.. b **. *ob* 
.......................................................................................... 4 .............. *.. b * os 
tg... o st.. o 4 6.6 
C3 111case could you provide brief details on any public-private partnerships that are involved In the 
promotion of your locality (for example, name, type oforganisation, year established. when became 
hivolved in place promotion): ............................................................................................................. 
06............................................... 0 .................................... t. 0 ......................... 0.00 #0................... 
................................................................................................................................................. * 
................................................................................................................................ 0.. $ 
........................................................................... o. * 0*................... * ................................. 0 0.4 
........................................................................................................................... *. 0 
60.............. *.. $. 
Thefollowing tables examine the nature and extent oflinkagcs between the various organisations 
Involved In the promotion ofyour locality. 
Please Indicate which letters apply to which organisallons. Multiple responses possible. 
For example: 
Organisation -, r, ýk Level of, -,,, 
Involvement 
-", Name of Institution/orgenisation' 
I A/E Organisation V 
2 11 Organisation X 
3 D/E ation Y/Organisation Z Organis. 
() 
Ai-c any ofthe Collowing private sector bodics dli-ectly involved in thc dcvelopment 'Md 
impIcincittation oflocd plue promotional 'Ictivilics? Please Could yotl pt-ovidC 111cir 11,1111cs and 
indicate their Icvel ofinvolvemcnt. Phwst, in(hcale which kuers appi'l, to which 01.. Sýani. wliouv 
Alulliple responses possib/c. 
A- Plays it leading role in the development and implementation of local place 
promotional activities 
It - Ilas continuous, direct involvement in the development and implementation of local 
place promotional activities 
- Ilas an on-going consultative role in the development and implementation of local 
place promotional activities 
1) - lists it specific consultative role in local [)far(- promotional activities 
F, - Participates in it 'promotional' public-privitte forum 
Private sector 1xvVI of Naine of instifution/organissition 
organissition ill% olvernent 















(b) Please specif . N, any other private scclor organ isat lolls' Involved, and ally o1hel. forms of III% (Avemellf, 
.... - ............ .................... ........................ ......................................................... 
.. I......... I .......... ....... ................... ......................................... 
I las this patlem of inv(dvenicni changcd ovcr thc last 5 years? 
Illost linpol-laill (ICNclopilicills, and whcll dicy occill-red: .......... 
. ... II... I ............. I ...................... I ....................... ............ ................ 
.................................................................................................... 
................................................................................ I ...... I .......... I. 
Ne. s. please ()tjjjllj(- 
........................... 
............. I ................. I .... I .............. 
7 
Are any ol'thc Following public sector bodies directly involved in the developmew and 
implementation ol'local pkicc promotional activities? Please could you provide their immes and 
indicate their level ol'involvcment. /)/t'(IS(' in(ficale which It'llers apply it) which orpinisalion. N. 
Multiple response, V pavvible. 
A- Plays a leading role in the development and implementation of local place 
promotional activities 
It - flits continuous, direct involvement in the development and implementation (if locall 
place promotional activities 
- Has an on-going consultative role in tile development and i ill plenlentation of local 
place promotional activities 
1) - Has it specific consultative role in local place promotional activities 
F- I'articipates in a 'promotional' public-private forum 
Public sector Level of Name of inst if tit ion/organisation 
organisalion involvement 






















II Icase specify aný ()I licr ptj I) I ic scctot* organisations invo I% cd, and any ollicr forms o I* mw I% Cillcl I 
........ I .................................................................................................................................................. 
.......................................................................................................................................... ... I 
I las this pallcun ofinvolvcnicnI changed over dic last 5 "cars? ............... 11 Nc,., p1cast. ()tllllflt. the 
most impoilant dcvelopinctils, and %%hen lhc. ý occurred: .................................................... .......... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................... I .................................... ............................................ 
................................................................................................................................................ I .......... 
C6 
(a) Are there any voluntary or community groups involved in the development and implementation of 
local place promotional activities? 
Yes F--j Go to (b) No F--j Go to C7 
(b) If yes, please provide brief details (for example, name, type of organisation, year established, when 
became involved in place promotion): ................................................................................................ 
...................................................................................................................................................... 0 
C7 Which organisation or group of organisations, if any, are responsible for the overall leadership of the 
development and implementation of local place promotional activities? 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
I Intend to follow up this postal questionnaire with face-to-face Interviews In order to gain more 
detailed Insight into the practical, institutional and political policy processes of place promotion 
within particular localities. Would you be willing to be interviewed at a time convenient to you (the 
Interview would last about one hour)? 
Yes 1: 1 No 71 
--- -- =====================-========-----------------=-------- 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
YOUR HELP IS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED 
Please return it in the SAE provided. 
It would also be most helpful if, in your return, you could enclose a copy of the promotional 
material given to prospective inward investors, together with recent figures on inward 
investments (if available), your current financial statement and your current economic 
development strategy/statement. 
===============================-=======-====--===-=---- 
